1 10 13 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/a2b0b259f64e507ee16caeac956ec4a6.pdf 9ca4cd1ca3c81cfbb2c6c85eec3fbc65 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image [14] p. ; 23 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Building China's Republic: Epic of Vision - Valour - Victory Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Chinese Communist Party; People - Politicians - Sun Yat-sen Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource G.H. Burchett and W.H. Burchett Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Moonee Ponds, [Australia]: Burke Print Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007-14-07 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0014 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 [1940]? https://ideasproject.org/files/original/a0f1056b5a0dea21f7ac19d324ba5031.pdf 979b676593ad7473a0af3aab76871fc4 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/eb4b03cf536653335c6cbf533ed00354.pdf 979b676593ad7473a0af3aab76871fc4 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Still Image A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 14 p. : ill. ; 18 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China and the U. S. A. Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; China - U.S. Foreign Policy; Communist Party Description An account of the resource This pamphlet is the text of a speech delivered on September 2 at the Coney Island Velodrome by Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, at the opening of the Communist municipal election campaign. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Browder, Earl Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived New York : Workers Library Publishers Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/7/2007 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0013 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1937 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/9f3afd4467031b905ac0c3bfa38caf96.pdf dc08e2a44caef3d4299c5e28d97f4ba3 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/611aa7223728b2875f62d4d4c2bd003e.pdf dc08e2a44caef3d4299c5e28d97f4ba3 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 47 p. : ill. ; 19 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China can win! : the new stage in the aggression of Japanese imperialism and the new period in the struggle of the Chinese people Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; People - Politicians Wang Ming; People - Politicians - Zhou Enlai; Sino-Japanese War Description An account of the resource Wang Ming described the tactics the Communist Party used against Japan. Transcript of pamphlet text: SptinsiY am of Wà ˆ ~ b y GrorgiIMritroff . . . .02 Unity for Spain, . Corres# wdence Between the C o m ~ u MIn ternational mid tba Labor tnd It b Happenhi a Spi CHINA CAN WIN! The New Stage in the Aggression of J apanese Imperialism and the New Period in the Struggle of the Chinese People BY WANG MING WITH A MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS BY MODERN CHINESE' ARTISTS WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 209 PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. ANESE MILITARISTS ON CHINA . . 5 CAN CHINA OFFER SUCCESSFUL ARMED RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION? . . . . . . . 1 1 HOW IS THE NATIONWIDE ARMED RESISTANCE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE TO BE ORGANIZED AND HOW IS ITS VICTORY TO BE SECURED? . . . . . . . . . 21 THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS . . . . . 39 209 PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. ANESE MILITARISTS ON CHINA . . 5 CAN CHINA OFFER SUCCESSFUL ARMED RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION? . . . . . . . 1 1 HOW IS THE NATIONWIDE ARMED RESISTANCE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE TO BE ORGANIZED AND HOW IS ITS VICTORY TO BE SECURED? . . . . . . . . . 21 THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS . . . . . 39 A MAP OF CHINA CHINA CAN WIN! BY WANG MING apanese usurpers have started a new large-n-' HscEale military offensive against China. The Chinese troops offer armed resistance to Japanese aggres-sion. China is in flames! Actually a Sino- Japanese war on a scale never seen before has already begun. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese militarists suddenly at-tacked Lukouchiao and were heroically repulsed by the 37th Division of the 29th Chinese Army. In order to gain time to bring up reserves and to conceal the true plans of its new military operations from public opinion, the Japanese militarists hypocritically declared that the events at Lukouchiao were an " accidental," " local inci-dent." However, subsequent facts have fully revealed the true purpose of the new offensive launched by the Jap-anese aggressor in China. THE CAUSES OF THE NEW OFFENSIVE OF THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS ON CHINA It has always been the dream of the ruling classes of imperialist Japan to establish their rule in China and completely to enslave the Chinese people. The history of the aggressive actions of the Japanese imperialists in 5 may be divided into the following four main Japanese war ( 1895) to the 14- 1918). During this time and on January 18, 1915, they presented Yuan Shih- kai with the so- called Twenty- one Demands, the satisfaction of which would have meant the virtual transformation of China into a Japanese colony. The third stage- from the ~ u k d e nev ents in iqai to the events of Lukouchiao in July of the current year. During these six years the Japanese imperialists seized three northeastern provinces ( i. e., Manchuria) and part of the territory of so- called Inner Mongolia ( the entire province of Jehol and six counties of Northern Chahar). The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol by Japanese im-perialism was a terrific economic and political blow to China. The fourth stage begins with the Japanese attack on Lukouchiao. The immediate and primary objective of this attack is the seizure of the five northern provinces of China ( Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shan-tung). The seizure of these five provinces would provide Japanese imperialism with rich sources of raw material and extensive markets, such as never were known in the 6 reference to Ethiopia and Spain as osition of waiting adopted by the helplessness of the fascist war incen-ce between Japan, ally, the absence, so far, of history of the Japanese Empire. However, the military operations of the Japanese troops in the Shanghai- Nan-king district show that this time the Japanese aggressor does not confine his plans to the northern provinces. The present military operations of Japanese imperial-ism, after the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol, signify a new stage in the execution of Tanaka's monstrous plan for the complete absorption of China and preparations for the seizure of India and Indo- China, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia and Australia, as well as preparations for a " big war" against the U. S. S. R., the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of securing the world supremacy of a Pan- Japanese Empire. " To conquer the whole of China we must first seize Manchuria and Mongolia and to conquer the whole world we must seize the whole of China." This is the idea of General Tanaka which the Japanese fascist mili-tarists are now attempting to carry out. The open intervention of the German and Italian fas-cist aggressors in Spain and the consequent aggravation of the situation throughout Europe, the policy of actual toleration of fascist aggression which the British govern-ting unity of action on the part of the interna-roletariat, against fascism and war, as a result of ion by the reactionary leaders of the Socialist ional of the proposals of the Comintern- these basic facts in the present international situation tenant peasants, oisie with the tarists, who are lea fascist militarists are seeking by their military adventure against the Chinese people to arouse a fever of chauvin-ism, to divert the attention of the masses from the in-ternal situation in Japan and to establish martial law, so that they may ruthlessly crush the revolutionary move-ment and all oppositionist forces. The Japanese militarists are pushing their offensive on China for the purpose of crushing the constantly growing anti- Japanese movement of the Chinese people. They have set themselves the task of destroying the cen-tral Nanking government, of smashing the forces of the united national anti- Japanese front and destroying its main participants, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. They want to behead and disorganize the resistance of the Chinese people, in order to make China their colony. However, we may confidently say that the brazen ag-gressors have miscalculated! China today is no longer what it was at the time of the Manchurian events. The Chinese people are prepared to offer determined resist- 8 ante to the Japanese militarists. This is shown by the recent declarations of the head of the Nanking govern-ment and Commander- in- Chief of the Chinese army, Chiang Kai- shek. Referring to the events at Lukouchiao, Chiang Kai-shek said in his speech at Ruling on July 17 that " the further development of the Lukouchiao events is a ques-tion of the life or death of China," and on July 30 in connection with the seizure of Peiping and Tientsin by the Japanese in an interview with the correspondent of the Central News Agency he declared: " Our whole people, seeing that the country is going through a criti-cal period, when our very existence is at stake, will fight to the end as one man.'' A portion of the Chinese troops and air force have already begun national defensive military operations in Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, Nanchang, Hopei and Chahar against the Japanese aggressors. A striking proof of the indignation of the Chinese people and its readi-ness for decisive struggle with the aggressor is the fact that all the organized anti- Japanese political and mili-tary forces of the country began to unite with unheard of speed. Thus at the conference of national defense in Nanking to which, for the first time, along with all the prominent military leaders of the country, the leaders of the Red Army of China, Comrades Chu Teh, Mao Tse- tung and Chow En- lai were invited, considerable progress was made as regards cooperation between the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other organiza-tions. Actually the general mobilization of military forces, including the Chinese anti- Japanese People's Red Army, for common struggle against the common national enemy has already started in China. CAN CHINA OFFER SUCCESSFUL ARMED RESISTANCE TO JAPANESE AGGRESSION? The Communist Party of China gave a clear and affirm-ative answer to this question in the first days of the Man-churian events. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese people share this standpoint. But many political and military men in China because of their " fear of Japan" and the influence of pro- Japanese elements for a long time opposed armed resistance to Japanese aggres-sion. To be sure, the advocates of this so- called theory of non- resistance become fewer and fewer each day. However, the complete refutation of their arguments is an inseparable part of the general struggle to organize real military resistance to the constantly increasing Jap-anese aggression. The advocates of the " theory of the impossibility of China winning" in an armed struggle with Japan main-tain that China, which is weak from the standpoint of military technique and industry, is as yet unprepared for armed resistance to a foreign enemy. If China at-tempts armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor it will inevitably share the fate of Ethiopia or, at best, of Spain. While arguing in this fashion they deliberately gloss over the tremendous difference that exists between China and Ethiopia or even Spain, from the standpoint of the forces and resources the country possesses for the struggle against the usurper. It is true that China is weak from the standpoint of military technique and industry and for this very reason all the great and even the small capitalist countries beat us. The leader of all peoples, Stalin, emphasized this weakness of China's in his report on the results of the 11 First Five- Year Plan. Comrade Stalin said that without industrialization the situation of the U. S. S. R. would be more or less analogous to the present position of China, " which has no heavy industry, has no war industry of its own and which is pecked at by everybody who cares to do so." The Chinese Communists well realize that the level of heavy industry and the military- technical equip-ment of the army are of tremendous importance in mod-ern warfare. But at the same time, as Marxist- Leninists, they recognize the truth, tested by history, that the out-come of war is decided by living people in the final analysis. In order to offer armed resistance to Japanese impe-rialism which is armed to the teeth, China must prepare. But how? The advocates of " the impossibility of China winning" reduce this question merely to the purchase of arms abroad and the increase of armament production within the country, for in their opinion until China shall possess the same armaments as her adversary she cannot offer successful armed resistance to the aggressor. The re- arming of China is of course necessary, but arguments that China cannot resist Japanese aggression until China's armaments correspond to those of Japan are utterly wrong and harmful. They are wrong for the very reason that China lags far behind Japan in this re-spect and the latter will not allow China calmly to catch up with her. The seizure by the Japanese aggressors of vast territories in Manchuria and Jehol, with their tre-mendous riches and resources, has already dealt a severe blow to China's defenses and now if China were to lose the five northern provinces in addition, as well as the Shanghai- Nanking area, its capacity to defend itself would be enormously reduced. 12 What does the loss of Manchuria, Jehol and the five northern provinces mean for China's defenses? It means the loss of over one- fourth of total population, over one-fifth the entire territory, nine- tenths of all the iron ore deposits, two- thirds of all the railways, four- fifths of all the coal mines and one- half of the total coal deposits, one- half of the entire production of salt. Obviously, if China cannot defend these rich provinces from Japanese occupation, she not only will deliver a huge portion of her population to the mercy of Japanese barbarian's. She not only will lose extensive territory that will facilitate hostile military operations. She not only will surrender her rich deposits of coal, iron- ore and salt and her rail-ways into the hands of her mortal enemy. She will at the same time be totally deprived of sources of raw material and the prerequisites for the development of her heavy and war industry. Furthermore what would the loss of Shanghai mean to China? It would not only mean the loss of the biggest economic, industrial, political and cultural city in the land, but also surrender to the enemy of the main mili-tary strategical center. It would mean opening the gate-way for the Japanese aggressor to all the rich districts on the Yangtse River. It would mean a permanent threat to Nanking, the capital of the Chinese republic. If the Chinese people cannot defend the Shanghai- Nanking dis-trict the aggressor will strike at the very heart of China. We must also tell the advocates of the " impossibility of China winning" that the purchase of arms and the reception of assistance from abroad largely depend on the powers of resistance and riches of China itself at the present time. It is a bitter truth of our times that no one considers the weak and those who do not defend them- 3 selves. And if after losing Jehol and Manchuria China loses its northern provinces, if it loses its important Shanghai- Nanking area, it will be weaker and poorer and then there will be less likelihood and opportunity of receiving loans, arms and other forms of assistance from abroad. If, on the contrary, China now seriously undertakes the armed struggle in defense of its territorial integrity and national independence, in the course of the struggle it can re- arm itself both with its ow11 resources and through the purchase of arms abroad. The clearest proof of this is the struggle of the heroic Spanish people against the fascist rebellion of Franco and the German- Italian intervention. The area of Spain is incomparably smaller than that of China; its population is twenty times smaller than the population of China. As regards industrial development Spain is one of the most backward countries in Europe. At the outset of its military operations against the fascist rebels the republi-can government of Spain had only irregular detachments consisting of poorly armed working people. However, as a result of the combined efforts of all the parties and organizations of the People's Front, and first and fore-most of the Communist Party of Spain, as a result of the solidarity and aid of the international proletariat and the democratic and. anti- fascist forces, in the course of a year's armed struggle the Spanish Republic not only created a regular army of half a million but also suc-ceeded in providing this army with modern military equipment. And if the comparatively small Spanish Re-public managed to organize its army and acquire the necessary armaments in the course of armed struggle, why cannot the enormous Chinese Republic do likewise? 14 If Republican Spain offers successful armed resistance to the combined forces of fascist Italy and Germany, why cannot vast China offer successful armed resistance to the armed forces of the single Japanese aggressor? For the Japanese aggressor, ' save for his military technical advantage in the first period of the war, as regards the remaining prerequisites for victory is inferior to the united national forces of the Chinese people. The advocates of the " impossibility of China winning" imagine that the weaker the resistance to the foreign aggressor the fewer the sacrifices for China. The irrefuta-ble facts of the history of Sino- Japanese relations com-pletely disprove this conclusion of theirs. In 1895 China offered armed resistance to Japanese aggression. Although China was defeated, her territorial losses were compara-tively small. In 19 14- 1 g the Chinese people offered determined opposition to Japanese aggression, as a result of which Japanese imperialism was unable to force China to agree to her enslaving Twenty- one Demands. In 1931, how-ever, the Nanking government pursued a policy of non-resistance in connection with the Mukden events. As a result, in a short time Japan occupied the whole of Man-churia and following that, Jehol. This is the biggest terri-torial loss that China has suffered in the last hundred years. In 1932 the Chinese 19th and 5th Armies, together with the Shanghai proletariat and the Communists, of-fered heroic resistance to the Japanese troops, as a result of which China saved Shanghai from Japanese occupa-tion. In 1936 the Suiyuan and Shansi troops heroically repelled the so- called combined Japanese- Mongolian- Manchurian troops and as a result the aggressor 5 was forced for a time to retreat from those provinces. And now, in connection with the new big Japanese military invasion, China is faced with the crucial alterna-tive of either seriously defending its national existence, which means life, or of not resisting Japanese aggression, which means death. The Chinese people must choose one of the two possible courses: they must either yield to the persuasions of those who maintain " the impossibility of China winning9'- take the course of non- resistance, for the alleged purpose of " avoiding excessive sacrifices'" and thereby sacrifice the whole of China to, the Japanese usurpers, or else they must take the course of the Spanish people, and even at the cost of temporary and partial sacrifices, defend the territory and the riches that have not yet been lost, and reconquer the land and the portion of the people's wealth that has already been seized by the aggressor, save the working people of China from the barbarism of the Japanese fascist military clique, save the whole of the Chinese people from enslavement. In other words China must either defend and recon-quer everything at the cost of partial and temporary sacrifices or else on the pretext of " desiring to avoid big sacrifices" actually lose everything, including national in-dependence, the people's freedom and the country's wealth. There is no mid. dle course. Departing from the false assumption of " the impos-sibility of. China winning'' the advocates of the " theory of non- resistance" further adduce considerations of an international character. In their opinion the external position of China is as yet unfavorable for armed re-sistance to the Japanese aggressor. Yes, the external position of China today is not as bril-liant as we would like it to be, from the * standpoint of our 16 country's defense. But Japan's position is no better than China's. The new Japanese aggression is not only a threat to the national existence of the Chinese people; it also menaces the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France, By its aggression Japan violates the Covenant of the League of Nations, the obligations of the Nine Power Pact and other international agreements; she facilitates the aggression of fascist Germany and Italy in ut Europe, she endangers the gen- '' Tl~ e si~ uation i5 now developing in such a way that to maintain peace thro~~ ghoutht e world ineans first and fore-most to bring about the defeat of the fascist invaders in Spain and China."* The aggravation of the external position of Japanese imperialism facilitates the struggle of the Chinese people. More than ever before, Japan is isolated in the interna-tional arena; her allies, the signatories of the so- called anti- Comintern treaty- fascist Germany and Italy- are in no position to provide Japan with military assistance to the extent that they would lf they were not involved by their intervention in Spain. It is unlikely that they will be able to extend war credits to Japan for they them-selves are in just as bad financial straits as their fond ally. And the struggle of the Chinese people against the aggressor and war incendiary in the Orient, like the strug-gle of the Spanish people against German and Italian fascism, is not oi~ lyth e cause of defending the country's own national existence and freedom. It is an integral part of the struggle of the whole of advanced and pro-gressive mankind against fascism and war,. for democracy * Georgi Dimitroff' Fascism Is War, pp. 12- 13, Workers Library Publishers, New York. 7 and peace. The solidarity and sympathy of the world pro-letariat and of all honest, peace- loving and democratic forces are on the side of the Chinese people. * Consequently, neither the internal nor the interna-tional position of China gives grounds for the assertion made by the advocates of the " theory of non- resistance" that China is in no position to offer successful armed resistance to Japanese aggression. However, it by no means follows that the struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressor is an easy matter, or that China's victory is guaranteed ahead of time. The armed struggle of the Chinese people for the preservation of their national independence encoun-ters tremendous weaknesses and diificulties, which it will require tremendous effort to overcome. The first basic difficulty arises from the far from ade-quate organization and unity of the national forces of China. Although as a result of the constant struggle of the Communists and the masses) as well as of the efforts of the progressive elements within the Kuomintang) the internal war has recently ceased, and the process of the peaceful unification of all anti- Japanese national forces has begun, the extent of this uriification is far from what is required for successful armed resistance to the foreign enemy. The many- millioned Chinese people who com-prise one- fifth of all humanity will become invincible only when they are united and organized into one irre-sistible national force. The second basic difficulty in the armed struggle against the aggressor arises from China's military techni-cal backwardness. Although the Chinese troops display devotion and endurance in the battle with the foreign invaders and are greatly superior numerically to the 18 WOMAN VOLIJNTEER BY JACK CHEN regular infantry divisions 01 Japan, they are far inferior to their adversary iron1 the s~ anclpoint of military tech-nical equipment. The Chinese air force, despite the con-siderable increase in the number of airplanes and the training of new heroic and skilled fliers, is not yet adeq~~ ate ' rhe Chinese navy is weak both numerically and in quality. The strengthening 01 the naval forces for pur-poses of coastal defen~ seis one of the urgent fighting tasks of the Chinese people and tlle Nanking government. The Chinese troops and the civil population are almost un-prepared for chemical warfare while the cannibalistic Japanese fascists have already begun to use poison gases aginst the Chinese people. Finally) in connection with the weak military technical equipment and lack of experience in modern warfare) the Chinese troops do not possess adequate military tech-nical experts. Although the experience of the Spanish Republic has shown that similar weaknesses and difficul-ties may be overcome in the course of the war, they are most keenly felt in the first period of the fighting. The third basic difficulty. of the anti- Japanese struggle lies in the fact that Japanese imperialism has had great experience in espionage and diversion, experience in de-ception) bribery and intrig~~ aeg ainst the oppressed peoples. In the course of decades the Japanese military political intelligence service (" Special Service Depart-ment"} has succeeded in planting its numerous agents: spies, diversionists) terrorists and provocateurs in all the more or less important military) strategic and political points and organizations of China, including a section of higher political and military circles. Many of these agents deliberately refrain from activity for the time 20 being) awaiting the opportune moment to strike a telling blow at the most vital points. Finally, the fourth basic weakness lies in the fact that because of the country's economic backwardness, financial poverty and extremely limited means of communication^ the Chinese troops will experience shortages and hitches in the flow of arms, ammunition and provisions and it will be hard to send up reinforcements and to secure the swift and timely mobility and mane~~ verincga pacity of the troops, etc. Yes, the difficulties and weaknesses of semi- colonial China in tile armed struggle with imperialist Japan are numerous and extremely serious. And it is therefore the task of the Communists and the Chinese people as a whole to find tlle means and the courage to overcome them. It would be a crime before the people to flinch from these difficulties and weaknesses. ' Today the entire Chinese people) save for agents of the Japanese, national traitors and hopeless cowards and chatterboxes, are no longer faced with the question of whether " China m~ ist or can offer armed resistance to Japanese aggression." Now China is faced with the one question of how to organize this armed resistance and how to secure the victory of the Chinese people in this difficult but glorious struggle for national liberation. HOW IS THE NATIONWIDE ARMED RESISTANCE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE TO BE ORGANIZED AND HOW IS ITS VICTORY TO BE SECURED? According to the information of the foreign and the Chinese press from the moment of the Lukouchiao events to the beginning of military operations by the Japanese troops in Shanghai) that is) prior to August 14, the Kuo- 2 1 mintang and the central Nanking government adopted the following measures in the interests of organizing re-sistance to the new acts of Japanese aggression: 1. Between one h~ indred and one hundred and fifty thousand men were mobilized in Hopei) Chahar and Shant~ ing to strengthen defense and to help the 29th Army. 2. The first conference of national defense was called. 3. An order was published reinstating Chang Hsueh-liang ( leader of the Manchurian army) as general) and readiness was expressed to reinstate General Tsai Ting-kai ( Coininancler of the 19th Army) in his post of command. 4. Under pressure of public protest headed by Madame Sun Yat- sen the seven arrested leaders of the " All- China Association of National Salvation" were freed. 5. Work was begun on military defenses in the dis-tricts of Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan) etc. 6. Commanders for the various fronts were appointed, Cliiang Kai- shek as Commander- in- Chief of all the Nan-king troops and Commander of the First Army, on the front along the Peiping- Hankow Railway; Feng Yu-hsiang) Commander of the Second Army, on the front along the Tientsin P~ ikow Railway; Yen Hsi- shan, Com-mander of the Third Army) on the Shansi- Suiyuan front . It must be acknowledged that although these meas-ures of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government do not yet meet the requirements of the situation and do not satisfy the country's defense needs) they are) never-theless, a big step forward by comparison with the posi-tion and policy of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government in the recent past. 22 Only after the Japanese attack on the Shanghai-king district did the Kuomintang and the Nanking gov- - - ernment begin more serious armed resistance to Japanese aggression. The near future will show whether the Kuo-niintang and the Nanking government, with the present coinposition of their leadership) will be'able to organize this resistance consistently to a victorious finish. We Communists earnestly hope that the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, after fully overcoming the resist-ance of the pro- Japanese elemenus, will lead the armed str~~ gglaeg ainst the Japanese invaders to a victorious finish, together with us and together with the whole Chinese people. The Communist Party of China for its part) deeply aware of its responsibility for the fate of the working class and of the entire Chinese people, has persistently advocated the slogan " Expel Japanese imperialism from China," which it advanced at the very beginning of Manchurian events in 1931, and, step by step) beginning with the Manifesto of August) 1935, and ending with the latest declarations regarding events in North China, it has offered concrete proposals) based on the policy of creating a single national anti- Japanese front by means of which the Chinese people will not only offer serious armecl resistance to Japanese aggression but will secure the victory. TVhat concrete proposals and demands do the Chinese Communists advance in their declarations and appeals? First) " the collaboration of a11 anti- Japanese parties and groups of China on the basis of the collab6ration of the Kuomintang ancl the Communist Party, to resist Japan and save the country." The collaboration of a11 parties and groups in China, based on a political agree- 23 p~~ blic. T'' here are now reports to the effec~ t hat the Kuomintang intends in the near future to reorganize the Nanking government in this direction, This is very well and we can only welcoi~ le it. But to hasten this work we must thoroughly expose various slanderous legends and wrong arguments. First of all the legends spread by pro- Japanese elements to the effect that the slogan for the Formation 01 an all- China government of national defense means the overthrow of the existing central Nanking % government is utterly false atld unfounded. It is slander and pro\- ocation! At the present time only the Japanese aggressor and his agents are interested in the overthrow of the Nanking government. We Chinese Communists openly declare that we sup-port the Kuomintang and the Nanking government and that we will fight Japanese imperialism together with them sho~ ildei- t o shoulder. * 4 wrong and scholastic assertion is made by certain incorrigib1e chatterboxes to the effect that the slogan for the formation of an all- China government of national defense means the formalion of a government which must necesisarily assume the title of all- China govern-ment of national defense and that otherwise it will not be such a government. Formalists! It is not a question of names but of essence! The assertions of those who say that the exi~ sting Nanking government has long since be-come an all- China government of national defense are also incorrect. No, the Nanking government has only now partially begun to carry out the tasks of national defense. But it has not yet become a truly all- China government of national defense such as the military situ-ation warrants and such as all advocates of a united anti- Japanesc national front demand. 25 The Nanking national government must become a truly all- China government of national defense and it can, provided it changes its policy in the direction of a determined struggle for national independence, for the democratization of the regime and ' the improvement of the material conditions of the masses, by removing pro- Japanese elements from the government and by drawing into the government the truly authoritative militant anti- Japanese leaders from the respective parties, groups and organizations, as the situation warrants and in conloi- m-ity with the wishes of the latter. Only this type of authoritative and fighting govern-ment, together with the convening of an all- China parlia-ment based on universal suffrage and universal demo-cratic liberties, can truly cope with the responsible, difficult and complex task of national defense, with which it is entrusted by 400,000,000 people. Onlv this type of allChina government of national defense can secure the universal mobilization of all the military, human and economic forces of the whole country for the sacred armed struggle of the entire Chinese people against the Japanese aggressor. The immediate liberation o all political prisoners, the repeal of all anti- popular and anti- democratic laws, the further amendment of the laws and conditions that govern the convening of the National Assembly, the radical alteration of the draft of the Constitution of the Chinese Republic, the immediate introduction of broad democratic liberties for all citizens ( with the exception of national traitors and Japanese agents), in a word the transformation of China into a truly united all- China republic- these measures will swiftly and effectively facilitate the establishment of mutual trust between the 26 ernment and thereby increase China's many times. obilization of all military di-nd the formation of a united all- China anti- Jap-army." A successful armed struggle against the Japanese aggressor requires the universal mobilization of all- China's military divisions and for this it is necessary to form an all- China united anti- Japanese army by uniting all the armed forces of China, i. e., all the central Nanking armies, all the provincial armies, the anti- Jap-anese people's Red Army, the Manchurian anti- Japanese people's armies, etc., with a single command, a single discipline, a single system of supplies and armaments and a single military plan for coordinating operations against the common enemy. The Nanking government and Chiang Kai- shek have I to a degree undertaken to form such an army. We natur-ally welcome this step. The Red Army and its command-ing and political staff, led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, has often confirmed its sincere readiness to enter the all- China united national revolutionary army as a component part, not only in words but in deeds. But the formation of a united all- China army has long been delayed because in recent years when the mutual struggle had already virtually ceased, certain leaders of the Nanking Army and certain Nanking politicians sought to utilize the slogan of the formation of a united national army in order to wetiken and reduce the fighting strength of the anti- Japanese national E ly. For example, they demanded the resignation ot me toremost, most capable leaders and organizers of the Red Army, Comrades Chu Teh and Mao Tse- tung, the reduction and curtailment of the size of the anti- Japanese people's Red Army, the removal of all staff leaders of all the divisions of the Red Army and the appointment of others, etc. Does this correspond to the general interests of the struggle against ' Japan and the cause of forming a united national army? According to the latest information the Nanking gov-ernment and the Kuomintang have already withdrawn several of their demands and the Red Army, in order to hasten the formation of the united Chinese Army and further the common struggle of the anti- Japanese front, has already officially complied with the orders of Nan-king on the appointment o its commanding staff and on the redesignation of the Red Army as a part of the na-tional revolutionary army. This is a big step forward in the formation of a united all- China army. Another serious obstacle to the formation of a united people's revolutionary army is the fact that some of the Nanking leaders have attempted, in the name of the formation of a united national revolutionary army, to weaken the strength of the local troops, while at the same time a section of the local military leaders, who have long been accustomed to regard their troops as their " personal capital," are reluctant to merge their military forces with the united all- China anti- Japanese army. We must frankly tell these military leaders in the center and in the localities that at the present time the national self-consciousness of all the fighters in the Chinese Army is constantly increasing. They realize that their sacred duty lies not in preserv-ing blind obedience to " their generals," but in conscious-ly performing the glorious task of defending the country and the people. Significant in this connection is the be- 29 havi~ orf the 38th Division of the 29th Army during the recent events, when its commander Chang Tsu- chung, a pro- Japanese agent, refused the request of his officers and soldiers that he order the division to resist the Jap-anese troops. Against the will of its commander the 38th Division, under the command of the best officers, volun-tarily went in a body to assist the 37th Division in de-fending the Peiping- Tientsin district from the Japanese aggressor. This is the ideal time to test all the military leaders of China. If under the present conditions anyone proves himself a traitor and a coward, if anyone opposes action against the Japanese, he will be despised by everyone as an unworthy military leader, as an unworthy son of his country. Fourth, " universal mobilization of the entire Chinese people." China's military force alone is far from enough for a truly successful armed struggle against Japanese im-perialism. What is needed is the universal mobilization of the entire able- bodied Chinese population, of all men and women, young and old, lor a common struggle to attain a common goal. The line of the Communist Party, which was expressed in its appeal of August I ( 1935), must become the direc-tive of mobilization: " Let those who have much money give their money; let those who have much arms furnish their arms; let those who have bread and rice give their bread and rice; let those who have good health give their strength and energy unsparingly; let those who have special training utilize their training. Let the entire peo-ple be mobilized in this manner!" Fifth, " the universal arming of the whole Chinese people." The military operations of the Japanese avia- 30 tion, infantry and naval forces have already shown with full clarity that in modern warfare the rear differs little from the front. Therefore we must arm our people with all the available weapons, that they shall not only be in a position to defend themselves at any place and at any time from the surprise attacks of the Japanese and their agents but may also provide the necessary aid to our troops on the front and carry on partisan warfare and diversionist work in the enemy's rear and on his flanks, etc. Right now the Nanking government and the local authorities must first of all arm the millions of working people of Shang-hai, Tientsin, Peiping, Hangchow, Wuhan, Tsingtao and other big cities of the country as well as the peasant masses of the northern provinces, the Kiangsu- Chekiang and Fukien- Kiangsi districts. The combination of the auxiliary operations of the armed masses with the mili-tary operations of the troops on the basis of a general military plan is the only way to secure the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from China. Sixth, " universal mobilization of the country's entire economy and the adoption of an economic policy of na-tional defense." Anyone can see the tremendous impor-tance of the universal mobilization of all the country's economic, financial and raw material resources in modern warfare. This task is especially urgent in China, which is backward economically and which must wage a long and dra, wn- out war on a vast scale with Japanese im-perialism. In this connection we Chinese Communists still have a lot of serious work to do together with our ally, the Kuomintang, in order to mobilize and organize the country's entire economy in conformity with the requirements and conditions of national defense. Seventh, " securing and improving the material con- 31 dition of the masses." The masses of China live in pov-erty, every year millions perish from hunger, floods, drought and other calamities. The chatter about the alleged impossibility of any form of improvement in die living conditions of the masses during the war- time must be discarded as a pernicious theory. Yes, in war- time it is difficult to improve the material conditions of the masses. During the nationwide defensive struggle people must endure great sacrifices. But the provision of elemen-tary living conditions, the improvement of the intolerable situation of the working masses during the nationwide armed struggle, is not only possible but is absolutely necessary in the interests of the struggle. At the present time hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers and employees who were previously employed in the Japanese enterprises have left their situations in sign of protest and as a boycott of the national enemy. But unemployment means hunger. Is it impossible to provide these hundreds of thousands of vanguard fighters with a livelihood? Of course it is possible. This year in many districts of China the peasants again suffer from drought and crop failure. Is it impossible to give elementary aid to the starving and impoverished peasants? Of course it is possible. We must also give sys-tematic aid to the many millions of unemployed and impoverished artisans, etc. Eighth, " the adoption of a policy of national defense education and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth." China has tens of millions of illiterate workers and peasants, and the system of education is far from satisfying either the requirements of the students them-selves or those of the state. Therefore in recent years China has witnessed a big, mass movement of the youth, 32 led by the best and outstanding scientific and educational leaders, advocating a policy of national defense educa-tion and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth. The main objectives of this movement are the fol-lowing: 1. The improvement of the educational system in the direction of developing the national consciousness of the youth and its determination to fight against the foreign enemy for the salvation of the country; * 2. The reorganization of the educational system to conform with the requirements of national defense and the training of specialists in the various fields; 3. Freedom of conscience and of study, struggle against the compulsory training of the youth in the spirit of ideas that are hostile to the people and to the nation; 4. Military training for the youth and the students; 5. The provision of work for those who have finished their studies and aid to students, etc. The Communist Party of China fully endorses this movement of the youth and the best section of the Chinese intellectuals, and it has included these demands in its own general program for a united national front of resistance to Japan and for the salvation of the country. Ninth, " confiscation of all the property of the Jap-anese aggressor and his agents and the destruction of Japanese spies and national traitors." The confiscation of all the property of the Japanese aggressor and his agents will deprive our enemies of an economic founda-tion in China; the means thus confiscated will go to defray a part of the military expenditures and to pro-vide aid for the anti- Japanese fighters and their families. It is generally recognized that. Japanese agents infest 33 the tang- and of other organizations, centrally and locally. ~ f the Kuomintang and anking government have definitely decided to wa armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor they not allow their apparatus to be infested by Japanese agents, especially in its most and dastardly traitors of the Chinese people, the Trotsky-ites, still carry on their filthy, subversive, diversionist and spying work on behalf of the Japanese secret service, with impunity, in Shanghai, Nanking, Sian and else-where? For it is a generally known and incontrovertible fact that the Chinese Trotskyites are employed by the Japanese secret service. Is not the counter- revolutionary slogan to the effect that China's main enemy is not Japanese imperialism but the Communist Party of China and the All- China Association of National Salvation directly dictated by the Japanese secret service? Is not the Trotskyite slogan of " an alliance with Japan for the struggle against the Communist Party and Chiang Kai- shek" a direct appeal of the Japanese aggressor to destroy the Communist Party and the Kuomintang? Is not the Trotskyite line " on the necessity of waging the national revolutionary war in China not only against Japanese imperialism, but at the same time, against all the imperialist powers" directed towards isolating China from Europe and America, in order to facilitate the Japanese seizure of China? Is not the Trotskyite propaganda of the notorious anti- Leninist theory on the impossibility of national revo-lutionary wars in the period of imperialism, plus the furious attacks of the Japanese- Trotskyite agents on the 34 slogan of the Chinese Communist Party for a national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism, a direct fulfilment of the Japanese instructions to preach the " theory of non- resistance" in China? Is not the Trotskyite slogan on the " necessity of simulta-neously waging a civil war against the internal enemy and a national revolutionary war against the external enemy" and the " impossibility and inadmissability of any united front between the Communist Party and the Kuomin-tang" a cynical application of the Japanese policy of " conquering China with the hands of the Chinese them-selves," and of not letting the national forces of China unite for the common struggle against Japanese aggres-sion under any conditions? The late national writer Lu Hsen was profoundly correct when he declared that " Jap-anese imperialism entirely welcomes the views of the Trotskyites in China." During the Sian events the Japanese Trotskyite agents headed by the bandit Chang Mu- tao made every effort to stir up war between Nanking and Sian. These same agents subsequently killed General Wang I- tse, a famous national hero who was the first member of the high command of the Chinese army openly and honestly to establish the united anti- Japanese front with the Com-munist Party and the Red Army. The Trotskyites, headed by the thrice- accursed rene-gades Huang Ping and Chang Mu- tao, receive $.~~ O, OOO a month from the Japanese secret service in North China to organize a so- called " new party" and to carry on their wrecking work. The Trotskyite representative Chang Mu- tao was included in the so- called delegation of friend-ship with Japan and went to Tokyo with the letter. The Trotskyiteis Shieh Nuon- shan, Cheng Hsiao- cha and the 35 blood- thirsty murderer Jen Tso- hsuan ( alias Yeh China) publish special papers and magazines, with Japanese money, which spread all kinds of slander against the Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the anti- Japa-nese mass organizations. Do not all these facts prove the full correctness of our great writer LLI Hsen who said that " by their conduct the Trotskyites are unworthy to be modern Chinese"? Do not all these facts show that the Trotskyites by agree-ment with the Japanese secret service are helping Japa-nese imperialism to seize China? Do not these facts prove that the Trotskyites are not only the enemies of the Communist Party, but the enemies of the whole Chinese people? All these facts fully confirm the words of the great leader of all working humanity, Comrade Stalin, to the effect that modern " Trotskyism . . . has changed . . . into a frantic and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversion-ists, spies and murderers acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states."* The Chinese people and international public opinion will judge the extent to which the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, as well as the local military and political authorities, are determined and prepared for armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor, by their attitude towards all Japanese agents and national traitors, including the Japanese- Trotskyite fascist agents. The government and the people of the U. S. S. R. have given us an example of how to fight against the foreign intel-ligence service and purge the state military and Party * Joseph Stalin, Mastering Bolshevism, p. 14. Workers Library Publishers, New York. 36 apparatus of these vermin, thereby strengthening its de-fenses and securing its rear in case of an attack by for-eign aggressors. Together with the above nine slogans and the de-mands on internal policy, the Communist Party also advanced the slogan on the " adoption of an anti- Japanese foreign policy." The Central Committee of the Con~ munist Party of China and the Central Execu-tive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, in their appeal of August 1, igyj, proposed a special point on foreign policy which calls for " the establishment of con-tact with all peoples that are hostile to Japanese imperi-alism ( with the Japanese working people, the Koreans, Formosans, etc.), for a common struggle against the com-mon enemy, the establishment of an alliance with all nations and states which support and sympathize with the national struggle of the Chinese people and of cordial relations with all powers and nations which maintain a friendly neutrality in the military operations becween Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people." And in one of its latest declarations regarding events in Northern China the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party proposed to the Nanking government that it immediately adopt an active anti- Japanese foreign policy, that it support the international peace front and that it enter all forms of agreements with other coun-tries which would benefit the cause of the anti- Japanese struggle. The application of the above measures in the sphere of internal and foreign policy will not only enable the Chinese people to organize truly nationwide armed resis-tance, but to ( secure the victory over the Japanese aggressor. 38 THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS The struggle of the Chinese people is entering a new period- the period of the direct organization of success-ful nationwide armed resistance to Japanese aggression. If in the preceding period the main task was to end the civil war in the country on behalf of a unanimous struggle against Japanese imperialism, now, when the armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor has already begun, the main task is to organize the nationwide armed resistance to the point of the complete expulsion of the Japanese invaders from China. If in the preceding period the Communist Party of China only succeeded in laying a certain foundation for the establishment of a united anti- Japanese front with the Kuomintang and with other organizations, it is now directly fighting for the speedy and the complete forma-tion of this united national anti- Japanese front, through the establishment of collaboration of political parties and organizations and the creation of a united all- China democratic republic with an all- China government of national defense and a united all- China anti- Japanese army. If previously the question of the organization of suc-cessful nationwide military resistance to Japanese ag-gression still faced the Communist Party in perspective, today it has become the immediate and urgent task. And from this it follows that if previously the Commu-nist Party of China concentrated its attention and its work for the most part on the Red Army and the Soviet districts and relied mainly on their forces, at the present time our Communist Party must not only concern itself 39 with strengthening and increasing the forces of the Red Army; it must also see to it that the best traditions and fighting qualities of the latter, as the most advanced, disciplined, and compact component part of the all- China army, are preserved. The Communist Party of China will not only be concerned with improving work in the So-viet districts so as to make them a buttress of the anti- Japanese struggle, but, relying on the growing revolu-tionary strength and might of the millions of working people all over China, it will struggle to transform other districts throughout the country into strong foundations for the all- China democratic republic. This means that in the first place the Communist Party of China must devote tremendous effort to the education and organization of the working class millions, who at the present time are again beginning to take an active and open part in the anti- imperialist struggle of national liberation as the most advanced, the most class- conscious and the most consistent detachment of the entire Chinese people. The Chinese Communists realize that work among the workers and among the trade unions in the main centers of the country was extremely weak in the previous period. Now, however, as a result of the growing class consciousness and organization of the working class and its activity and initiative, the mass influence and the base of the Communist Party grow and strengthen and the nationwide struggle against the Japanese aggressor will become more and more powerful. Second, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of organizing and drawing the broad peasant masses which comprise the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people into the nationwide and general 10 democratic struggle. The Chinese Communists realize that for all their rich experience of work among peasants, save in those districts where the Red Army was or now is, they have on the whole done very little to organize the peasants. Yet the more broadly and the more effectively the peasant masses are organized and the more actively they are involved in the revolutionary struggle, the stronger will be the anti- Japanese national liberation movement and the more certain its successful issue. Third, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of strengthening and extending its work among the Chinese youth in general and among the student youth in particular. The Chinese Communists realize that work among the youth is especially weak. The Chinese youth are deeply imbued with the spirit of national liberation; they take their stand heroically and devotedly on the front line of the anti- Japanese struggle and they are destined to play an important role in the struggle of the Chinese people for national lib-eration. Fourth, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of organizing its members and all honest revo-lutionary elements in all sections of the national revolu-tionary army in order to raise the fighting spirit of the army and strengthen revolutionary military discipline, to provide examples of heroism and self- sacrifice and to secure the mutual cooperation of the people and the army in the hard but historic struggle with the mortal enemy. Fifth, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of strengthening its influence and its work in Manchuria and Jehol. The Communist Party can be proud of the fact that Communists, despite great hard- 41 ships and tremendous sacrifices, work and struggle in Manchuria and Jehol. In the fulfilment of its great historical revolutionary tasks our Chinese Communist Party inevitably encoun-ters many difficulties. These difficulties are connected with the need for carrying on- ' . . the struggle against Japanese imperialism, armed as it is to the teeth- a crafty enemy which is cleverly dispersing the forces of China and making use of every internal struggle in this country for its own robber ends." * These difficulties also arise from the fact that in China there exist certain representatives of. the propertied classes, who like the French bourgeois leaders in the period of the Franco- Prussian war of 1870- 71, place the selfish interests of their classes above their national duty, who readily commit national treason and who, under certain conditions, will assist the foreign foe in his struggle against the Chinese working class, against the Chinese people. " But there are also internal difficulties in the path of the Communist Party of China. It has to overcome the resistance of sectarian elemenls, who do not understand that in the present conditions the only way to secure the liberation of the Chinese people is that of establishing a united national front against the Japanese violators. It also has to carry on a struggle against the opportunist capitulators who are ready to sacrifice the political and organizational independence of the Party and the Red Army, and to dissolve them in other organizations."** The first difficulty of an inner- party nature is cun- -- * See The Communist International, October, 1936, Georgi Dimi troff, " The Fifteenth Anniv ersary of the Communist Party of China," p. 1339. ** Ibid., p. 1340. 42 nected with the fact that in recent years the Chinese Communist Party has made a sharp political turn, such as was scarcely experienced by any other section of the Comintern. Instead of the previous armed struggle with h e Kuomintang, the Communist Party now fights for collaboration with the Kuomintang and the other organi-zations. Instead of the civil war of the Red Army with the Kuomintang and non- Kuomintang troops which lasted for nearly ten years, the Communist Party now struggles for the unification of the Red Army with all other Chinese troops in a united all- China national revo-huionary army. Instead of the previous armed struggle for the overthrow of the Nanking government and the establishment of an all- China Soviet government the Communist Party now fights for the formation of a single all- China government together with the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, for the formation of a united all- China democratic republic with an all- China govern-ment of national defense. At the same time the Communist Party openly with-draws its slogan of the Sovietization of China at the present stage of the struggle of the Chinese people. Although so far the Communist Party is making this political turn with con~ parative success it would be wrong to say that its ranks do not still include a consider-able number of people who, because of the sharpness of the turn, are caught in the snares of ideological con-fusion and practical error. Now more than ever before the Communist Party must carry on a most serious ideological struggle and improve the Marxist- Leninist theoretical training of its forces. The Chinese Communists, like true sons of their people, take their stand on the front lines, in defense 43 of China's national existence and national independence, but this does not mean that the Chinese communists have been transformed into bourgeois nationalists or that they have been dissolved in the ranks of the latter. There always has been and always will be an impassable barrier between the Communists and the bourgeois nationalists. While we take a most decisive stand in defense of the national interests of our people, we remain true revolutionary internationalists and consis tent proletarian fighters. While we declare ourselves, despite the differences in principle that exist between communism and Sun- Yat-sen- ism, advocates of the basic revolutionary slogans of Sun Yat- sen, of the best revolutionary traditions of the Chinese people, we Comnlunists never for an instant under any circumstances cease to be true followers of the Marxist- Leninist teachings. While we take our stand under specific historic condi-tions for the formation of a united national front with the Kuomintang and the other organizations on the basis of a common platform for a common struggle against a common enemy, we Chinese Communists will never, under any circumstances, even for an instant, tolerate the loss of the political and organizational independence of our own Party, or the concealment of our own Com-munist face and banner. " The Comn~ unist Party of China, while loyally and honestly fulfilling its obligations according to the agreement undertaken by it regarding the struggle against the usurpers, does not in-tend to take either the path of blind faith in its allies, or the path of capitulation."* * Ibid. While we actively favor the creation of a united all- China democratic republic and the calling of an all- China parliament, under the specific historic conditions, we Chinese Communists are never, under any circum-stances, elen for an instant, transformed into bourgeois-democrat, and we do not cease to be consistent advocates ol Soviet power and of socialism. The second difficulty of an inner- Party nature arises from the necessity of re- educating the old Party forces in conformity with the new tasks, of training and pro-moting new forces from among the activists and leaders of the mas- i revoliitionary movement who have devel-oped in recent years. The majority of the present forces o the Con~ n~ unisPta rty of China were trained and tempered in the civil war. Many of them are of peasant origin. They have had experience in armed struggle against the Kuomintang and its armies, but many of them iitterly lack experience in the struggle for the masses under conditions where there iis neither a Soviet power nor a Red Army and have not the remotest con-cept of the working class movement in big cities. There-fore the education of old Party forces in conformity , with new conditions and methods of work is a far from easy matter. A task of no less importance is the training and pro-motion of new forces, primarily from among the work-ers. In recent years many activists and leaders of the mass an ti- Japanese movement and the strike struggle have grown up and developed. It is among them that the Communist Party can and must recruit fresh forces and new reserves, its new fighting forces, directly linked with the broad masses and possessing new experiences of struggle and work. The Party has helped them and 45 will help them, for the Communists value every honest and capable son of the people. In the process of the national revolutionary struggle many of the present activists and leaders of the anti- Japanese movement will become acquainted with the theory and practice of Communism; they will draw closer and closer to our Party and will in the near future become sons and daughters of the great Communist Party. Some of them have already joined the Commu-nist Party of China. But not all active participants in the anti- Japanese movement can be Communists. The desire and determination to take part in the anti- Japa-nese struggle in themselves are far from sufficient to warrant being a member of the Communist Party. Com-munists are not only fighters in the national revolu-tionary movement but consistent fighters for the libera-tion of the working class and of all working mankind, that is, fighters for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet power and for communism. The third difficulty of an inner- Party nature arises from the fact that under the present conditions- the cessation of the internal war and the beginning of the nationwide armed struggle of defense- the enemies of the Chinese revolution, and first and foremost the Japa-nese secret service, will inevitably redouble its efforts to penetrate the ranks of the Communist Party with its agents, provocateurs, diversionists, terrorists and wreck-ers, who are recruited primarily from among the con-cealed Trotskyites, the followers of Chen Tu- hsiu, Lo Tsian- lung, etc., so as to destroy from within the power and strength of the most revolutionary and the most military party, of the party which they fear the most, the Communist Party of China. This circumstance is all 46 s because revolutionary vigilance and against provocation and espionage k and insufficient in our Party's ranks. ing the leading ones, do most serious and the Tremendous difficulties uggle to organize a na-nwide armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor, to a's national existence and the cause of gen-eral peace. The entire Chinese people, every political party and group, every political, military and public leader of China, is confronted today with a crucial test. The Chinese Communists, true followers of Marx, En-gels, Lenin and Stalin, the great teachers of the working class and of all working mankind, and worthy sons and daughters of their people do not flinch from these diffi-culties and will find the way to overcome them. To-gether with the entire Chinese people, with the solidarity and support of the entire international proletariat and of all progressive mankind, the Chinese Communists have confidently and definitely entered the big historic battles with Japanese imperialism for a great new, in-dependent, free and happy Chinese Republic! , - . y'^ < The News from China- No question about it- if you don't read the Daily Worker you don't know the news from China. b4 ;: yp4: i, 2G: 5TiTfgHd j., Â¥".." 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Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0012 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1937 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/c2b46156f47cc44d748e9466f250f29b.pdf d104cf411e7618f0a47066a91dda79a5 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/eaa02f470fe79c0f919ddb8273a82d41.pdf d104cf411e7618f0a47066a91dda79a5 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 114 p. : ill. ; 19 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China Defence League Annual Report & Survey of Projects 1939-40 Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Chinese Communist Party Description An account of the resource 4408.pdf Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource China Defence League Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Hong Kong: The Central Committee, China Defense League Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource digitized 2007-14-07 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0011 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1940 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/74ac8045db8306e34f57b460981e2fc8.pdf 1a071deeb5e8e091a34fe011e600f1f0 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 24 p. : ill. ; 21 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China League Against Imperialism Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Chinese Communist Party Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource International Secretariat of the League Against Imperialism Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived London: International Secretariat of the League Against Imperialism Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007-14-07 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0010 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1936 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/54fc3f9e2d69f716522f2e5ef85b374e.pdf fbbae532eafcba507739467f946bb14c https://ideasproject.org/files/original/b829713439497b51f5fc67fa81accddb.pdf fbbae532eafcba507739467f946bb14c Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 32 p. : ill., ports. ; 19 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China's Greatest Crisis Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; China - U.S. Foreign Policy Description An account of the resource A pamphlet by Frederick Vanderbilt Field describing relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Revolution, the Sino-Japanese war, and the need for American support of a democratic China. Transcript of pamphlet text: GREATEST CRISIS By Frederick V. Field ABOUT THE AUTHOR Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the Executive Committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on Far Eastern problems. He is also Executive Vice- President of the Council for Pan- American Democracy, and a member of the Editorial Board of New Masses. Published by NEW CENTURYP UBLISHERINSC,. , 832 Broadway, New York 3. N. Y. January, 1945 209 Printed in U. S. A. CHINA'S GREATEST CRISIS By FREDERICK V. FIELD ' W e remember that the Chinese people were the first to stand up and fight against the aggressors in this war; and in the future an unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and pros-perity not only in Eastern Asia but in the whole world." - PRESIDENTR OOSEVELT. What Is at Stake China is in the deepest crisis of its entire modern history. This is not the first time that the Chinese people have been threatened by internal breakdown, nor is it the first time that they have suffered from foreign invasion. It is not even the first time that internal conflict and foreign invasion have coincided. That in fact has been the customary pattern of Chinese history, from the Opium War of 1840 to today. What distinguishes the present crisis from previous ones is the character and intensity of the present war which de-mand a showdown inside the country. Chinese reactionaries have heretofore been able to trade space and principle for have been able to ally themselves with the nation's the price of delaying history and obstructing prog-this war foreign imperialists accepted a com-ise with Chinese reaction. They accepted a preferred cia1 privileges. For a variety of reasons they did to utilize military force to ravage, destroy and e Chinese land. Under those circumstances in the hundred years between the Opium War and the present war a Chinese nation slowlv and laboriously began to take shape. There was sufficient con-flict and looseness in the alliance between Chinese reaction and foreign imperialism to permit the growth of a formidable Chinese revolutionary movement. A section of the Chinese bourgeoisie itself led the revolution against foreign ( including Manchu) domination. The introduction of capitalism which came with the long period of foreign imperialism played a certain progressive role in struggling against and partly de-stroying feudalism. It is different today. The world has tightened. Imperialism in its most violent and decadent form, fascism, seeks to destroy and subjugate the world. Japan's specific objective in China is not to gain a preferential position or to obtain special privileges but to take over the entire nation. Japan aims to destroy the Chinese revolution. And it will either do so or be destroyed itself. There is no more room for compromise. This is, then, a desperate struggle for the Chinese people. A greater unity than ever before in Chinese history was estab-lished among all strata of the Chinese population in 1937. The reactionaries who allied themselves with the enemy at that time were a mere handful condemned as traitors. The great mass of Chinese people, bourgeois as well as proletariat, declared their loyalty to China in its supreme test. The nresent internal crisis has arisen because of the de- JL fection of certain elements from the ranks of the big bour-geoisie who have chosen to ally themselves directly with the forces of Chinese feudalism and indirectly ( though in some cases directly) with the invader. Should these elements remain in control of the Chinese government, China will remain backward. Should the present reactionary group remain in control the defeat of japan by China's allies will not save China from - p lung- ing- in to the dark regions of history. There is more than this at stake in the crisis of China. It may be conceivable that Japan could be defeated without any further active aid from China. But this is a thought not 4 ed. As long as there remains a thread of an such a costly and prolonged method of crush-ust be seized and woven again into the power-coalition warfare. Thus in a purely military ican and British people and all other members of the anti- Japanese alliance have a vital stake in the regen-eration of the Chinese nation. Moreover, there is no alternative to a progressive Chinese nation in the security organiation now being hammered into shape by the United Nations. The security that we look for-ward toaafter the cessation of military hostilities is one based upon the close alliance of strong, peace- loving nations, capable hen a crisis arises. Capable, indeed, of g in time of crisis. We look forward, leadership in commercial and political airs which will by example and conscious into modern life and high living stand-rd areas of the world. Without this we e such leadership unless it has itself the strong democratic nations? Can a function without the participation of a a? The answer to both questions is obviously in . The United Nations in peace as in war is an upon four major pillars. China is one of these. collapses an entire corner of the edifice crumbles ole is perhaps fatally impaired. r for a moment a world security organization which on without China in its leadership. There are a e, one- half the population of the world, inhabit-of China, India and the colonies of the south-d southeastern Asia. The whole area is now tly semi- colonial, all heavily weighted with st- war development to be supervised, to be reat capitalist nations of the West? If so you in your calendar that we shall most certainly of intense imperialism. That, in other words, to a basic relationship between the advanced capitalist nations and the colonial and semi- colonial peoples which in its nature nourishes the seeds of future conflict. The architecture of post- war world security requires the Chinese nation as an indispensable part of the foundation. It must be the new Chinese democracy which exercises leader-eration of the Chinese nation. merica we are beset with two more concentrated ar for expansion as Chi ing it. The othe ell and destructive as any other form of thought. In planning for our own 11 for a sharing of what the world Greece, Italy, Belgium, the Id colonial system, all these wo great industrial nations seeks to protect itself from a threatened no- punches- pulled trade competition from America by having recourse to reactionary politics. It is enough, for a pamphlet on China, to suggest the prob-lem of the Anglo- American difficulty without having to elabo-rate it. The point here is that the most certain way of resolv-ing the difficulty is to create a world economy in which there is enough and more, to go around, £ 01 everybody. The United States and Great Britain can and must reconcile many of their competitive problems. But the surest solution for both to adopt is the development of new markets large enough to absorb the exportable industrial capacity of both. That is where China is again a key to what can be done in the post-war. If China can take its place as a democratic nation which stimulates an expanding economy within its borders the chances of other areas, particularly those neighboring China. doing likewise is enormously enhanced. CHINESE SOLDIERS MARCHING TO THE FRONT 7 Our concern, then, in the affairs of our ally China is vital. We are inescapably bound with the immediate future of the Chinese people. We need them, as they need us, in finishing off Japanse militarist- imperialism. For this an effective war of coalition is absolutely necessary. Without a strong China crippled. Unless China adership to the billion peo- , that is, except the western nce would most certainly tagonisms? How can post-by the American people position to buy an expand-how, obversely, can China it is in a position to buy huge from us? And besides all that, is there the basic commercial conflict between Great Britain unless the world market ith sufficient rapidity to absorb the ex-s? Yes, our concern in China is indeed cter of the Chinese Revolution or an American, brought up, trained and modern and highly industrialized capitalist erstand the Chinese crisis. In historical terms of centuries between our two modes of living. ourselves in the position a formidable language Were we Americans of Washington's day, of Independence, an integral part of the closer to the Chinese of 11 far away, for the Chinese people are struggling barriers we, as colonists, never had to over- States, like China, came within the orbit of hich the Chinese have had 8 nialism. But unlike China the economy and society of ed States or of the colonies which preceded them er dominated by the feudal way of life. That is an and it is a montrous one. While we fought successfully against colonialism and after ridding ourselves of it formed a con-stitutional democracy which has ever since assumed a greater role in world affairs, the Chinese still struggle against the dual foe of feudalism and imperialism. To understand this it is necessary for us to view the Chinese revolution in historical perspective. In this task we are today immeasurably aided by the recent publication of a transla-tion of China's New Democracy by the leader of the Chinese Communist. Party, Mao Tse- tun?. This is a booklet which must be read for itself; it is too succinct to bear paraphrase. The following paragraphs, which depend largely upon that booklet, should not be regarded by the reader as a shortcut to the exceedingly important Chinese writing that is now available to us in a translation of the original. For centuries, until the imperialist invasion of the early part of the nineteenth century, China had been a feudal coun-try. Foreign penetration brought with it new forms of society. The nation gradually turned into a colonial, semi- colonial and semi- feudal society. The country's economy became orien-tated toward the relationships established by the victorious foreigners who by force of arms and the tantalizing bait of opium consolidated their imperialist position in the treaty ports, or centers for foreign trade. Feudalism retreated, but did not vanish, before the onslaught of capitalism. It is from this period that the Chinese revolution, historical-ly considered, may be said to date. In China's New Democ-racy Mao Tse- tung puts it this way: " This first step [ of the Chinese revolution] may be said to have begun from the days of the Opium War in 1840, i. e., from the time when the Chinese society commenced to change from its original feudal form to the semi- colonial and semi-feudal form. During this period, we have the Tai Ping Revo-lution, the Sino- French War, the Sino- Japanese War, the Reform Movement of 1898, the 191 1 Revolution, the May 4th Movement, the May 20th Movement, the Northern Ex-the Agrarian ~ e v o l u t i ~ tnh, e December 9th Move-the present Anti- Japanese War. All the above move-speak from a certain point of view, were for the realization of the first step of China's revolution. They were movements of the Chinese people in different periods and in different degrees to realize such a step- to oppose imperialism and feudalism and to struggle for the establishment of an independent democratic society. . . ." The Chinese revolution about which Mao is speaking in the above quotation and with which we are now concerned is the bourgeois- democratic revolution. It is the revolution through which England fought in the seventeen'th century, France at the end of the eighteenth century, and ourselves in the War of Independence. It is the revolution designed to win nationhood, independence from foreign domination, in-dependence from medieval internal obstacles to the develop-ment of production and a free market. It is, in short, the revolution to establish bourgeois democracy. MA0 TSE- TUNG AND CHU TEH, CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS The Rise of the Workers and Peasants The present stage of Chinese history, the stage of the war, is the continuation of the same revolutionary process which began over a hundred years ago. But following the first World War ihe revolution underwent such a sharp change that it is necessary for us to distinguish between two different stages, one prior to 1919 and the second from that date on. During the First World War the direction in which the world was moving changed. Two sets of events signified that change. The first was the breakdown of three imperialist na-tions, Russia, Germany and Austria, and the wounding of two others, Britain and France. This had a profound effect upon Chinese bourgeois thought which witnessed the foreign imperialists fighting among themselves and destroying each other. The second set of events which marked the new direc-tion of society was the construction of a socialist state by the Russian proletariat and the revolutionary movements which swept Germany, Austria- Hungary and Italy. These events awakened the sleeping proletarian, peasant and petit- bourgeois masses of China and stimulated them to share with a section of the bourgeoisie leadership of the revolution. The main stream of revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi- colonies which had previously flowed in the direction of world capitalism now joined the currents of the proletarian-socialist revolution. In these undeveloped areas organized proletarian and peasant movements sprang up whose mini-mum program remained the achievement of bourgeois democ-racy but whose maximum program reached toward a later stage of socialism. The revolutionary struggle in these areas found a new ultimate goal which gave a new orientation to the immediate struggle for bourgeois democracy. In China we see very clearly how this came about. It began on May 4, 1919, a date to be remembered in Chinese history. The background of the May 4th Movement was this: On May 7, 1915, Japan had presented China with the notorious Twenty- one Demands which aimed at nothing short of estab-lishing a Japanese protectorate over the whole nation. A 11 weak and corrupt government of feudalists and imperialist stooges in Peking faced with a Japanese ultimatum secretly agreed to a large number of these demands. As soon as the news leaked out great public demonstrations were organized in protest; May 7th thereafter became National Humiliation Day. During the winter and spring of 1919 the hopes of the Chinese people were greatly bolstered by President Wilson's fourteen points. When it was learned that the Peace Confer-ence was violating these principles and planning to hand over most of the Chinese province of Shantung to the Japanese ( part of the Twenty- one Demands) full realization of the tragic consequences of the Peking government's pro- imperial-st, pro- Japanese policy swept the intelligentsia. They organ-ized a movement designed to force the Chinese delegates in Paris to refuse to affix their signatures to the peace treaty and to demand at the same time democratic reforms in the govern-ment. Accordingly on May 4th several thousand students in Peking marched on the Presidential Palace demanding the punish-ment of the three politicians most responsible for the pro- Japanese policy. Finding the road to the palace blocked the students marched to the residence of one of the traitors where they found all three in conference. They set fire to the house and gave the traitors a sound beating. The next day most of the students of Peking went on strike. A boycott of Japanese goods was organized. The movement rapidly spread to other parts of China. From many provinces student delegations poured into the capital demanding that the government refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles, that it declare null and void the Sino- Japanese Treaty of 1915 which had embodied many of the Twenty- one Demands, that it pun-ish the responsible traitors, and that it grant the people free-dom of speech, assembly and organization. Early in June the movement was taken up by workers and merchants in Shanghai. It assumed a national character not only through the of similar movements through-out the country but also through its broadening to include, in addition to the intelligentsia, also the broad masses of the proletariat, the middle classes and the bourgeoisie. 12 We have devoted space to this movement of over twenty-five years ago because it marked an outstanding development in the Chinese revolution, the development which indicated the new directions which the revolution would henceforth take. What was that development? It was the broadening of the leadership of the revolution to include classes and groups other than the bourgeoisie. It was the coming forward into revolutionary leadership of the workers and petty bour-geoisie. From the May 4th Movement on the Chinese revolu-tion no longer was led solely by the bourgeoisie nor did it any longer aim for a society under bourgeois dictatorship. China had a new perspective: a bourgeois- democratic revolu-tion as a transition toward socialism; a revolutionary leader-ship composed of a coalition of all the revolutionary classes in which the workers and peasants would grow increasingly strong. In 1919 there was no Chinese Communist Party. There were, however, Communists. They were members of the in-telligentsia who had read Marx and Lenin and been pro-foundly influenced by the Russian Revolution. During 1 g 1 g and 1920 they organized Communist groups in various cities. In July, 1921, the First Convention of the Communist Party of China was held and the Party which was to play such a vital role in the nation's history was formally launched. This, however, was not the only sign of an awakening proletariat. In 1922, Hongkong seamen won the first major strike in Chinese history. The next year railway workers of the Pek-ing- Hankow line began a strike movement which threatened to sweep the country until brutally put down by the war- lord Wu Pei- fu who worked closely with the British. Other his-toric landmarks of the growing militancy of the workers were the May 20, 1925, incident known as the Shanghai Massacre, followed in June by a similar incident in Canton, known as the Shameen Massacre; the famous workers' blockade of Hong-kong for 16 months in 1925- 26; and the growth of the all- China Labor Congress from some 70,000 members in 1922 to over three million by 1927. Sun Yat- sen's Three Revolutionary Principles The second or Great Chinese Revolution took place during this period and as a direct result of the new forces which had come forward. It was in 1924 that the new forces of revolution inside China formally allied themselves with the new forces of revolution outside the country. From 1924 to 1927 was a period of cooperation among the revolutionary classes within the country and alliance with the Soviet Union; from this came the consolidation of the revolution through the great Northern Expedition of 1926 which wiped out the menace of warlord ism. There are certain characteristics of the unity forged at that time which have a direct bearing upon today's critical situa tion. For it was from 1924 to 1927 that the political program of the new Chinese revolution was agreed upon and put into practice. That program illustrates sharply the changes thai had taken place as a result of the influence of the World War and the Russian Revolution upon China. The program of the rev-olution up to then had been expressed by Dr. Sun Yat- sen's three PI1 n~ ip1o~ f s the people, known in Chi-nese as the San Mirs Chu I. These were the princi-ples of nationalism, democ-racy and peoplesy liveli-hood. As the instrument of the bourgeois intelligentsia before 1924 they had served the old phase of the revolution, the p h a s e which looked forward to bourgeois dictatorship. It was the genius of Dr. Sun DR. SUN YAT- SEN that he recognized the changes that took place in the internal composition of the Chinese revolution and exer- 14 cised leadership to have those changes reflected in a new political program to serve the new phase of the revolution. The new San Min Chu I integrated the three peoples prin-ciples with three revolutionary policies: alliance with the So-viet Union, cooperation with the Chinese Communists, and protection of the interests of the workers and peasants. It provided the basis for a coalition of classes in carrying for-ward the revolution. To the Communists it represented a minimum program, to the right wing of the coalition a maxi mum one, to all the classes cooperating with each other it was the basic political program for this stage of the struggle. CivilpWar and the Role of the Bourgeoisie The great revolutionary movement of I 924- 27 was de-serted by the bourgeoisie during the latter year. Once again, this time under the leadership of Chiang Kai- shek, the right wing forsook the revolution and allied itself with feudalism and imperialism. Under the aegis of this evil reactionary alliance the country was torn asunder by civil war for the next nine years. Hundreds of thousands of China's most valiant revolutionary fighters, drawn from the peasantry, proletariat and petty bourgeoisie were slaughtered in a succession of brutal " anti- Communist campaigns." It was because of this civil war that the Japanese enemy was able to penetrate so far into the life and land of China before a new unity was forged in 1937. The bourgeoisie, important sections of which had joined the revolutionary coalition of 1924- 27, betrayed the revolution and the nation by their desertion in 1927. Why did they do so? And what lessons may we learn from that period which illumi-nate the situation today? Mao Tse- tun? gives us answers to these questions in the following passage from China's New Dc-mocracy: Chinese bourgeoisie, being the bourgeoisie of a col-semi- colonial country, is extremely weak politically nomically, and exhibits another characteristic- the stic of compromise with the enemy of the revolu-e Chinese bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, l5 even in the process of revolution, is never willing to break with the imperialists completely, and being closely associated with rural land exploitation, it is also not willing, and is unable, to overthrow imperialism and feudalism thoroughly. Thus the two fundamental problems or tasks of China's bourgeois dem-ocratic revolution can by no means be solved by the bour-geoisie itself. Moreover, in the long period from 1927 to 1936, the bourgeois elements surrendered to the imperialists, allied themselves with the feudal forces, contradicted their former revolutionary program, and opposed the revolutionary people. Again, during the present anti- Japanese war, a part of the big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching- wei, surrendered to the enemy, illustrating a new betrayal of that class. . . " Revolutionary character on the one hand, compromising character on the other- such is the dual character of the Chi-nese bourgeoisie. This dual character was also seen in the European and American bourgeoisie according to history. To unite with the workers and the peasants to oppose the enemy . when the enemy is endangering them and to unite with the enemy to oppose the workers and the peasants when the latter are awakening is a general rule for the bourgeoisie of various countries, only, the Chinese bourgeoisie shows this character-istic more vividly. . . ." In these principles of the bourgeoisie of a semi- colonial country lies the explanation of the desertion of 1927 and the alliance of the Chinese ruling classes with the imperialists in the 1927- 36 period. During the years of revolutionary unity from 1924 to 1927 workers and peasants organizations had flourished under the protection of the new San Min Chu I. We have- already cited the growth of the labor movement, the mass demonstrations throughout the land, the strike actions, the growth of the Communist Party. To this it should be added that during the Northern Expedition the advance of the armed columns northward against the warlords and feudal strongholds became a genuine peoples movement. Peasant organizations supported the armies, fought with them, swelled their ranks. In the cities the proletariat carried the fight against the imperialists, allied at that time with the warlords. It being a characteristic of the big bourgeoisie " to unite with i 6 the enemy to oppose the workers and the peasants when the latter are awakening," this right wing of the coalition in the face of this awakening surrendered to the enemy. The New Anti- Japanese Unity of 1937 By 1936 the pendulum had swung to the opposite side.. The imperialist enemy, Japan, endangered the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The stage was therefore set, politically, for a resumption of internal unity. A large section of the bourgeoisie, represented by the government of Chiang Kai-shek, acceeded to the demands of the people for the formation of a national anti- Japanese front. The slogan of unity to resist the invasion had long before been advanced by the Chinese Communists. Only a few months after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, to which the Central Government had offered no armed opposition, the Chinese Soviet Government from its stronghold in south-eastern China had formally declared war against Japan. The popularity and correctness of this policy soon became apparent as the Communists and their armies undertook the famous " Long March" back into the western reaches of the country and north to a base in the upper part of Shensi province from which forces could be sent out to meet the Japanese. All along the line of march the slogans of the anti- Japanese front were spread, thus forcing the hands of the vacillating bourgeoisie from below. In the summer of 1935 the Communist Party issued a mani-festo proposing the establishment of an Anti- Japanese Alliance Army and a National Defense Government. Gradually, as these policies took effect among sections of the bourgeoisie and of the ruling Kuomintang party, the Com-oned direct political or military attacks upon t and appealed to its more enlightened elements ovement of national resistance. In the spring of Tse- tune. leader of the Communists, called uuon Chiang Kai- shek himself to participate in forming a solidna-tional front against the aggressor. The climax came in a dramatic split within the ruling circles, when Chiang Kai- shek's chief " anti- Com-munist" military represen-tative in the northwest, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, turned against his chief's policies and kid-napped him for the pur-pose of forcing democratic concessions from him. It was largely thanks to the speedy intercession of rep-resentatives of the Commu-nist Party that this episode, known as the Sian Inci-dent, was altered from a highly dangerous act of GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI- SHEK ercion and terrorism int demonstration of the integ-rity, patriotism and discipline of the progressive forces. Chiang Kai- shek's safe return to Nanking set the stage for unity nego-tiations which in the next months brought together a new coalition of parties and groups against the Japanese enemy. The courageous defense of the Chinese people against an enemy equipped for modern warfare and trained for the task of fascist conquest soon became a glorious page in history. Beset by a backward economy and untrained, poorly equipped forces, almost forsaken by their supposed friends, the British and Americans, who mistakenly aided the Japanese instead. the people of all clases rallied to the defense of their home-land. The unity which had been achieved was broader than ever before. One does not describe this period as one does the unity of 1924- 27 by referring to segments or sections of the upper classes joining the coalition. In 1937 all of the upper, middle and proletarian classes cooperated and those who deserted i 8 were singled out as traitors and often executed. Internal de-mocracy, in consequence, made rapid strides. Political prison-ers were released, there was an unprecedented freedom of speech and assembly, and certain steps were even taken to democratize the procedure of government itself. Mao says of this period, " a sort of cheering and inspiriting air pervaded every walk of life in the nation." W- hat had made this broad unity possible? The strength 01 the common enemy was unquestionably the most important factor. All classes in China were faced with disaster; the na-tion as a whole faced the greatest crisis of its history. Nothing short of broad unity could save the nation. With the rapid inroads being made by the Japanese armies and the unprinci-pled policies of exploitation and expropriation they brought with them none but the blind could have any doubts on that score. But it must also be said that China was better prepared internally for unity than ever before. The Great Revolution of 1924- 27 had left an undying heritage. The extensive direct contact which millions of peasants and workers had had with the Communist movement during the civil war period and especially during the Long March had advanced the political thinking of the masses. Even among the bourgeoisie matters had not stood still. Capitalism had enjoyed considerable growth. A Chinese capitalist class of some strength had de-veloped to challenge both feudalism from within and impe-rialism from without. Sections of the bourgeoisie were there-fore less dependent upon the feudal elements than before. Thus the bourgeois- democratic revolution, despite setbacks and contradictions, had progressed, altering somewhat the class composition of the nation. The Breakdown of Unity, 1939 lasted until certain elements in the bourgeoisie the awakening of the peasants and workers, or ifferently, the advance of democratic ideas and in-s a greater threat than compromise with the Jap- 19 anese. This coincided with the invader's advance into the great cities of Canton and Hankow. With their fall, in the late autumn of 1938, China lost to the enemy its last com-paratively modern city ports. With them was lost the economic base of the new capitalist class, for the institutions of capital-ism had been centered in the more modern cities and had not yet penetrated the countryside or the interior provincial seats. The balance of power within the bourgeoisie conse-quently shifted toward those elements whose power rested upon the feudal hinterland. From the winter o 1938- 39 on the unity of the Chinese people began again to disintegrate. There had been signs of trouble even before the fall of Canton and Hankow. In May, 8 , re actionaries within the government, fearing the rise of the new student movement, had destroyed all youth organ-izations by the simple expedient of compelling them to register with the government and then refusing registrations to those considered undesirable. Reactionaries had also begun to clamp down on meetings and newspapers. But it was during that winter that the signs of returning reaction and disunity be-came unmistakable. The prisons and concentration camps began to fill- not with Japanese, nor with Chinese traitors, but with patriotic, democratic leaders. Strained relations be-gan to develop between Kuomintang and Communist troops. In March of 1940 an armed clash occurred between Central Army and Eighth Route Army troops in southern Hopei. All efforts at conciliation on the part of liberal elements within Kuomintang China proved unavailing. Such armed clashes assumed a more serious character during the summer and culminated in the notorious New Fourth Army Incident of the fall and winter of 1940- 41. The New Fourth Army. orig-inally made up of scattered units of the former Red Army, had grown strong in Central China and was occupying highly important ground recaptured from the Japanese just south of the former capital, Nanking. This Communist nucleus had been reinforced by recruits from many other political groups and had established a guerrilla base of immense military value. In the fall of 1940 Ho Yin- ching, the Minister of War, who has recently been removed from that office, ord New Fourth Army to abandon that territory and move ward across the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. Was Ho Yin- c going to replace these troops with others so as to hold t vital territory from the enemy? Not at all. He was prepa to abandon the area to the enemy. In the face of the New Fourth Army's natural refusal to carry out such a command and its attempt to negotiate the matter with Chungking, Ho ordered Kuomintang troops to encircle and attack. This was partly carried out, a large and courageous Chinese force being cut to pieces, and the New Fourth's leader General Yeh Ting being imprisoned for his delay in carrying out this treacherous order. Fortunately, a large part of the New Fourth escaped and is today going ahead with the job of fighting the Japanese invader. Meanwhile the Central Government dispatched another strong force, well supplied with artillery and mechanized equipment, under the deceptive name of " pacification" forces, to blockade the Northwest Border Region upon which is based the main body of Communist- led armies and guerrilla troops. Five lines of fortifications were erected between that Region and the rest of unoccupied China. For what purpose? To pro-tect them against the Japanese? Certainly not. The blockade was established in an attempt to starve out the most effective ction of all the Chinese armies and to prevent any growth democracy therein established from freshening the pol-air of reaction in which Chungking China was being this period until the fall of 1944 the provocations of gking reactionaries kept the nation on the constant civil war. Evidence abounds that it was from no on their part that it has so far been factors which have prevented such a een the comparative weakness of the ue, divisions within the Kuomintang, the nists both politically and militarily, of the great mass of Chinese people and groups to any course which would mean 21 capitulation to the real enemy, Japan. But if the reactiona-ries have failed to provoke armed civil war they have succeeded in frustrating China's war effort against Japan. The nation, as a result, finds itself threatened with defeat. The entire anti- Japanese coalition, as a result, finds its task the more difficult, and the prospects of world security are dimmed by the clouds that have gathered in the Far East. Obstacles to the War Effort In order, however, to understand how a regeneration may come about it is necessary for us to list more precisely some of the results of the reactionary clique's rule since about 1940. Inflation is one of these. It 1s estimated that the average citizen of Chungking now pays more than 200 times as much for food, clothing and other essentials as he did before the war. Prices of many manufactured goods have increased 500- fold, other items go as high as a 1,000 per cent increase. At first persons with fixed salaries, the intellectual and profes-sional classes, were hardest hit, but for the last two or three years all classes have felt the pinch. As Maxwell Steward remarks in a pamphlet War- Time China, published during 1944 by the American Council, Insti-tute of Pacific Relations, even more serious to the war effort " was the fact that industrial production and construction had L begun to slow down. Manufacturers who had made contracts with the government found that owing to the constant increase in prices of raw materials and labor they could not afford to fulfill their contracts. They found it more profitable to hoard and speculate in raw materials than to turn them into finished goods. As a result, nearly a fifth of the small factories in the Chungking area were not operating in the early months of 1944. Mineral output had also been cut drastically, and be-cause of the extremely high costs of transportation, most construction, including the building of new industry, had come to a standstill." The Central Government had failed conspicuously in de-veloping basic war industries. An example is the steel industry. 2 2 For months Chungking has been asking the United States tu fly steel and steel products over the " Hump" from India. Apologists for the Chungking clique have asked: " How can our armies fight when we have no steel with which to supply them? The fault is not ours, it is that of American lend- lease." There is no secret as to why American officials have been reluctant to allocate much- needed space on the airplanes to steel and steel products. The reason is that while China produced only about 10, ooo tons of steel in 1942 and a little over 8,000 in 1943, it is well known that there exist plants capable of turning out ten and fifteen times that much if only the obstructions to the industrial war effort could be elimi-na ted. Large sections of the Chinese army remain dominated by feudal traditions. There are an insufficient number of trained officers, there is an overabundance of generals whose loyalty is to local feudal lords instead of to the nation. There is a conspicuous lack of democratic procedure in the armies of the Central Government. The troops prey upon the land and do not seek to defend the common people. As a consequence the civilians often fail to support the troops when a military crisis arises. Practically all first- hand reports verify the truth of these statements. The Central Government is made up of a number of rival cliques whose only common denominator is loyalty and sub-servience to feudal reaction. Each has its gestapo which, in turn, find a single common bond, that of ferreting out democratic ideas and those who advance them. Prominent among these is the gestapo gang run by the C. C. Group, which is led by two brothers, Chen Li- fu, until recently Minister of Education and now in charge of Kuomintang Party organiza-tion, and Chen Kuo- fu, head of the Personnel Division of Chiang Kai- shek's headquarters. Another such group is that headed by Tai Li who runs the secret police of the Military Affairs Commission. Both these gestapo organizations operate abroad as well as in China, keeping close track of the behavior of Chinese students and officials and falsifying- the true issues Democratic Ferment in Kuominfang China It would be a mistake if the conclusion were drawn from what we have so far written that things are all black in Kuomintang China. Even during the period when unity was disintegrating, the accomplishment of some of thelarmies and of the people has been tremendous. There has been constant public pressure against treachery, against hoarding and speculation, against the several gestapos which keep the clique in power. There has been insistent demand for political and military unity. It has been only in rare instances that the peasantry has become completely demoralized by the depravity of the feudal landlords and their government supporters. Throughout the nation a high level of patriotism and political understanding has been manifest. That is what has kept the rift of disunit from splitting China asunder. That is what un hope for a regeneration of our Ally. There is a tremendous democratic, anti- Japanese fer Much of it is necessarily expressed in terms of indivi heroism. The writings of such sympathetic observers as Agn Smedley and Ilona Ralf Sues tell us of many episodes which the real situation multiplies by the thousand and million. Organized political expression is difficult for the reasons given. Where it occurs, therefore, it is doubly important for having stood up against intimidation and terrorism. Much of the opposition to the reactionaries comes from within the Kuomintang itself. This Nationalist Party, once organized on a mass base, became restricted to the bourgeois-feudal bureaucracy after the split of 1927. It has never re-gained its mass base. Yet it remains broad enough- or, it u perhaps should be said that the reactionary clique remains - hsiang ( the "~ hristian" Committee of the Kuo-ittee, and Tan Cheng, uan. Many military leaders, General Chen Cheng, the similar demands. The small minority part should also be mentioned in t munist troops occurred, they h issues of unity and democratic willing to take the steps necessary to win the war, operate to frustrate the war effort. Included in their ranks and protected by them are outright fascists and pro- Japanese. But behind this bureaucratic facade is the great majority of Chinese people struggling for the right and the means to defend their homes, backing those leaders inside and outside the Kuomintang who are demanding democratic reforms. Democratic Leadership of the Communist Party GENERAL CHOU EN- LA1 The leadership in the national struggle for a democratic, anti- Japanese unity, is taken not by any of the above - mentioned groups but by the Chinese Communists. The reasons for this are plain. The Communist Party repre-sents the most forward-looking political elements in the nation. It is the party closest to the masses because it is composed from their ranks and is identified with the needs of the peasantry and workers. It speaks, also, for the petty bourgeois elements whose welfare is bound up with that of the peasantry. Since the period of the anti- Japa-nese War, moreover, the Communists are no longer alienated from those members of the landed gentry and of the city bourgeoisie who have thrown in their lot against the invader. The Conlmunists no longer de-mand confiscation of the land nor seizure of capital so long as it is put to the service of the war. On the contrary, the policy of the Communists is to support and encourage individual, private enterprise as a weapon not only to increase production but to wipe out feudalism. In demanding reforms from the Central Government the Communist Party, therefore, speaks for a coalition of classes already functioning. There are other reasons why the Communist Party acts as spokesman for all democratic elements of the nation. They have far greater strength than any of the other groups. They are relatively concentrated geographically speaking and they exercise leadership over large armed forces whom in nine years of bitter civil war the Kuomintang, with aid from abroad, was never able to defeat. The Issue in China Today The issue in China is not the Kuomintang versus the Com-munist Party. Nor is it Democracy versus Communism. Chi-nese reactionaries would have us believe that those are the is-sues. They speak of the " Reds" in much the same way that Martin Dies does in this country. They picture the spectacle of Communism sweeping Eastern Asia and of themselves as the shining knights of democracy. Such propaganda is picked) up by American reactionaries and spread in the United States. It is the line that Clare Booth Luce takes. It is the line of the yellow press. It suits all those, regardless of nationality, who wish to compromise the war. It is the kind of nourish-ment on which all who fear genuine democracy more than they fear fascism flourish. But the issue so stated is completely false. There is no group, least of all the Communists, which advocates Communism in China today. In earlier pages we have shown what is the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party. We have indi-cated that they stand in the front ranks of those striving to establish capitalism in China. It is true that their perspective reaches beyond today. The bourgeois- democratic revolution which they struggle to advance is historically but one step; it will lead, in due course, to the second revolutionary period of socialism. But that second step is not an issue of today, it does not figure in the battle of political unity in the war. It is as stupid to pretend that it is an issue as to say that because e right wing of the anti- Japanese front envisages an indefi-te tenure for the capitalist mode of production and strives for eturn to bourgeois dictatorship after the war, these bour-is elements should now be combatted. Nothing could be seless. who try to obstruct the progress of the war by saying issue in China is Democracy versus Communism make crude mistake. They would have us believe that the Chungking clique represents democracy! Who is so gullible as to think that forces and institutions which rest upon a foun-dation of feudalism, that oppose individual capitalist produc-tion, that ally themselves with the fascist enemy go by the name of democracy? The issue of China is between democracy on the one hand and an alliance among feudalists, defeatists; pro- Japanese and pro- fascists on the other. The stakes are the achievement of freedom and independence through participation in coalition warfare for the defeat of Japan or a return to an indefinite period of dark medievalism. There can be no other alternative. For, if one blockades the spread of democracy in China one inevitably helps the enemy. A Chinese cannot take the position that he is in favor of winning the war but opposes unity with the Communists, for it is a contradiction of policies. If he acts to obstruct unity he also acts to aid the Japanese. Similarly any policy which takes advantage of the plight of the peasantry, any act of speculation or of hoarding, any attempt to restrict production are direct contributions to the cause of fascism. Looking Toward a Solution It is not within the province of this pamphlet to suggest the concrete ways in which a solution can be reached. The condi-tions of solution constantly change as the Chinese situation and the international scene change. Terms advanced two years ago or even a few months ago must now be altered because the relationship of forces within China and between China and its allies have meanwhile changed. It must also be remembered that the solution is to be found within a country whose national condition is still that of being colonial ( in the occupied regions), semi- colonial and semi- feudal ( in Free China), and that feudal customs and institutions still dominate in most parts of the land. We should not therefore look for solutions which might be sought in seemingly parallel situations in our own country. One or two examples of this point are in order. China has a gigantic wartime problem in stopping inflation, in control- 28 and wages, and in managing its currency system. e done by Chinese equivalents of the OPA, the B and NLRB, or the Federal Reserve System? The answer is no. For these are instruments appropriate only to well-developed economies with a strung federal constitutional sys-tem of government. They are not applicable to a semi- feudal, semi- colonial country. In countries like China such centralized agencies are useful only to the most backward reactionary elements who use them deliberately for the purpose of bolster-ing their own power and preventing the accomplishment of the very objectives for which the agencies are purportedly established. Such, in fact, has been the recent history of China. We have . cited the critical need for utilizing all of the meager plant capacity China possesses for the manufacture of steel. Is this to be done under the aegis of a highly cen-tralized WPB? It is extremely doubtful that such an agency could have more than a most limited usefulness. The way to get production going in an undeveloped country is by indi-vidual, popular initiative rather than through methods which have been worked out in a highly organized capitalist state. Emphatically the material conditions for a centralized econ-omy do not yet exist in China. The foundations must first be laid. For a rough parallel we must look back to the early days in this country before an integrated national economy had de-veloped, when the economy depended upon individual and local initiative. It was only after such methods of production had established the necessary material conditions that the Federal government began to play any important part. In the field of politics we must also look forward to a marked degree of decentralization- not the decentralization ival feudal warlords, but that of the early stages of capital-ocracy. Chungking has raised this issue in de-the Northwest Border Region submit uncondi-authority. Chinese representatives of the Chung-n this country have tried to draw a parallel ituation in China and the acceptance by Presi-t of a new autonomous region in our own northwest under the leadership of American Communists! Earl Browder has exposed this fallacious argument in the following way: " The answer to such a comparison with America is that the United States has a constitutional democratic regime that has developed continually for over 150 years, while China's Chungking administration is neither constitutional nor demo-cratic, it is the self- constituted power of an extremely limited fraction of the Chinese population. To make any valid com-parison with American experience, it would be necessary to go back to our pre- constitutional days, and assume that a provisional national government in America had decided to wipe out all State governments and in their place to appoint administrations for all States and localities. This would need further qualification, that America never had even a provi-sional national government so entirely unrepresentative as the Chungking regime in China, for our Constitutional Congress was at least the beginnings of representative national govern-ment; yet neither it, nor the succeeding constitutional Federal Government ever dreamed of wiping out local self- government and substituting for it governments appointed from the center. Yet that is exactly what Chiang Kai- shek is demanding in rela-tion to the Northwest Border Region. The whole force of American experience goes to support the Northwest Border Region as against the extreme centralism and entire absence of democracy of the Chungking regime of Chiang Kai- shek; we know from American experience that our own nation could never have been united and become strong by applying the formula Chiang Kai- shek is trying to use for China." * Things have gone too far to permit the working out of China's problem within the framework of the Kuomintang bureaucracy. The military situation goes rapidly against our Chinese ally. The Chungking clique has proved itself in-competent to organize the nation to meet the emergency; it continues to place obstructions in the way of the war effort. This dangerous situation can be averted only by the forma-tion of a new representative government in which all anti- * Introduction to China's New Democracy, by Mao Tse- tung. Nev Century Publishers, 1944, 72 pp. 30 [ apanese parties and groups are given a voice and from which I all defeatists, reactionaries and pro- fascists are drastically I eliminated. The new government must be a coalition of all democratic elements. Patriotic forces within the Kuomintang must, of course, be included but the power of the Kuomintang bureaucracy must be forever broken. In order to form such a government the Second Peoples Congress held in Yenan in the middle of December, 1944, called for a national conven-tion of all anti- Japanese parties. It stated, " Our sole task is to cooperate with the Allies to overthrow the Japanese invaders." We Pledge Our Aid The interest of the United States is inescapably linked with the solution of the Chinese crisis. In the opening section of this pamphlet we discussed the factors which go to make up our vital stake in the regeneration of our Far Eastern Ally. These include the successful military prosecution of the war against Japan, the post- war market for American- made manu-factures, the problem of American- British commercial compe-tition, the stability of the United Nations world security or-ganization, and the immediate future of the vast colonial areas over which a democratic China could wield influence. Our government has not been unaware of this matter. It has been one of President Rooseveltys outstanding contribu-tions to the war in- the Far East that from the very first he has seen the necessity of a strong, unified Chinese nation. His was the influence which placed China nominally among the high command of the United Nations. His has been the leadership which has struggled to supply content to the shell of Chinese strength through helping to bring about the condi-tions of internal Chinese unity. President Roosevelt has asso-ciated the influence of the United States with the needs of the vast majority of the Chinese people, within and outside e ~ uornintane, for a government of all those elements in na willing to fight the Japanese under the leadership of ng Kai- shek. He has consequently lent our influence to ins for the ousting of the treacherous elements in the inese government and armies, in behalf of cooperation among all the military forces o the nation, for a high corn-mand capable of handling the problems of modern warfare, and to the strengthening of the ties among all those nations joined in the anti- fascist coalition. . This is a line of policy that deserves and, for its successful fulfillment demands, the enthusiastic support of all sections of the American public. It is a policy which is playing a powerfully progressive role in the Far East and in the war of the United Nations. It may even prove to be the decisive factor in turning the tide against reaction and in favor of democracy in China. A deep bond of friendship is being established between the American4 and Chinese people. Faced by a relentless enemy they have formed and are today strengthening a lasting alli-ance. In the early years of the war, before Pearl Harbor, the Chinese fighting without our aid, performed acts of heroism which have few parallels in history. For their courageous and farseeing sacrifice we shall forever remain indebted. Today these Chinese allies find themselves in the most dangerous crisis of their history. We are in a position to repay part of the debt and in so doing to make a momentous contri-bution to our joint war effort and to future world security. The American people must pledge every possible form of aid in behalf of the political and military tasks to which the demo-cratic- loving masses of China and theirpatriotic leaders are dedicated. spokesman for the Chinese Communists, is a work of historical importance . . . one of the essential documents for evaluating the current Chinese crisis . . . containing the Chinese Com-munists' long- time program and perspective for the liberation and development of that great n " on."- Earl Browder. W*...< I ,,-. . .^ ,' " No document more important than China's New Democ-racy by Mao Tse- tung, the revered, Chinese Communist leader, has' emerged from that nation since the beginning of the war. It is unquestionably the most significant contribu-tion to the foreign understanding of the problems and per-spectives of our Far Eastern ally available to us. . . . " China's New Democracy reaches the English- speaking public just as the Chinese nation faces the sharpest test of its history. If we thoroughly comprehend the lessons which Mao Tse- tung here teaches us, our efforts to support those , policies which will result in a regeneration of China will be immeasurably strengthened."- Frederick V. Price 25 cents . f w , ft , *' I^:. .'.'^; y '. -"" yTffqg!@ W, . , (,( Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Field, Frederick Vanderbilt Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived New York : New Century Publishers Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/7/2007 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0008 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1945 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/4edcf3d5112255ea28dbed950f4d568d.pdf 34f3e1456af6cc9f164ce4b0f9d73d54 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/d68564d9a6f90f0e01ba65103e33642b.pdf 34f3e1456af6cc9f164ce4b0f9d73d54 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 62 p. ; 18 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource China's New Crisis Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Kuomintang; Chinese Communist Party; CCP Description An account of the resource Key books ; no. 14. An overview of Chinese-Japanese relations. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Strong, Anna Louise Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived [London] : Fore Publications Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/7/2007 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0009 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1942? https://ideasproject.org/files/original/f9b90621c17df2d5beb116e21f545408.pdf 6c7ff2bb4e054daa28b511e051e038cf https://ideasproject.org/files/original/64307ad9d7d007535af2dcb81506b4d3.pdf 6c7ff2bb4e054daa28b511e051e038cf Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 96 p. : ill., 1 map ; 19 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Heroic China Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Second United Front Description An account of the resource A history of the Chinese Communist Party from its birth to the formation of the Second United Front. Transcript of pamphlet text: Other Books and Pamphlets on CHINA The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial . Countries~ WangM ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I0 Report to Seventh congress of the Conuhunist International. war in the ~ a~ ra s t ~ ~ eHn& r. y . . . . . . . .: . . I0 .. Bed China- President Mao Tse- tzmg . .; : . . . . . . . . OS W eSov iets and partisan areas di~ cqssedb y the leader of the Chineae Red Army. War in China- Ray stewart E,, mT4mm , w F~ v, Le ;, k,,! j5 * Yd'.,, " * v31 v *-, Chinese Toiling Women: How They &. q5Helping , the Chinese Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . .&$.&. .&. . a . 05 China's Red Army Marches- Agms Smedley. . . 1.60 Landlord and Peasant in Chinaxhen Hem- seng 2.00 The Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . + +. ., . ,. .7 5 *-. a ~ Order from your nearest booksbop or from WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS P. 0. Box 14<, Sta. D New York City HAPTER 1 The Semi- Colonial Position of China NA IS AN ENORMOUS COUNTRY. She has an area of 11 ,- ,000 square kilometers, and in size she is second only to the . S. R. She is larger than all the countries of Europe put ther. She has a population of 450,000,000. history of the Chinese people goes back 5,000 years. It uced prominent thinkers, brilliant generals and remark-inventors. It has created an extensive literature in the most d branches of knowledge. It has achieved enormous successes iculture and manufacture. Two thousand years before the t era the magnetic compass was known in China. The nese invented and used gun powder long before the Europeans. e Chinese learned to manufacture pnper in the second century present era and in the seventh century printing from type on boards was invented. In the eleventh century separate invented. For many centuries China was tal ware and dyes which preserved their and color for ages. The Chinese people are noted for achment to their country, their remarkable diligence and s, China today is one of the most backward is a semi- colonial country, and it is this that determines tion. The international imperialists are rending the living China and trampling upon the national sentiments of this reat people. The international imperialists are subjecting the vast illions of the Chinese toilers to ruthless exploitation and are them to poverty and starvation. ring and strengthening the survivals of feudalism in the international imperialists have made the condition s of the Chinese peasants absolutely intolerable. More d the best land at that, belongs to the land-lords. Bondage to the landlord, monstrously high rents, an un-le burden of military imposts and taxation, high usurer's t as well as the whole system of imperialist bondage and citation are utterly ruining the masses of the Chinese peasants. The Economic Backwardness of China agrarian country, but only 10 per cent of the total untry is cultivated. Not all the land is fit for culti-of the land that is fit for cultivation only 26 characteristic that in recent years the area ion has not been expanding but shrinking. system falling into ruin, enormous areas d are being transformed into deserts. Large tracts of land flooded and transformed into swamps because nobody trouble to regulate the flow of the rivers. The ruined ition to cultivate the land and are aban-present conditions the land cannot feed them. t, the area of land under cultivation is steadily ural country but, paradoxical as it may , she is compelled to import food, and 8 per cent of the wheat e requires is imported from abroad. Although she could produce bundance, she even has to import the raw materials ly developed flour milling and cotton industries. rich in natural resources, but only a very small part of eposits are calculated at 1 output of coal is only 00 tons are obtained ct that coal is to be osits very convenient for lated at 1,000,000,000 0 tons and the greater used to satisfy her own nomic backwardness ot China is evident from the cent of her cotton yarn and 40 per cent of her n on hand looms. Half the total consumption of is met with non- factory production. In coal mining ing, from 25 to 30 per cent of the workings are employing primitive methods. China makes hard-rich water power resources ( rivers), oil deposits deposits of non- ferrous metals for her own economic e population of China represents one- fourth of the total lation of the globe. She possesses rich deposits of useful raw share of the world output of these is as follows 1 . . . . . . . . . 0.6 Lead . . . . . . . . . 0.1 ore . . . . . 0 .5 Tin . . . . . . . . . 5 . 0.22 No. spindles . . . . . 3 ig won . . . . . . . . 0.35 Raw silk . . . . . . . IS. These figures strikingly illustrate the industrial backwardness oreign capital does all it can to retard the all- sided develo of the productive forces of China. In spite of this, e invasion of international imperialism has been ace he development of capitalist relationships and the growt hinese working class. At the present time there ar ndustrial workers in China, and over 12,000, OO 0 in the handicraft and domestic industries. The rking class is a very formidable force. The most compact unl the Chinese proletariat are concentrated in factories be1 oreign capital. The long working day, miserable wages, ployment, complete lack of rights, the absence of a aws for the protection of labor and national oppressio t of the Chinese workers. They have to bear international imperialism, i. e., ruthless ssion. It is not surprising, therefore ass is the most compact force and t t fighter in the national liberati The Imperialist Enslavement of China The international imperialists, having seized all the economic key positions in China, are retarding and distorting the economic development of the country. They own all the important factories and works. The control and management of the railroads and of the water and air transport systems are concentrated in their hands. They control the financial life of the country with the aid of their banks and the loans they have forced upon China. The imperialists control the customs and the salt monopoly. With the aid of the Chinese landlords, usurers and merchants, the impe-ialists have entangled the masses of the Chinese peasantry in a exploitation. After ruining the ancient and most important s of agriculture, MS., tea and silk, the imperialists are irecting the development of agriculture on lines that entirely uit their interests. By fostering and utilizing the survivals of m in the country, the international imperialists doom agriculture to a state of chronic crisis. h the aid of the bayonet the international imperialists are menting the economic enslavement of China with political vement. They subject the Chinese to incredible restrictions eir own land. The imperialist powers have unrestricted rule he so- called " leased territories" which they wrested from by force. They are complete masters in the so- called foreign oncessions and settlements. They maintain their garrisons on ese territory. They introduced the system of extra- territorial-nder which foreigners are not subject to Chinese law and t be tried in Chinese courts. Doing all they can to diminish reduce the political independence of China, the imperialists of the Chinese people into the state of mi- colonial slaves. Fostering and utilizing on of China in their own interests, the introducing a regime of colonial ter to the vital interests of the whole oppression and exploitation of the international se to a powerful national liberation movement masses of the Chinese toilers are realizing ore and more that it is necessary to wage a determined struggle or the complete economic and political independence of their try. Larger and larger masses of the Chinese people are rally-the call for the overthrow of the yoke of imperialism and e abolition of the survivals of feudalism. This movement grown particularly fast in the post- war period as a result of he inspiring example of the victorious great October Revolution ussia. In this period the Communist Party of China, the stalwart and consistent fighter for the national and social e Chinese people, entered the arena of the history of the revolutionary national liberation in China in the post- war years and the history of the ent of the Communist Party of China that we chapters of this pamphlet. CHAPTER I1 China After the World Imperialist War. The Birth of the Communist Party PEOPLE were strongly under the illusion that the over Germany would bring relief to China and that the unequal treaties that were imposed upon China d and annulled. As is well known, China belonged e group of powers which was victorious in the world im$- t war. Therefore she had the right to expect that the Versailles Conference would at least restore to her the Shantung ula and the Port of Tsingtao which previously had been by the Germans and which were occupied by the Japanese uring the war. At the opening of the Conference President Wilson promised that as soon as the League of Nations was estab-lished every assistance would be given to China to enable her to om her state of inequality and to help the Chinese bhc to become an absolutely independent and a great state. of these declarations and expectations the Versailles Treaty s 1 5 6- 1 5 8) sanctioned Japanese usurpation and formally ed to Japan all German rights and privileges in Shantung. he Versailles Conference the victors not only plundered entral Powers but, taking advantage of the ection of China, legalized the further partition avement of that country. n of May 4, 1919 Conference outraged the na-mese people, and as soon as the news ecisions reached China, a powerful wave ot popular up against the signing of the treaty, against the perialists and against the Peking government which consisted of representatives of the pro- Japanese Anfu clique. On May 4, 1919, a demonstration of 15,000 students was held in Peking. The students marched to the Legation Quarters and submitted a petition to the Ministers of the Allied Powers, de-manding justice for China. On that day the demonstrators wrecked and burned down the house of the universally- hated Minister for Railways, whom they denounced as a " traitor who had sold China to Japan". The government took repressive measures against the students in Peking and in retaliation the latter declared a strike. A stu-dents' union was organized, a wide anti- Japanese cam initiated and a fresh boycott of Japanese goods was d a result of the boycott Japanese trade with China nearly 40 per cent. This movement, and the boycott in part was supported by the Chinese bourgeoisie who mad a result of the reduction of Japanese imports. The Japanese movement, particularly in its first stages, favorably by Anglo- American capital, which hoped ment would weaken the position and curb the a Japanese capitalists in China. But despite the plan American and Chinese bourgeoisie, day after da umed wider dimensions an tical strikes broke out in various industria e of students', workers', and me country. Street demonstrations a idable character. re of the growing mass movement the Peking compelled to make certain concessions. It re-predatory Versailles Treaty. It yielded t demand of the students for the dismissal of the three most Ministers whom they regarded as the " betrayers of the i of China". Soon, Tuan Chi- jui, the head of the ment, was compelled to flee from the capital. In the so- called Coalition Government consisting of of the Fengtien clique and the Chihli group came The former were agents of Japanese capital, and the latter were pro- British and American. The Chihli group, headed by Tsao Kun and Wu Pei- fu, acquired more and more influence in the government, and in June, 1922, they removed the representatives of the Fengtien clique from office and filled all the ministerial posts with their own men. At first the Kuomintang stood aside from the rapidly grow-ing anti- imperialist movement. Notwithstanding the enormous influence it enjoyed among the masses, the Sun Yat- sen ora; an-ization was still at that time a conspiratorial organization which placed its hopes upon the " revolutionary generals". It is charac-teristic that when a delegation of students arrived in Canton and urged the leaders of the Kuomintang to support the nascent movement, Sun Yat- sen refused on the ground that the Kuo-mintang was weak. Influence of the October Revolution The great October Revolution in Russia gave a powerful impetus to the anti- imperialist struggle in China. Having made a beginning in the world proletarian revolution, the great October Revolution in Russia ushered in a new epoch in the struggle of the Chinese people for national and social liberation. It helped to rouse the class consciousness and to stimulate the organization of the Chinese proletariat. It increased the intellectual equipment of the Chinese revolutionaries and imbued them with confidence in their ultimate victory. It inspired them to wage a self- sacrificing and steadfast struggle for the fundamental interests of the Chinese people. The victorious struggle of the Red Army against the imperialist interventionists and Russian White Guards, the complete abolition of national oppression and inequality over the whole territory of the former Russian empire, the Soviet govern-ment's abandonment of all the predatory enslaving treaties im-posed upon China by the tsarist government- all this roused among the Chinese people enormous sympathy for the Soviet government and greatly increased the popularity of the U. S. S. R. It is true that the news of the revolutionary events in Russia reached China somewhat belatedly. For nearly 18 months China was cut off from Soviet Russia by the barrier of the Kolchak 12 and the Czechoslovakian and Japanese interventionist forces. Only after the Red Army had routed all the White Guard forces and had driven the interventionists out of the coun-try did news of the actual state of affairs in Soviet Russia begin to penetrate into China. It was then that China heard the his-toric appeal of the Soviet government to the Chinese people of July 25, 1919, in which it annulled all secret treaties by which the tsarist government had enslaved the Chinese people. The Soviet government abandoned all the conquests of tsarist Russia and offered to establish friendly relations with China on the basis of absolute equality. On September 27, 1920, the Soviet government again ap-d to the Chinese government to accelerate the establishment iendly relations between the two countries on the basis of lete equality and the mutual respect of interests. Enlarging on e principles of the declaration of 19 19, the Soviet government umerated the main points of the proposed agreement between two countries. The first point again repeated the declaration ( the government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet epublic declares annulled all treaties concluded between the for-er government of Russia and China, abandons all conquests of rese territory and all Russian concessions in China, and re-es to China without compensation and for all time all that s predatorily seized from her by the tsarist government and e Russian bourgeoisie". These declarations created an enormous impression in China; ey were greeted with enthusiasm by the progressive section of e Chinese people. However, on the instructions of the imperial-powers, the Peking government did all it could to put off negotiations with the U. S. S. R. and it was only on May 31, 1924, that a treaty was signed laying down the general principles upon which a11 questions between the U. S. S. R. and China were to be ettled. These principles reflected the thesis advanced by the Soviet government in its declarations of 19 19 and 1920. The Peking agreement between China and the Soviet Union of 1924- this only treaty which China has concluded on the basis of complete equality and genuine f riendshipwas welcomed by the Chinese people with tremendous enthusiasm. The Formation of the Communist Party and Trade Unions The year 19 19 saw the beginning of a workers' strike move-ment which assumed wider and wider dimensions as time went on. For example, in 19 18, the number of workers who took part in strikes was 6,500; but in 19 19 the number grew to 9 1,500 ( according to incomplete figures) and in 1921 it had risen to 108,000. In Shanghai, Peking and other towns, the strikes mainly affected Japanese enterprises. The workers obtained partial satis-faction of their demands. The first labor organizations were formed. In 1920 the trade unions in Shanghai celebrated for the first time in China the First of May. At this time various circles and societies sprang up among the Chinese radical intellectuals bearing very characteristic names such as " Regeneration", " The New Youth", " New China", etc. Among the progressive intellectuals a movement was started for the reform of the Chinese language. Translations of European literature, including Marxian literature, became more and more widely circulated. A modern Chinese literature also sprang up reflecting the influence of the growing revolution. Circles were formed for the study of Marxism and the experience of the Russian revolution, and evening classes, clubs, and political study circles were formed for workers. The First Congress of the Communist Party In the beginning of 1920 a group of seven persons who called themselves Communists gathered around Professor Chen Tu- hsiu in Shanghai. This group began to publish a newspaper for workers and set to work to form trade unions. In the middle of 1920 this group already had about 50 adherents in Shanghai. Soon, rade unions were formed in Shanghai for mechanics, printers textile workers. Simultaneously with the formation of the ghai Communist group, similar groups were formed in ing led by Li Ta- chao 2nd Chang Kuo- tao, in Hunan, led by ao Tse- tung and in Hankow and Wuchang headed by Chen - chiu and Tung Pi- wu. By the end of 1920 Communist s had been formed in a number of other important centers in ong Chinese immigrants in France. At first these da groups for the study of the fundamental prin-arxism. In these circles the first cadres of the Com-ovement in China were trained. Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in July, 1921. Thirteen delegate? were present, but not all were Communists. Among them were adherents of anarchism, legal Marxism, biblical socialism and casual fellow-travelers of the Communist movement in general. The very moderate program that was discussed at the congress gave rise to heated debate as some of the delegates regarded it ( particularly the points on discipline, centralism and the ultimate aim of the party) as being too radical. Nevertheless, after a long discussion it was decided that the party call itself the Communist Party and that its aim should be to organize the proletariat under the leader-ship of the party for the capture of political power. From the very first moment of its existence the Communist Party of China suffered severe internal shocks. The anarchist " Communists" broke away. In Peking only two members of the original group were left. In Canton the organization fell entire-ly into the hands of the anarchists and only after some time had elapsed was a new Communist group formed. At the same time the Party purged its ranks of people like Chen Kung- po and Tai Tsi- tao, who had temporarily attached themselves to the Com-munist movement. Subsequently, the latter became the ideological leader of the Right Kuomintang. The group of consistent Com-munists who were inspired by the successes of the U. S. S. R. fought staunchly for a disciplined Bolshevik Party and for a revolutionary trade union movement. The Workers' Secretariat formed in Shanghai under the leadership of the Communists became the center of the working class movement. Particularly strenuous work was carried on by Mao Tse- tung ( now head of the So government in China), Li Ta- chao ( who in 192 7 was tortured death by the militarists in the dungeons of Peking), tao ( now member of the Political Bureau of the C mittee), Tung Pi- wu ( now president of the Suprem the Soviet districts of China), Chen Tan- chiu ( no Commissar of Food Supplies in the Soviet Districts and other comrades. The activities of the Communists were facilitated by the general situation in the country, by the in-creasing activity of the workers and the growth of the anti- im-perialist struggle. The Washington Conference The growing popularity of the Soviet Union and the rapid growth of a wide national movement in China caused consider-able alarm in the camp of the international imperialists. At the same time Great Britain, and particularly the United States, re-garded the strengthening of Japan's position in China and her unceasing expansion as a direct menace to their interests in the Far East. In order to weaken Japan, to prevent the further growth of the liberation movement in China by means of a few con-cessions, to counteract the growing popularity of the U. S. S. R. and to foster the illusion that American capital had a " special mission" in China, the U. S. A. convened a conference in Wnshing-ton which took place from September 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. The countries represented at this conference were the U. S. A.. Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Portugd - a- n-- d China. At this conference the U. S. A. succeeded in securing the breakup of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, a partial limitation of the naval armaments of Great Britain and Japan and the d States. Unlike Great Britain and Japan, the United States no territorial spheres of influence in China, but she strives secure the economic and diplomatic subordination of the whole f China to herself and thus transform the whole of China into colony. Relying on her economic strength the U. S. A. resorts more subtle methods of imperialist penetration and screens by all sorts of liberal phrases. he only practical significance of the Washington Conference was Japan's undertaking to withdraw her troops from . But this obligation did not prevent Japan from send-ing more troops to Shantung as well as to other provinces in China. From the standpoint of the interests of the Chinese people results of the Washington Conference were miserable in-d; but the American imperialists did all they could to exagger-e the importance of this conference and to use it as a means f still further fostering the illusion that American capital was giving disinterested support to China. restitution to China of Shantung. Moreover, Japan undertook to transfer to China the Tsingtao- Tsinanfu Railway for the sum of 53,000,000 gold marks. But this transfer never took place. Nor did France keep the promise she made at the Washington Conference to restore to China the " leased" territory of Kwang-chow- wan. China was promised the right to raise her customs duties an additional 2.5 per cent, but the final decision of this was postponed for a special conference. As a result of the United States pressure the Washington Conference endorsed the principle of the " open door" in China and all the powers declared that they would abandon their efforts to establish " spheres of influence" in China. As is well known, these assurances proved binding neither on Great Britain nor Japan; but this formula fully coincided with the interests of the 16 at as were the hopes which the Chinese people placed on tnnce of the foreign powers, the results of the Versailles shington Conferences caused disappointment among wider ider circles. This was accelerated by the sharp contrast be-the policy of the imperialist powers and the friendly policy towards China pursued by the Soviet Union. e first to abandon all hopes of China receiving assistance mperialist powers was the Chinese proletariat. As its ns grew, its confidence in its own strergth increased, and the bitter experience of the struggle taught it to recognize who were the enemies and who the friends of the liberation move-ment. Developing the strike movement under the growing in-fluence of the Communist Party, the Chinese proletariat passed through the stern school of the class struggle and more and more confidently took the path of the revolutionary struggle in de-fense of national interests. The Hongkong Seamen's Strike notable incident in this struggle was the Hongkong ike which broke out just as the Washington Con-being held. It began on January 12, 1922, under the - cheng, who was not yet a Communist at the , was the recoghized leader of the Chinese and Canton. The principal demand the rward was for an increase in pay. At the end of 000 men were on strike. One hundred and sixty- six steamers of a total tonnage of 280,000 were held port. The strike spread to other branches of industry economic strike, it soon assumed the gle of the Chinese toilers against British ment of Sun Yat- sen which was in power openly supported the strike. Collections for ere made in all the towns of South and Central otwithstanding all the measures of repression taken by the g authorities to suppress the strike, the strikers stood gle the Hongkong government and the d to negotiate and on March 5 an ractically recognizing the seamen's union reases of pay ranging from 15 to 30 per the period of the strike. The strike revealed ized workers in the struggle against the first outstanding victory of the Chinese h imperialists assumed the character of a ary triumph of the whole of the Chinese victorious fight of the Hongkong seamen gave a strong he further development of the working class move-o the growth of the trade unions. lately after the Hongkong strike successful strikes were Shanghai seamen, textile workers, tobacco workers, ce employees. A strike of metal workers in Hankow 15.000 miners in the Province of Hunan also ended victories. ~ u r i Anu~ gu st, September and October, 1922, the principal railways of China went on strike. working class movement was crowned by ngress of Trade Unions held in Canton on this upsurge of the working class move-ommunist Party of China successfully developed its The Second Congress of the Communist Party he Second Congress of the Communist Party of China was n July, 1922. Twenty delegates were present. The Congress ed a resolution to affiliate to the Communist International. A program of action was adopted containing the following points: ( 1) To fight against the feudal militarists; ( 2) T o fight against the imperialists for the complete independence of the Chinese people and their state; ( 3) To fight for the creation of a united, federal, democratic republic; ( 4) To fight for the right of self-determination for Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang; ( 5) To fight for free speech, freedom of assembly, free press, right to strike and universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage; ( 6) To fight for an eight- hour day and other improvements for the workers; ( 7) To fight for the abolition of liki between the different provinces) an the establishment of a single tax o , rent law; ( 8) To fight for equal rig improvement in public education. This program, as well as other decisions adopted by the Con-gress, reflected certain weaknesses of the Party such as its in-adequate participation in the national liberation struggle, and its failure properly to understand the importance of the national and uestions and of fighting for the leadership of the masses asantry. work of the Party consisted mainly of teaching revolu-theory and organizing trade unions, primarily of the waymen, seamen, and textile workers. The Party carried on tensive work among the young people. In e guidance of the Communist Party, the F outh Leagues was convened in Canton. At tha eagues had a membership of about 4,000. The In ommunist Party rapidly spread amon e of trade unions, with a total me er the leadership of Communists. The ruggle and the revolutionary demon tariat began to cause increasing alarm among t f the Chinese bourgeoisie, among: the feudal mili titularly among the international imperialists who were only wait-ing for an opportunity to strike a blow at and crush the revolu-tionary movement. This blow was struck at the time of the Peking- Hankow railway strike. The Peking- Hankow Railway Strike In October, 1922, the capitalists started an offensive against workers' organizations. The textile and tobacco workers' strikes in Shanghai were suppressed by military force and the trade unions were broken up. In a short period eleven trade unions were sup pressed in Shanghai. The big strike of 40,000 Kailan miners, which was marked by two bloody conflicts, ended with the sup-pression of the trade union. But particularly sanguinary were the incidents in February, 1923. On February 1, 1923, a conference of railwaymen employed on the Peking- Hankow railway was to have opened. A day before the opening of the conference, General Wu Pei- fu, who had issued an order prohibiting the conference, ordered the military to occupy the premises of the union at Chengchow and to disperse the delegates who had gathered there. In retaliation a strike of railwaymen on the Peking- Hankow railway was called on Feb-ruary 4. On the evening of February 6 a joint conference of foreign consuls, the Chinese military authorities and representa-tives of the railway management was held in Hankow. At this conference it was decided to suppress the strike by military force. Next day in Changhsintien, Chengchow and Hankow the troops opened fire upon crowds of workers. Mass arrests were made. Workers who refused to resume work immediately were beaten to death. All the workers' organizations were suppressed. The heroic conduct during the strike and at the time of their execution of Lin Hsiang- chien, chairman of the railwaymen's union, and the lawyer Shi Yang, roused the admiration of large masses of the Chinese people and will live forever as one of the most glorious pages in the history of the struggle of the working class of China and of its Communist Party. Notwithstanding the unexampled firmness and courage dis-played by the workers, the February strike ended in defeat. But from this defeat the Chinese proletariat learned a lesson. 20 shooting down of the workers dispersed all illusions con-ing Wu Pei- fu, whom hitherto a number of workers' organ-ons regarded as a " friend of the workers" and as " being in avor of working class legislation". It became clear to every orker that Wu Pei- fu was the servant of the foreign capitalists. he Chinese learned from their own experience that their struggle for economic demands must be linked up with the PO-litical struggle against the rule of international imperialism and against the tyranny of the Chinese militarists who acted as the tools of the imperialists in enslaving China. The workers realized that they could achieve victory and secure an improvement in their conditions only if they built up strong organizations. he Third Coqress of the Communist Party fter the events of February 7, 1923, the trade union move-in China outwardly seemed to decline. As a matter of fact rade unions went underground, and in the course of 1923 and 1924 they successfully developed their activities in organizing the masses of the workers. At that time the trade unions already embraced a considerable section of the workers in the most im-portant centers of the country. The Communist organizations also spread all over the country. At that time the membership of the Communist Party reached 400. The small and exclusive propaganda groups which had comprised the Party up to now began to grow into a mass political party. n important part in this was played by the Third Congress Party which was held in Canton in June, 1923. The very sharply raised the question of the Party taking a more active part in the growing national liberation movement. Neither at the Second Congress of the Party nor at the Party Conference held at Western Lake in February, 1923, was the question of creating a united anti- imperialist front and of the Communists joining the Kuomintang settled definitely. The Third Congress of the Party was guided by the special decision of the Executive Committee of the Communist International of January 12, 1923, which stated: " The only important national- revolutionary group in China is the Kuomintang which relies partly on the liberal democratic bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and partly on the intellectuals and workers. Insofar as the independent working class movement in the country is still weak, insofar as the central task confronting China is to carry out the national revolu-tion against the imperialists and their feudal agents within the country, and insofar as the working class is directly interested in the solution of this national- revolutionary problem but is not yet sufficiently differentiated as an absolutely independent social force- the E. C. C. I. considers that it is necessary to coordinate the activities of the Kuomintang and of the Young Communist Party of China." proposing that the Communists join and work inside intang the E. C. C. I. at the same time called upon the eserve its complete political and organizational in-from all other political groups. The resolution stated: orting the Kuomintang in all campaigns on the national-ont as long as that party pursues an objectively correct munist Party of China must not merge with it and must campaigns furl its own banner." ry. It is particularly important to point to this defect in gram because in a special instruction sent by the E. C. C. I. Third Congress of the Communist Party emphasis was id on the primary importance of a correct solution of the problems, and the fundamental slogans of the agrarian on, primarily the confiscation of the landlords' land for enefit of the peasantry without compensation, were indicated. e instruction on this point read as follows: " The national revolution in China and the creation of an anti- imperialist necessarily be accompanied by an agrarian revolution of the against the survivals of feudalism. This revolution can be suc-cessful only if it succeeds in sweeping in the bulk of the Chinese population - t h e parcelized peasantry. . . . The Communist Party, as the party of the working class, must therefore strive to establish an alliance between the workers and the peasants. This can be achieved only by unceasingly carrying on propaganda for and carrying out the slogans of the agrarian revolution, such as the confiscation of the land of the landlords, the mon-asteries and churches and their distribution gratis among the peasants, the abolition of starvation rent, the abolition of the present system of taxation, the abolition of customs barriers between provinces, the abolition of tax farming, the abolition of the mandarins, the establishment of peasant local government bodies to which the confiscated land is to be transferred, etc., etc." is instruction was not reflected in the decisions of the Congress of the Communist Party. The Fourth Congress of the Communist Party e Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Chin as held in January, 1925, devoted its attention mainly t work of the Party. By that time the Party 11 uomintang and had started to develop its . The Congress more precisely formulat ty. It also adopted the Party rules and a n resolutions on the trade union movement, the peasant work among young people, work among women, generalizing previous experience the object of the was still further to improve the agitation, propaganda and org izational work of the Party. One of the most important questi discussed at the Congress was how to combine the struggle against imperialism with the development of the everyday struggles of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie for their immediate demands. Bearing in mind the importance of fighting for the economic demands of the proletariat, the Fourth Congress pointed out in its resolution that to ignore these tasks would not only mean damaging the interests of the proletariat, but also " weak-ening the national liberation movement". But in drawing up a platform of immediate demands for the peasantry the Congress committed a mistake in not formulating these demands in suf-ficient detail and in failing to link them up with the fundamental demand for the confiscation of the landlords' land for the benefit of the peasantry without compensation. This mistake arose mainly out of a wrong conception of the stages of the Chinese revolu-tion. The theses on the " National Revolutionary Movement" adopted by the Congress stated that the stage of the united na-tional liberation front would be immediately followed by the stage of the proletarian socialist revolution. Thus, it left out the agrarian revolution which is a stage in the anti- imperialist revolution and serves as a firm base for it. At the time of the Fourth Congress the Communist Party had nearly 1,000 members. The Young Communist League had 9,000 members of whom 30 per cent were young workers; the majority of the members were representatives of the progressive intellectuals, particularly students. The Party extended its in-fluence over increasing sections of the toilers. The successes of the Party reflected the rapid development of the revolutionary move-ment in the country and served as an index of the growth of the forces in the revolutionary camp. The Canton Base of the Revolution At this time the Canton base of the revolution had become very much stronger. During the preceding years the Kuomintang had experienced a number of serious crises. In 1922, General Chen Chiung- ming, Commander- in- Chief of the armed forces of the Southern Kuomintang government, rose in rebellion against Sun Yat- sen. Chen Chiung- mmg was opposed to the Kuomintang interfering in the affairs of North China and rose up for the In Canton there was a r stubborn fighting took place between the Canton forces and th of the counter- revolutionary organization. Enjoying the wide s masses, and actively assisted by the Communists, t g achieved complete victory over the " Paper Tigers' e Canton government also succeeded in utter1 he forces of Chen Chiung- ming. nt part in these operations was played by the Cadet Military College, situated on the Island of W . The success of the military operations condu anton units greatly served to raise the prestige of Chia k. In 1923 he was Chief of the General Staff of t forces which conducted the two successful campaign hiung- ming and against the Kwangsi militaris of which the Kwangsi province submitted to the government. In 1924, when he was Chief of Wampu y College, Chiang Kai- shek directed the military opera ions against the " Paper Tigers" and against the remnants of the forces of Chen Chiung- ming. Coming to the front as a result of these operations and skillfully taking advantage of the victory of the Canton troops to strengthen his own authority, Chiang Kai- shek in 1935 became Commander- in- Chief of the armed forces of the Canton government. The victories of the Canton government served to strengthen Canton as the base of the growing national revolutionary move-ment. The successes achieved by the Communists and the Kuo-mintang in South China, principally in Canton, exercised wider and wider influence upon the anti- imperialist national moveme and particularly upon the working class and peasant moveme all over China. ged Situation in the North which took place in the North of Chi during this period a1s; served to stimulate the ment and the strike movement. Shortly befo group had been at the height of its fame and General Wu Pei- fu, had seemed to be the In 1923, at a meeting of Parliament, the mem all hand- picked men, he succeeded by bribing t ion of Tsao Kun as President of the Chinese ei- fu crushed every organized action of the y armed force. At the same time, on the pretext r the national unification of China, he waged a gainst Chang Tso- lin in North China and against evolutionary government. of 1924, during the height of military opera-tions, Wu Pei- fu was betrayed by General Feng Yu- hsiang who, joining his forces with General Chang Tso- lin, inflicted defeat upon the Chihli troops. The Tsao Kun government, which had been kept in power by the military forces of General Wu Pei- fu, was compelled to resign in favor of the victorious group. Thus, the ent of the Chinese Republic disappeared from the Tso- lin, however, was not yet quite secure in his position. His forces were menaced by those of Feng Yu- hsiang which had been renamed the First People's Army and which occu-pied an independent position. On the other hand, the remnants of Wu Pei- fu's forces had not yet been utterly crushed. This made the establishment of a strong central government in China im-possible. As a result, Tuan Chi- jui ( who was in fact a Japanese agent and an appointee of Chang Tso- lin) came into power and he was compelled to flirt with the leaders of the national liberation movement. He invited Sun Yat- sen to visit Peking and he issued a statement to the effect that his government was only a provisional government and that it was necessary to convene a National Assembly for the purpose of establishing a lawful government. But instead of a National Assembly he convened the so- callede CC Reorganization Conference" which consisted of high govern-ment officials and generals. This caused a rupture between h and Sun Yat- sen. The negotiations which had been proceed1 came to nothing as no agreement could be reached. At that time powerful mass movement under the leadership of the Corn L was developing in all the big towns of China in support of the demand for the convocation of a National Assembly. The Tuan Chi- jui government was no more democratic than the previous militarist government had been. But its relative weakness and irresoluteness prevented it, at least at first, from I, resorting to police methods in combating the mass movement. Thi o keep in constant contact with you. I firmly believe I created favorable conditions for the resumption of activities by th ch you have rendered my country up to now will working class organizations, for the revival of the strike move- idding you farewell, dear comrades, I express the ment and of the whole of the political life of the country. Sun near when the U. S. S. R. will welcome mighty and d and ally, and that in the great struggle for the ressed peoples of the world both allies will march Yat- sen's arrival in Peking and the vigorous propagandist activity which he developed in North China greatly strengthened the Kuomintang and rallied new forces around it. There was also a marked increase in the activities of the Communists in North and Central China. Death of Sun Yut- sen At this time severe illness cut short the life of that great Chinese revolutionary, Sun Yat- sen. Long years of revolutionary effort had undermined his health, and on March 12, 1925, he passed away. He had devoted two- thirds of his lifetime, about forty years, to unceasing revolutionary struggle, first against the monarchist rule of the Manchus, and later against the reactionary militarists and international imperialism. The services he rendered in the latter years of his life are particularly noteworthy. Influ enced by the great October Revolution in Russia, and studyin lessons, he began to rely more and more upon the broad m of the people in the revolutionary struggle for the liberation o China. Just before his death he wrote the following letter to the Central Executive Committee of the U. S. S. R.: es: While I am here laid low by a sickness against which hts are turned to you and to the fate tice. I am leaving be ' With fraternal greetings, " Sun Yat- sen." 1 and testament to the Kuomintang, of which he r and constant leader, was written in the same alliance with the U. S. S. R., cooperation with the t for the mass movement and revolutionary erthrow of imperialist rule- such were the Sun Yat- sen which served as the banrer of the the best years of its history. CHAPTER I11 The Communist Party in the First Stage of the Chinese Revolution SUN YAT- SEN DIED at the moment of a new upsurge of the na-tional liberation movement. The working class took advantage of the slightest weakening of the regime of oppression to proceed to new and greater activity. To this were added circumstances of another kind. At the beginning of 1925 the industrial crisis in China which particular1 affected the textile industry caused the already bad conditions the Chinese workers to become ever so much worse. The capital offensive against the standard of living of the proletariat calle forth increasing resistance on the part of the Chinese workers. On February 10, 1925, a strike broke out at a Japanese- owned textile mill in Shanghai and soon spread to the other 20 Japanese textile mills in Shanghai employing 40,000 workers. The strike lasted for more than two weeks and ended in a partial victory for the workers. In April the textile workers in Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow went on strike. In the middle of May the strike wave swept back to Shanghai as the mill owners had failed to carry out the terms agreed upon at the settlement of the previous strikes. The workers' demands were of an economic character. At that time events occurred in the streets of Shanghai which served as the starting point of the Chinese revolution of 1925- 27. On May 30, the Shanghai students and workers' organizations organized a demonstration to protest against the brutal treatment of the Chinese workers by the imperialists and, in particular, against the murder of a Chinese mill worker, a Communist named KU Cheng- hung, by a Japanese overseer. The English police in Shanghai opened fire on the demonstrators as a result of which 1 score were killed and wounded. Over 600 demonstrators ested. This incident caused a wave of indignation to sweep whole of the Chinese population of Shanghai. From that moment the fight against international imperialism assumed un-nted dimensions and force. ese events served as a striking object lesson of imperialist China. A manifesto issued by the All- China Federation of nts in Shanghai have illuminated the situation in China like a lightning. Everything has become clear. Everybody- in China s seen the real face of imperialism, the face of a ss meetings were organized in the streets of Shanghai at the vast crowds assembled displayed unprecedented en-m. The workers in a body downed tools in factory after On June 12 over a half million workers were on strike. The Chinese merchants joined the political strike of the workers and on June 1 all shops were closed. On June 3 all Chinese banks ceased operations. The business life of the city came to a stand-still. The Shanghai, Committee of the Students' Union carried on agitation in the streets; it organized joint demonstrations with the workers and sent its representatives to other centers in China. In the beginning of June huge student demonstrations and strikes Â¥ o solidarity with the Shanghai workers and students were held in ng, Hankow and other cities. In the middle of June the police in Hankow fired on a demonstration of workers ts, and to protest against this a general strike of work-eclared. In Kiukiang, a crowd of demonstrators set e premises of the local branch of the Japanese Bank of . A wave of solidarity strikes swept over the whole e out in Peking, Tsingtao, Nanking, Canton, cities. Fearing the further development of s concentrated over 30 warships at Shanghai. of the workers, students and anti- imperialist d under the slogans of the struggle for the China, the abolition of imperialist rule, the 3 1 annulment of the unequal treaties, the establishment of political liberties and the improvement of the conditions of the proletariat. The whole movement was led by the Joint Committee set up on June 5, consisting of representatives of workers*, merchants' and students' unions. The Chinese bourgeoisie did not for long continue their active participation in the national liberation movement in hai. In order to encourage home industry the Chinese m turers demanded the cessation of the strike in their factories. workers were obliged to yield, and on June 15 work was resume in the Chinese- owned factories in Shanghai. A few days later the Chinese merchants called off their strike. Their argument in support of this was that " the merchants' strike was a resolute step at the moment of popular excitement when it was necessary for everyone to demonstrate his sympathy for the victims and to pro-test against the murderers. As the cessation of trade causes con-siderable damage to our interests without causing any serious loss to the foreigners we decided to call off the merchants' strike." ese proletariat as a school of mass political anti- imperialist n. In the course of these events the Chinese proletariat proved to be a courageous and consistent fighter against imperialism; ecame transformed into an independent force more and more ccessfully aspiring to leadership in the national movement. The i events gave a powerful impetus to the growth of the tions of the Chinese workers. In the very first days of nts 72 trade unions were organized in Shanghai and the anghai Trades Council was formed which subsequently led he whole of the strike movement of the Shanghai workers. The weakened by the desertion of the bourgeoisie the liberation movement was subjected to fresh trials. The Chinese militarists came to the aid of the international imperialists t o suppress the revolutionary struggle of the masses. General Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso- lin, flooded Shanghai with his troops and brutally suppressed the workers' and students' organizations. He prohibited meetings and demonstrations, began to arrest the active workers and students and to suppress the trade unions. Left en-tirely to their own resources the Shanghai proletariat heroically continued the struggle against the imperialists. They held out staunchly for over three months. In view of the changed situation, however, they were compelled for the time being to abandon the slogans of the revolutionary struggle against international im-perialism and put forward immediate economic demands. On the basis of these demands the trade unions entered into negotiations with the employers. In September, 1925, the workers in a> organ-ized manner resumed work in the Japanese mills, and in October resumed in the English & ills. hanghai events played an extre of the revolutionary movement Shanghai events exercised enormous influence on the subsequent development of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and helped to strengthen Canton as the base of the national liberation movement in South China. These events called forth demonstra-tions of the masses of the people against the international impe-rialists and Chinese militarists all over China. The Shamin- Hongkong Strike he effect of the upsurge of the revolutionary struggle for n which swept the country as a result of the Shanghai events was felt most in Canton where the soil for it was most favorable. On June 23 a demonstration was organized in Can-ton to express solidarity with the Shanghai movement. When the demonstration approached Shamin, the foreign concession in Can-ton, the British police opened fire on it and several hundred Chinese were killed and wounded. In retaliation to this fresh atrocity committed by the imperialists a general strike broke out in Hongkong and Shamin under the leadership of the members Communist Party, Comrades Su Chao- cheng, Teng hsia, Hsiang Ying, Lo Teng- hsian and others. All the Chinese workers left Hongkong and went into Canton whe with the assistance of the Kuomintang government, lodgin food and work were provided for them. The strikers organize armed self- defense units and set up a Revolution Tribunal to deal with agents of the imperialists and t ese and English were compelled to leave e Chinese workers, coolies, domestic servan en refused to do any work for them. The Hon strike lasted 16 months, causing losses to the British capitalists amounting to . £ 50,000,000 The Hongkong strike roused the sympathy of the whole coun-try. In all parts of China collections were made on behalf of the strikers. Meanwhile, the strike committee in Canton organized bodies of armed pickets to see that the boycott of British goods was maintained, and in all its activities it helped to strengthen ve all along the line. Chang Chung- chang, the Shan-arist, occupied Shanghai and ruthlessly suppressed the workers' organizations. The same fate awaited the workers' the position of the Canton government. It helped the further development of the anti- imperialist struggle and the development of the working class movement all over China, and it helped to draw millions of peasants into the revolutionary struggle. The hundred thousand strikers served as a solid backing for the Can-ton government. The assistance and protection which the Canton government gave the Hongkong strikers served to raise its prestige very considerably and to strengthen the sympathy of the toilers in the rest of China towards it. The leadership and active participation of prominent Com-munists in the Hongkong strike served to stimulate the growth of influence and prestige of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the Chinese people. The heroic struggle of the Shanghai and Hongkong prole-tariat in the summer of 1925 marked a turning point in the Chinese national liberation movement. At first the politically most active force in the anti- imperialist movement was the Chinese na-tional bourgeoisie and the petty- bourgeois intelligentsia. The move-ment mainly assumed the form of mass student demonstrations, mass meetings and the boycott of foreign goods. It was only as a result of the Shanghai and Hongkong general strikes that the national liberation movement took the path of genuine mass revo-lutionary struggle against international imperialism. The heroic action of the Chinese and Hongkong proletarians marked the be-ginning of the Chinese revolution of 1925- 27. The Events of March 20, 1926 The growth of the revolution did not proceed evenly, how-ever. The last months of 1925 and the first half of 1926 wit-nessed a temporary subsiding of the revolutionary wave. With the help of the imperialists the Chinese reactionary elements passed to 34 .. - organizations in the industrial centers of North China. The work-ers' strike movement revealed marked signs of weakening. Meanwhile, as a consequence of the active intervention of the Japanese, Kuo Sung- ling, who had risen against the Manchu-rian satrap Chang Tso- lin, was crushed. Wu Pei- fu concluded a military agreement with Chang Tso- lin, and both militarists hurled themselves upon the First People's Army under the com-mand of Feng Yu- hsiang, who had declared himself a supporter of the Canton Kuomintang government. Hard pressed by his enemies, Feng Yu- hsiang withdrew from Tientsin, Peking, and Kalgan and retired westward into Inner Mongolia. Wu Pei- fu succeeded in winning the cooperation of the peasant organizations, known as the Red Spears, in the Province of Honan and with their aid inflicted defeat upon the Second and Third People's Armies which had been only recently formed. the most important events of that time occurred in Can-n March 20, 1926, General Chiang Kai- shek, Com-geoisie to bridle the revolution." Chiang Kai- shek's action opened the sluic Kwangtung started an attack up hiang Kai- shek failed t that moment the nation' acts which determine the chaiacter of the Chinese revolution: The semi- colonial position of China and the financial and omic rule of imperialism; ( b) The yoke of feudal survivals emented by the yoke of militarism and bureaucracy; ( c) The rowing revolutionary struggle of vast masses of workers and easants against the feudal bureaucratic yoke, against militarism, gainst imperialism; ( d) The political weakness of the national ourgeoisie, its dependence upon imperialism, its fear of the revo-lutionary movement obtaining a wide scope; ( e) The growing ~ I I f the proletariat, the growth of its prestige of the toilers; ( f ) The existence of the as a neighbor of China." rialism and the yoke of feudal survivals were the independent development of China and the people; they were the principal factors which inese revolution. Hence, the Chinese revolu-ion was co ith the following main tasks: shed in the revolution. Only when the Chinese proletariat achieves the leadership of the vast masses of the toilers in town and country, overcomes the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, and paralyzes its influence over the masses will the complete victory of the bourgeois- democratic revolution become possible. nd in view of the general crisis of capitalism, and particularly in of the existence of the U. S. S. R., this victory opens the pros-of the Chinese revolution growing into a socialist revolu-ion. Let us now see how events in China developed. The Northern Campaign om the militaristsy armi educational wor rces, took the offe largest industrial and political center in China. It is an amalgama-tion of the towns of Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang. The trans-fer of the ~ u o m i n t a ng~ ov ernment to Wuhan served to raise the revolutionary spirit and activity of the masses of the toilers to a still higher pitch. The victory of the Northern Campaign would have been impossible without the assistance which the masses of the workers and peasants gave to the Canton forces. Workers' strikes and peasant uprisings in the rear of the enemy facilitated the advance of the Canton army. The masses of the toilers, in their turn, took advantage of the advance of the Canton army, the extension of the territory of the revolution and the democratic conditions that prevailed in that territory, to develop the struggle for the satis-faction of their own demands and create their own organizations. Growth of the Mass Movement and Break- Up of the United Front A wave of workers' strikes swept over the whole territory under the rule of the Kuomintang government. By means of strikes the workers employed in the f oreign- owned factories in Hankow secured a rise in wages, a reduction of the working day and recognition of their trade unions. Important victories were also won by the workers in other towns occupied by the National Revolutionary Army. The struggle for liberation spread to other parts of China where the strike movement also grew. Nearly all the urban workers joined trade unions. For example, in 1923 the number of organized workers in China was 230,000, in 1926 it was 1,264,000 and in May, 1927, the number was 2,800,000. The peasant movement also assumed wider and wider dimen-sions. At first, by joining the struggle, the peasants secured a reduction in rent and the abolition of the numerous and burden-some taxes. In the course of its development the movement spread to wider masses of the peasantry and assumed a more revolu-ovince of Hunan, in March, 1927, over 1,000,000 peasants organized in peasant unions. In the provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hupeh and particularly in Hunan the peasant unions had a membership running into millions. The total number of peasants who belonged to peasant unions in the territory of the I Kuomintang government was about 10,000,000. Enormous successes were achieved by the Communist Party. I I he number of its local organizations increased enormously and e circulation of its publications increased manyfold. For exam- , the circulation of Hsiangtao, the central organ of the Party, ched 50,000. The provincial and regional committees of the Party also published their own newspapers, magazines and mass agitation literature. The Party had grown into a mass party hold-ing strong leading positions in the liberation movement of the Chinese workers and peasants. In the beginning of January, 1927, the revolutionary masses seized the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. In March, after two unsuccessful attempts, the workers in Shanghai made a third and successful armed uprising rendered direct assistance to the Canton army in occupy-ghai. international imperialists waged an active struggle against essfully developing Chinese revolution. In September, British gunboat bombarded Wanhsien, in the province of Szechuan, as a result of which 227 Chinese were killed and several hundred were wounded. All the time the imperialists blockaded Canton and rendered effective assistance to the re-actionary Northern militarists. In fact, this was a concealed form of imperialist intervention. The further successes of the revolu-tionary movement and the advance of the National Revolutionary Army to the region of Shanghai stimulated the international imperialists to still further activity. At the end of March, 1927, they presented an ultimatum to the National Army and bombarded Nanking from their warships. The powerful sweep of the revo-lution and the pressure of the imperialists frightened the national bourgeoisie into the camp of the counter- revolution. Chiang Kai- shek brought about a counter- revolutionary coup d'etat. On ril 1 1 and 12, 1927, his troops surrounded the headquarters of Shanghai workers' union and of the Workers* Guard, disarmed the latter and shot down all workers who resisted with machine guns. In Canton his example was followed by General Li Chi-shen. On April 18, Chiang Kai- shek formed a " national" gov-ernment of his own in Nanking in opposition to the Wuhan gov-ernment. In the territory of the Nanking government the workers', peasants', students', and educational organizations were brutally suppressed. The Communist Party was driven under-ground. Chiang Kai- shek's treachery marked the end of the first, Canton stage of the Chinese revolution. The characteristic fea-ture of the revolution at that stage was that it was a revolution of a national united front. The national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement and it was directed mainly against the yoke of the foreign imperialists. As Comrade Stalin has said: was a revolution of the united national front. This does not here were no antagonisms between the revolution and th nal bourgeoisie, in rst Stage of the Revolution haracter and tasks the semi- colonial ition of China. It took into account the feudal survivals in country as the predominating form of oppression and the con-tion between these feudal survivals and the rule of imperial- . It foresaw the various stages through which the Chinese anti- imperialist and anti- feudal revolution had to proceed. The Communist International was of the opinion that in the first stage of the revolution in which the national bourgeoisie fought against imperialism and did not hinder the training and tion of the masses of workers and peasants in the spirit of tion, a bloc with the national bourgeoisie would facilitate owth of the forces of the working class and the peasantry. ese tactics logically followed from the necessity of making use even a temporary and unstable ally in the struggle againrt rful enemy, international imperialism. But these tactics sed the utilization of the national bourgeoisie in the in-f the revolution and not the subordination of the prole-t to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. That is why the munist International always urged the necessity of preserv-the independence of the proletarian movement, the necessity developing the mass movemert to the utmost and the necessity waging a relentless struggle for the hegemony of the prole-t in the Chinese revolution. The Communist International foresaw that the first stage of e revolution, in which the movement was directed mainly against perialism and was supported by the national bourgeoisie, would vitably be superseded by a second stage in which the bour-would desert the revolution and the main content of the tion would become the agrarian revolution. The C. I. ned the Communist Party of China in good time of this in-ng of class forces in the course of the revolution. unist International attached decisive importance development of the agrarian movement. It was at the anti- imperialist struggle could be victorious the agrarian peasant revolution served as its base. In 1926, Comrade Stalin sharply criticized the Chinese ries who considered that it was impossible to unleash the rural districts of China and were afraid to " The anti- imperialist front in China will be stronger and mightier the sooner and more thoroughly the Chinese peasants are drawn into the revolution." This idea was emphasized in the resolution adopted by Seventh Plenum of the E. C. C. I. in December, 1926, which stated : " The development of the national revolutionary movement in Chin now depends upon the agrarian revolution." The Cornintern's Fight on Two Fronts The Communist International championed its correct line, which was entirely based upon the tenets of Lenin, in a fight on two fronts. At that time opportunist trends represented b Chen Tu- hsiu, Peng Shu- tze and others were strong in the lea ership of the Communist Party of China. The Party leadershi of that time did not understand that the alliance with the nationa bourgeoisie was only temporary and conditional and, notwith-standing the advice of the Communist International, it failed to warn the masses of the inevitable treachery of the bourgeoisie. The Party leaders interpreted the tactics of the united front to mean subordinating the struggle of the proletariat and peasantry to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. For example, the Communist Party did not put up adequate resistance to Chiang Kai- shek during the events of March 20, 1926. When the North-ern Campaign started the Communist Party agreed to the restric-tion of the right to strike and of the organization of workers' pickets. The Communist International, relying on the Bolshevik elements in the Communist Party of China, waged an irreconcil-able struggle against these opportunist mistakes. On the other hand, the Trotsky- Zinoviev opposition dre up its own line on the question of the Chinese revolution against that of the Communist International. The oppositi denied the overwhelming importance of the feudal militarist yo and failed to realize the decisive importance of the agrarian rev lutionary movement in China. They attributed the anti- imperi character of the Chinese revolution entirely to the interests of Chinese capitalists who demanded Chinese control of the custom 4 2 thereby defending the point of view and interests of the bourgeois-landlord and militarist elements. he Trotsky- Zinoviev opposition rendered the same service eois- landlord elements by demanding the break- up with the national bourgeoisie and the withdrawal of nists from the Kuomintang even at the first stage of inese revolution. Such a policy could only have resulted eakening of the forces ofthe revolution. - Had the Communists left the Kuomintang during the North-mpaign, when the prestige of the Kuomintang among the was higher than ever before, the masses would have been flung into confusion. Such a policy would have played into the hands of the reactionary elements who indeed wanted to expel the Communists from the Kuomintang. It would have deprived the Communists of a means of approach to the broad masses and would have made their struggle to organize the workers and peasants and to lead them in the struggle more difficult. The attitude of the Trotsky- Zinoviev opposition on the ques-tion of the Chinese revolution reflected the characteristic features of Trotskyism, vk., utter contempt for the national features of the Chinese revolution, ignoring of the semi- colonial position of China, underestimation of th; agrarian revolution, failure to understand the bourg- e ois- democratic features of the revolution. repudiation of the premises for a powerful agrarian peasant move-ment, underestitnation of the role of the peasantry and disbelief strength and ability of the to lead the peasantry. was the correct tactics of the Communist International nsured for the Communist Party of China achievements of exceptional importance. As Comrade ~ t a l i nh as said: he Communist Party entered into a bloc with the national bourgeoisie on at the first stage of the revolution in order to widen the territory of the revolution, to become crystallized as a mass party, to create for itself the opportunity openly to organize the proletariat and to lay a path for itself to the peasantry. . . . The national bourgeoisie has deserted to the camp of the counter- revolution and has lost contact with the broad masses of the people. . . . Is it not clear that only a correct policy could have led to such results? Is it not clear that only such a policy could have increased the fighting fitness of the proletariat? " CHAPTER IV I organizations were broken up and Communists who led The Communist Party in the Second Stage of the Revolution CHIANGK AI- SHEK^ S COUP D'ETAT signified the desertion of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of imperialism and of bourgeois-landlord counter- revolution. As Comrade Stalin has said: " Chiang Kai- shek's coup d'etat signifies that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, that the turn has started from a revolu-tion of the national united front to a revolution of millions of worker1 and peasants, to an agrarian revolution, which will strengthen and extend the struggle against imperialism, against the gentry and feudal landlords, against the militarists and the counter- revolutionary group of Chiang Kai- shek." he Wuhan Revolutionary Center As a result of Chiang Kai- shek's treachery two governments, two centers, were formed in South China: the center of revolu-tion in Wuhan, and the center of counter- revolution in Nanking. The fact that the policies of these two centers were the very oppo-site of each other is characteristic. The Nanking government immediately proceeded to come to terms with the imperialists and began ruthlessly to suppress the mass anti- imperialist move-ment in its own territory. In the territory of the Wuhan govern-ment the revolutionary struggle of the masses against imperialism rose to unprecedented heights. Nanking immediately pursued a course towards a rupture with the U. S. S. R. The policy of Wuhan was to establish still closer ties with the land of the proletariar ass movement were shot down in whole groups. In Wuhan, ever, the activity of the Communist Party freely de scale. The posts of Minister of Agriculture, Minis e Affairs and Minister for Labor were occupied by sts. Measures were drawn up for establishing closer c the organs of government by the masses of the toil preparations were made for convening provincial dele-etings which were to establish democratic and elected nment. . In Hunan such a meeting was called for he authority of the Wuhan government extended to the ince of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and part of the province of an. Its troops conducted a successful offensive against the tionary northern militarists and strove to establish contact the farces of Feng Yu- hsiang who had repeatedly de ty to the Wuhan government. second stage of the revolution was mark upsurge of the mass movement in the ter an government. A successful strike struggle hinese workers, nearly all of whom were organ ization of armed pickets helped the workers to action of their demands from the employers m rowth of the peasant unions continued. In the r example, the membership of the peas ,000 in March, 1927, to 2,000,000 on . Nearly everywhere the peasant unions ions of government in their rural dist Iutionary initiative, the peasants began to abolish landlor places the peasant unions arrested the most hated o and gentry, tried them, confiscated their property armed units. The agrarian revolution grew rapi digress of the Communist Party It was in this situation that the Fifth Congress of the Co Party of China was opened on April 27, 1 asted for nearly two weeks. By that time the rmous succe& s. It had become a mass party and a factor in the political life of the country. The membership of the Party had grown from 994 at the time of the Fourth Congress to 57,967, of whom 53.8 per cent were workers. The membership of the Young Communist League had grown to 35,000, of whom 41 per cent were young workers and 14 per cent were young peasants. The Young Pioneers had a membership of 120,- 000. The circulation of the weekly organ of the Party rose from 7,000 to 50,000. The Party exercised its influence on and led trade unions and peasant unions having membership running into millions. The Fifth Congress was held quite openly. Leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang such as Wang Ching- wei, Tan Yen- kai and Hsu Chien attended the Congress and greeted it in the name of their party, thus demonstrating, as it were, lasting cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Having met in the very heat of revolutionary battles, it was the function of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of China to sum up the preceding activity of the Party, to outline the prospects of the further development of the revolution and tc indicate the immediate tasks of the Chinese Communists. - 2% . I I ' on which very larg- el. y coincided with the line of the ommunist ~ nternational. The second item was the theses of the Seventh Plenum of the C. C. I. on the Chinese question. These were adopted unani-usly without amendment. The third item was the agrarian question, but on this very ongress did not take up a distinct, clear n the advice of the Communist Interna-mined this question and took up a more sistent position in regard to the confiscation of all landlord or the benefit of the peasantry. mistake was made in allowing Chen Tu- hsiu to remain in position of General Secretary ofthe Party. This mistake may ttributed to the fact that he was one of the founders of the that at the Congress he voted for the resolution which his opportunist mistakes. But with the further devel-vents, the actual concentration of the leadership in his nd led to very severe consequences for the Party. first item to be discussed was the political and organizatio he Fifth Congress of the Communist Party the situa-report of the Central Committee which was submitted to ban began sharply to change for the worse. It is true Congress by the secretary of the Party, Chen Tu- hsiu. The Con- oops of the Wuhan government fought successfully gress pointed to a number of mistakes committed by the Part reactionary northern militarists. In fierce battles on leadership during the period under review owing to its wron front particular fame was won by the Communist, interpretation of the tasks of the united national front. The Party riel Chang Hsian- y~ ng, who died on the field of battle. Not-leadership overestimated the strength and revolutionary capabilities andinff the victories which the Wuhan forces won over the of the national bourgeoisie. The Party did not adequately ensure of the reactionary northern militarists, the political situation the protection of the interests of the masses of the toilers. During uhan became more complicated every day. The economic the Northern Campaign the Party, as the resolution of the de carried on by the international imperialists and the Congress stated, " did not pay adequate attention to the necessity of deepening the social foundation of the revolution simultaneous-ly with its territorial expansion". Failing to advance demands for dical agrarian changes, the Party failed to strengthen the bond tween the proletariat and the peasantry and failed to ensure the ading role of the proletariat in this alliance. Rejecting a num-ber of opportunist theories advanced by Chen Tu- hsiu, the Con-gress, on the report of the Central Committee, adopted th e of the bourgeoisie disorganized the whole ol economic the territory of the Wuhan government. This led to the le between the workers and the capitalists becoming more . The exploiting classes began to exert more and more pres-the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang. Of still greater e was the agrarian movement of the peasantry, which n to enormous dimensions. The petty- bourgeois leaders of the Kuomintang were scared by the growing agrarian revolu- ovincial Government and Chairman of the Political tion and, eventually, this drove them into the camp of the counter the Kuomintang in the provinces of Honan, Shensi and revolution. t the end of June, however, he entered into an agree- A counter- revolutionary rebellion in the rear hastened the ith Chiang Kai- shek and sent an ultimatum to the ' leaders swing to the Right of the Wuhan Kuomintang. Internal dis- Wuhan Kuomintang demanding a rupture with the integration began with the betrayal of the national government by the army division commanded by Hsia Tou- yin. This divisio ' no-, to the economic crisis and the intensification of class protected Wuhan from the invasion of the Szechuan militaris antagonisms resulting from it, and owing to the increase in mutiny 111/ 1~ 1 ~~, In the middle of May, 1927, the division turned against t and: rebellion among the reactionary officers, vacillation increased Wuhan government. On the orders of Chiang Kai- shek it allow and more in the ranks of the Wuhan Kuomintang. Day by 1 1 cthaep tuSrzee cthhuea nw treoospst t ao rctro osfs itths el inperos vainncde thouf s eHnuapbelhe da nthde mth day,, thclee aWrlyu haasn a Kfourocme iwnhtaicnhg dbiedg anno t tcoo urenvteeraalc ti tbseultf wmhoicrhe saunpd-menace the capital of the Wuhan government. rnrted the attack on the workers' and peasants' organizations. Hsia ~ o u - ~ i n ' dsi vision was beaten back from Wuhan b The, Wuhan government put up no resistance to theattacks of the troops commanded by the Communist Yeh Ting, who ha - Hsu, Keh- hsiang and Chu Pei- teh. It began to capitulate to the roved himself to be a talented commander durin" g the Northern - r e-- a c- tionary generals. Campaign. But just at that time the troops under the command At the end of May, 1927, the Wuhan government began of Hsu Keh- hsiang, in Changsha, the principal city in the prov- to i& e a series of decrees restricting the activities of the workers' ince of Hunan, rose in rebellion against the ~ u h a ngo vernken and peasants* organizations and protecting the exploiting classes. 11111 On May 21, 1927, Hsu Keh- hsiang dispersed the Left KUO A special order was issued restricting the activities of the political mintang provincial government, suppressed the trade unions an administration in the army. At the end of May the Wuhan gov-peasant unions, disarmed the workers' pickets, shot over 1 00 eminent dissolved two of the largest peasant unions in the province leaders of the mass organizations and setup his own reactionary measures did not check the offensive of the government in the province of Hunan. nts; on the contrary they accelerated it. he province of Kiangsi practically deserted Wuh to the Right continued until the middle of ionary section of the military commanders the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang de-with the landlords and the ~ entrva nd whn dared a ruoture with the Communists. From that moment re- 0 " J - - - - --- --. - scared by the growth of the peasant movement acted as t action reigned supreme in Wuhan. All the revolutionary mass organizers of a counter- revolutionary coup d'etat. In Nanchan organizations of the workers, peasants and students were smashed the capital of the province of Kiangsi, a coup d'etat was led up. Communists were executed wholesale. In this way the leaders General Chu Pei- teh who exnelled the Communists from t of the Wuhan Kuomintanz oaved the wav for unitv with the L G2 1 J J army, dispersed the peasant unions, outlawed the Communi Nanking center of the bourgeois- landlord counter- revolution. - party andbegan to suppress the workersy and peasants' movemen by armed force. pportwnist and " Left" Deviations in This series of betrayals was crowned by that of Feng Y the Wuhan Period hsiang. On April 18, 1927, Feng Yu- hsiang was promoted to t age of the Chinese revolution the task of the post of Commander- in- Chief of all the Wuhan forces. In t o take advantage of the enormous influence beginning of June, 1927, he was appointed Chairman of the the masses, and of their membership of the transform the Wuhan government into the revolutionary demo-cratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry. It was pre-cisely on these lir- es that the Communist International advised the Party to act. The resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. of May, 1927, stated: " The main thing at the present time is the ' plebeian' revolutionary solution of the agrarian problem by tens and hundreds of millions of peasants themselves from below. . .' . It is necessary rapidly, boldly and determinedly to pursue a policy towards the mass arming of the workers and peasants." Wuhan government to do everything to develop revolution and to quicken the revolutionary struggle masses to the utmost. The Communists should ha the agrarian of the broad ve fought to The leadership of the Communist Party of China in the persons of Chen Tu- hsiu, Peng Shu- tze and Tan Ping- shan ignored the advice of the Communist International and pursued an obviously opportunist policy. Instead of quickening the mass movement they, under the pressure of the Kuomintang and the reactionary officers, restrained the masses. Infected with oppor-tunism, the leaders of the Communist Party not only failed to counteract but actually supported the measures adopted by the Wuhan government to restrict the activities of the workers' and peasants' organizatiors. They did not take advantage of the posi-tions the Communists occupied in the government to organize the masses for the struggle under the slogans of the agrarian revo-lution and to establish closer contacts between the masses of the people and the organs of government. The Communists in the government merely used their positions for the purpose of political wire- pulling and scheming. They served as a screen for the anti-labor and anti- peasant policy of the Wuhan government, which was already swinging to the Right. The opportunist leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party not only failed to take measures to arm the workers and peasants, but as soon as the leaders of the Kuomin-tang began to waver they adopted a resolution calling upon thc Wuhan workers' pickets voluntarily to disarm and dissolve theil units. They should, as Comrade Stalin advised, " have createc from among the revolutionary peasants who had 50 01 of the agrarian revolution, and from among the revolu-y workers, reliable army corps . . . and make them the bul-of the revolutionary government in Wuhan". But instead oing that the leaders of the Communist Party pursued a policy capitulation and this weakened the position of the Communists the National Army. Nor did the leaders of the Party take any sures to organize resistance to the counter- revolutionary re-ions in Changsha, Nanchang and other places. In order not to isplay disloyalty" to the Wuhan government, Chen Tu- hsin n Ping- shan prohibited the armed peasant units from ion against the reactionary officers. ude, Right opportunist political mistakes committed by of the Communist Party at that time were the main uses of the defeat of the Chinese revolution. No less dangerous " that period of the revolution were the views and slogans enuously advocated by the Trotsky- Zinoviev opposition. At the ry beginning of the Wuhan period this opposition again de-anded that the Communists leave the Kuomintang and advance slogan for the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and sants' Deputies. This slogan implied the overthrow of the uhan government when it was still a revolutionary government d when it enjoyed the support of the broad masses. At that e it was the duty of the Communists to take advantage of the olutionary situation and the existence of the Wuhan revolu-onary government to develop the anti- imperialist and agrarian evolution still further. As Comrade Stalin said in May, 1927: (( To create Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies now, for mple, in the region of activity of the Wuhan government, means ating dual power, it means issuing the slogan for a fight to overthrow e Left Kuomintang and for the formation of a new, Soviet government The demand for the immediate formation of Soviets was an venturist leap forward. It meant fighting the existing revolu-onary government of the Wuhan Kuomintang, which meant ving the interests of Chiang Kai- shek; for the latter was striv-ing to overthrow the Wuhan government and to put a stop ta the cooperation between the Left Kuomintang and the Com- ~ ~ l! i! l ~ ~ ~ ~ i S~ t aih ~ and the Chinese Revolution ggle against international imperialism and for na-ocial liberation, for socialism. talin's writings and speeches on the problems of the evolution are a rich contribution to the store of Marxist-revolutionary doctrine. It is impossible to study the ese revolution without seriously studying all the writings and hes of Comrade Stalin on the problems of the Chinese revo- " We welcome the energetic intervention of the Cornintern which en-s to expose the mistakes of the previous Party leadership and thus Party. We emphatically condemn the opportunist, non- revolutionary ursued by our Central Committee and consider it necessary, on the the lessons of the past, radically to change the course of Party The conference declared that the previous Central Committee the Party in the person of Chen Tu- hsiu, Peng Shu- tze and ers " not only pursued a profoundly wrong policy directed to-ds the defeat of the revolution, towards voluntary liquidation capitulation, but stubbornly refused to admit their mistakes to submit to the counsels of the leading international body. Communist Party Conference, August, 1 92 7 The experience of the international Communist movement as of enormous service to the young and not yet sufficiently ture Communist Party of China in overcoming Right oppor-ist and " Left" deviations in its ranks. At the special con-nce of the Communist Party which opened on August 7, 7, an important step was taken towards the Bolshevization of part?. This conference was convened on the demand of the mmunist International, and in spite of the opposition of Chen - hsiu and the other opportunist leaders of the Party. The st Conference emphatically condemned the opportunist of the previous leadership of the Party and qualified its icy as being an openly liquidationist one. The resolution adopted by the conference stated: the decisions and recommendations of the Comintern and thus give it an opportunity to understand the problems and to express its decisive opinion." By electing a new leadership and advancing the slogan of the agrarian revolution as the core of the struggle of the masses of the toilers, the August conference marked a historical turning point in the development of the Communist Party of China. The Nanchang Rebellion The August Conference was held when White terror was at its height, and when, as a result of the victory of reaction in Wuhan, the Party had been driven deeply underground. The treachery of the Wuhan Kuomintang meant the desertion of the middle class and a considerable section of the urban petty bour-geoisie to the camp of the bourgeois- landlord counter- revolution. But the workers and peasants did not retreat without a fight; they did not lose hope of defending and preserving the gaffs of the revolution. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, at-tempts were made to defend and to continue the cause of the revolution by armed force. Among these bold attempts was the Nanchansr re bellion. u This rebellion was raised by two corps of the National Army under the command of the Communists Yeh Ting and Ho Lung. On the night of August 1, 1927, these forces, 20,000 strong, captured Nanchang, disarmed the local forces, confiscated the property of the banks and, exacting tribute from the Nanchang bourgeoisie, marched southward for the purpose of capturing the province of Kwangtung. On September 24, 1927, Yeh Ting's troops occupied Swatow, a big port in the province of Kwangtung, but on October 2 he was compelled to retreat from that town and was defeated by the Kwangtung militarists. This defeat was due to the superiority of forces of the reactionary militarists; but another important reason for it was the wrong tactics pursued by the leaders of the rebellion. This movement lacked a clear and correct political program. Instead of supporting the peasants and carrying out the agrarian revolution, the leaders of the Nanchang rebellion advan tremely curtailed agrarian slogans, such as the confiscatio 54 y from the big landlords, and, what was worse, they did out these slogans. No contact was established between the rebel trooos and the L sant movement, nor was any attempt made to rouse and arm e masses of the peasants for the struggle. In its advance the nchang army failed to destroy the old apparatus of government establish organs of government of the toilers in their place. a result of these mistakes, for which Tan Ping- shan was pelled from the Party, Yeh Ting's campaign bore the char-ter of purely military operations and ended in complete failure. Only a very few regiments of Yeh Ting's army managed to icate themselves from the ring of militarist forces which sur-ded them. These regiments, led by Chu Teh, established acts with the peasant partisan movement at the junction of vinces of Kwangtung, Fukien and Kiangsi, and served as the nucleus out of which the Chinese Red Army eventually The Canton Commune In the autumn of 1927 a wave of peasant uprisings swept South of China, but only in rare cases did these isolated up-s result in lasting success. For example, the peasant struggle d important, though temporary, successes in the district of a, in the province of Kwangtung. A Soviet government was shed in the district and the land of the landlords was trans-e peasants. In the district of Hailufeng, in northeast ngtung, soviets were established which existed from Novem- 1927, to March, 1928. The soviets abolished the landlords' es, removed the landmarks from the fields and divided the and other property of the landlords among the peasants. But the events in these districts were not characteristic of the situation in the country. Everywhere the united forces of unter- revolution waged an offensive against the revolution-orkers' and peasants' camp. These were the circumstances hich the workers of Canton rose in armed rebellion. The ellion was the most powerful and heroic attempt to gains of the revolution. On the night of December the armed workers* units in Canton, in conjunction with 55 the officers' training regiment, which had gone over to the side of the revolution, under the command of the fearless chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, Comrade Chang Tai- luei brought'about a revolution in the city. After capturing the city the rebels proclaimed the establishment of a Soviet government. For the first time in this huge semi- colonial country, the soviets becam a slogan of practical action. The Canton commune did not last long. It fell after thre days of heroic fighting. But it succeededin demonstrating to th whole world the genuine revolutionary program of the Sov government. It issued a number of decrees directed towards t radical improvement of the conditions of the workers and peasa such as the eight- hour day, increased wages, confiscation of t landlords' land without compensation for the benefit of the peas ants and the annulment of all extortionate debt and lease agree ments. Immediately after the Soviet government was established i Canton over 3,000 political prisoners were released. The Sovie government immediately began to organize a Red Army, t confiscate the houses and other property of the militarists for th benefit of the poor people in the city, and to organize state ai for the unemployed. As the Sixth Congress of the Comintern stated, the wo historical significance of the Canton Commune lay in the f that it became " the sign of a new soviet phase of the revolution But the Canton rebellion did not stimulate a new upsurge of th Chinese revolution. On the contrary, it took place amidst the gen era1 retreat of the revolutionary forces and the ebb of the revo-lutionary tide. As was quite correctly stated in the decisions of the Communist Party of China, the defeated Canton rebellion was a rearguard action of the retreating revolution. In spite of the heroic struggle of the workers and soldiers? the Chinese militarists, thanks to their numerical superiority and the support of the imperialists, succeeded in crushing the Canton Commune. The defeat was also largely due to the defects in the leadership and, in particular, to inadequate preliminary political mobilization of the masses of the toilers, and the absence of an spite of its short- lived character, the Canton Commune n important gain for the Chinese revolution. For the first the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and the hment of soviets as the form of the revolutionary demo-tic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry were ractice in China. r the defeat of the Canton Commune a period of fierce set in. The defeat of the heroic Canton proletarians still encouraged the reaction, consolidated its forces and ned its position. The Ninth Plenum of the E. C. C. I., took place in February, 1928, analyzed the situation in and noted the subsiding of the first wave of the broad revo-onary movement of the workers and peasants. In its resolution Plenum stated : " In a number of industrial centers the working class movement, bled ite and held in the grip of unprecedented White terror, is passing through age of some depression." hat is why the Ninth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. in its reso- Chinese question emphasized that the Communist na must prepare for an inevitable fresh upsurge of ary wave, and that under the prevailing conditions st concentrate its work on winning over the vast workers and peasants, politically educating them, organizing them around the Party and its slogans. The resolution stated: serious danger that exists in the present situation is that, an incorrect appraisal of the present situation and of an the forces of the enemy, the vanguard of the workers' ment may become isolated from the masses, may run up its forces and allow itself to be defeated piecemeal." CHAPTER V The Communist Party on the Eve of a Fresh Revolutionary Upsurge THE APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Ninth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. entirely fitted the political situation which arose in China after the defeat of the Canton Commune. The most important gains of the revolution were lost. The mass movement was suppressed. The position of imperialism and of the Chinese governing classes . had become considerably stronger. In a num-ber of places the Communist organizations were almost com-pletely broken up. The Communist Party's contacts with the masses were correspondingly weakened. The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party It was in this situation that the Sixth Congress of the Com-munist Party of China was convened in the summer of 1928. The Congress summed up and generalized the experience of the first round of the Chinese revolution. It closely analyzed the causes of the defeat of the revolution of 1925- 27. It very thor-oughly exposed the opportunist mistakes of the Party leadership of that time and condemned the view held by several leading comrades that the Chinese revolution would develop uninter-ruptedly in an ascending line. In appraising the situation that then existed the Congress in its resolution stated that ". . . the first wave of the workers' and peasants' movement, which to a large extent proceeded under the leadership of t China, ended in the severe defeat of the worke weakening of their revolutionary organizations ( t 58 s and the Party) and in the physical extermination of a considerable n of the workers' and peasants' vanguard. In the main the present ation is characterized by the absence of revolutionary enthusiasm among any considerable section of the Chinese people." the same time the Sixth Congress pointed out that a fresh e of the Chinese revolution, certain symptoms of which e already visible at that time, was inevitable. Taking this anal-of the situation as its starting point the Sixth Congress stated " the general line of the Party in this new period in which first wave of the revolution has ended in a number of severe eats and the new wave has not yet risen . . . is to fight for sses". This line was formulated more definitely in a num-of special resolutions on trade union work, work in the rural ricts, work in the army, among the youth, among women, etc. Noting the deviations within the Party the Sixth Congress hasized the danger of putschist tendencies. These tendencies ed some of the Party organizations to the path of premature unprepared armed actions which were doomed to failure. At same time the Congress called for greater vigilance in the ty and urged the necessity of fighting determinedly against Right opportunist deviation, the danger of which had not been entirely overcome in the ranks of the Party. The Sixth Congress adopted an agrarian program. This pro-contained the demand for the confiscation of all landlord s without compensation for the benefit of the peasantry and tionalization of the land when a workers' and peasants' government is established all over China, or in the decisive regions of the country, if such a measure is supported by the bulk of the ' antry. On the peasant question the Congress laid down the wing main tactical line: " The main bulwark of the prole-at in the rural districts is the poor peasants. The middle sants are strong allies." On the questions of the rich peasants, however, the Sixth gress adopted an indistinct formula which subsequently cer-members of the Party interpreted as meaning the t of an alliance with them. This mistaken line was a special letter on the peasant question addressed to 59 the Communist Party of China by the Communist International in June, 1929. In summing up the work of the Sixth Congress it must be said that it correctly appraised the situation, it outlined the pros-pects of the revolutionary struggle for liberation, distinctly laid down the important tasks of the Party and adopted a comprehen-sive program of work for the Party. The main line adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China was after-wards endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Communist Inter- In developing its activities on the basis of these decisions munist Party of China soon achieved important successes. The Policy of the Nanking Kaomintang cessions in Hankow and Kiukiang which it had ion. The Japanese capitalists seized the Han ere cut. Rest days and holidays for the workers were and all imnrovements in conditions of labor, including ent of the workers by factory management staffs, foreign capitalists began more and more to grab hold se industry. In coal mining the share of foreign capital 54 per cent in 1923 to 72 per cent in 1928. In 1 industry the share of foreign capital increased the same period from 70 per cent to 90 per cent. In the textile dustry, in which before the revolution of 1925- 27 Chinese d 50 per cent of the capital, the share of foreign capital in had risen to 80 per cent. The Nanking government proved totally incapable of pro-ng the young Chinese industry from foreign competition. true that on February 1, 1928, new tariffs were introduced, t the new tariff agreement did not provide for increased riffs on imported cotton goods, yarn, cement, coal, paper, atches, etc. Tariffs were increased on goods of secondary impor-nce and on articles of luxury. Consequently, the new tariff reement did not in the least help to develop Chinese industry. 1 this created very severe conditions for Chinese industry. 8 and 1929 output in a number of branches of industry rtailed. Many factories closed down entirely. Thus, in , all the silk- winding factories in Shanghai closed down. early the whole of the flour milling industry came to a stand- The crisis most severely affected the tobacco, match, textile leather industries. The growing agricultural crisis in China had particularly isastrous effects upon the economy of the country. The policy ursued by the Nanking bourgeois- landlord counter- revolutionary loc did not alleviate, but actually intensified the chronic crisis f agriculture. The burden of taxation, the imposts of the mili-arists and bondage to the landlords increased. Larger and larger he Chinese peasants were pauperized. The number of cken people in China grew catastrophically. In 1927, e were afflicted with famine; in 1928, 27,000,- 929 the number was 57,000,000. It is true that the Nanking government made a pretense of fighting for the national independence of China. It also resorted to a number of maneuvers to create the impression that it desired to create order in the country and alleviate the conditions of the masses. Among these maneuvers were clamant declarations about revising the unequal treaties; but the imperialist powers de-liberately ignored these declarations and continued to strengthen their rule in China. Another of these maneuvers was the passing of the agrarian law and labor law which, however, were never carried out. Failure dogged the footsteps of the Nanking gov-ernment in everything it undertook. Nor was the Nanking government able to cope with the task of uniting the country. It is true that in June, 1928, the Nanking forces marched into Peking. Formally, the Nanking government became the government of the whole of China; but actually it failed to bring about the unification of the country. Real power remained in the hands of the war lords, who differed in no way from the former Tuchuns and who would not toler-ate the interference of the central government in the affairs of the regions which they controlled. The internecine wars of the militarists continued to sap the economic and political life of the country. The war between Nanking and Mukden came to an end only in the middle of 1928. In March, 1929, war broke out between Kwangsi and Nanking. In September, 1929, Chang Fa- kwei declared war on Nanking and in October, 1929, F e ~ gYu - hsiang started military operations against Chiang Kai- shek. In December the troops of Shi You- san and Tang Sheng- chih revolted against Nanking. In the spring of 1930 war was resumed between Nanking and Feng Yu- hsiang, who was joined by the Shansi militarist, Yen Hsi- shan. All these were symptoms of a growing crisis in the camp of the Chinese counter- revolution. The ConjZict Over the Chinese Eastern Railway An important factor hastening the disintegration of the Chinese reactionaries was the unsuccessful adventurist attempt of the Chinese militarists to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway. This railway belonged to the U. S. S. R. and was transformed by the Soviet government into a purely business enterprise. By the agree-of 1924 the Soviet government voluntarily agreed to the ay being under the joint management of the U. S. S. R. and ina. Urged on by the international imperialists the Kuomintang ilitarists on July 10, 1929, violently seized the Chinese Eastern ailway. The Soviet members of the managerial staff were dis-issed. The mass arrest and persecution of Soviet railway em- Confronted with this provocative and arrogant seizure of the ese Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists in gross viola-of the onlytreaty China had concluded on the basis of com-e equality and the utmost consideration for the interests of e Chinese people, the Soviet government did all it possibly could ecure a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In spite of this the tang militarists continued their acts of provocation against S. R. Then the Special Far Eastern Army struck a crush-rogant Chinese militarists. The latter were mpelled to restore the Chinese Eastern Railway to its former ition. The Kuomintang militarists who had become tools of international imperialists lost further prestige among the road masses by their raid on the C. E. R. This conflict stimulated increased activity among the Chinese workers and peasants. A esh wave of strikes and demonstrations of Chinese toilers swept e country, particularly the huge demonstrations in Shanghai on uly 26 and August 1, which expressed sympathy for the U. S. S. R. CHAPTER VI A Fresh Upsurge of the Revolution and the Struggle for Soviets THE CHINESE COUNTER- REVOLUTION suffered utter bankruptcy in its foreign and home policy. The bourgeois- landlord bloc failed to remove, or even to alleviate, a single one of the contradictions which gave rise to the Chinese revolution. International imperial-ism did not surrender but clung still more tightly to its privileges and strengthened its rule in China. The country remained dis-united. The power of Chinese militarism was not undermined in the least. Not a single step had been taken to solve the agrarian problem. The masses of the people remained in their former state of subjection. Revival of the Workers' and Peasants' Movement The Nanking counter- revolution strengthened the imperial-ist regime of colonial exploitation and the predatory landlord-militarist plunder of the masses of the toilers. Consequently, the state of utter economic ruin, the monstrous impoverishment of the masses of the people and the sharp intensification of class antagonism could not but lead to a fresh upsurge of the revolu-tion in China. The working class movement rapidly emerged from the stat of depression into which it had fallen after the defeat of th revolution of 1925- 27. The strike wave began to rise most markedly in the second half of 1928. In that year about 400,000 workers were involved in strikes; in 1929, however, the number of workers involved in strikes rose to 750,000. The strike move-nt bore mainly an economic character, but as time went on the ns of the Chinese workers began to acquire a political color. and more frequently demands were put forward for the e of imprisoned labor leaders, for the dissolution of Kuo-intang unions, and for freedom to organize proper trade unions. re and more frequently slogans were advanced against the omintang and international imperialism. About 5 0, O 0 0 Shang-workers took part in the First of May demonstration in 1929; over 100,000 workers in different parts of China responded the appeal of the Communist Party to demonstrate on Inter-a1 Anti- War Day on August 1. In 1930 the strike move-continued to grow and assumed a more persistent and growth of the working class move-ant movement began to revive in the remes by poverty and anger the Chinese in larger and larger masses into an armed is- landlord regime. The peasant par-first units of the Chinese workers' ere created and successfully developed. the insurgent movement were created, ts sprang up. Already at the end of 1927, Haifeng and Lufeng, two districts in the province of Kwang-ng, the revolutionary forces led by Communists overthrew the ndlords, defeated and disarmed the landlords' self- defense oops and the first Soviet district was established which lasted era1 months. The leader of the Hailufeng Republic was one the most prominent leaders of the Communist movement in ' na and a beloved leader of the peasantry, Comrade Peng Pai, o subsequently, in 1929, was shot in Shanghai. hile the counter- revolutionary Trotskyists, who had united followers of the renegade Chen Tu- hsiu to fight against out the doom of the Chinese revolution and ed stabilization of the bourgeois- landlord ime in China, the heroic Chinese Communists did not lay their arms but amidst the severe conditions of underground ared the masses for fresh battles. Partic-n the creation of the Chinese Red Army was rendered by Comrades Mao Tse- tung, Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Peng Pai, Fang Chi- min, Huang Kung- lueh and Ho Lun These were heroic fighters and staunch Bolsheviks who, in sp i f suffering and privation, did not for a single day cease fighting for the cause of the Communist Party and for the vital interests of the Chinese people. At the head of the whole Party Mao Tse- tung, Chu Teh, Fang Chi- min and scores of other present leaders of the Chinese Red Army passed through the furnace of the revolutionary event with which the past ten years of Chinese history are filled. They mobilized and led the masses into battle when the revolution was advancing, at the rise of the revolutionary tide; and they, too, led the masses in retreat, in the stern days of the temporary defeat of the revolution in 1925- 27. They passed through the stern school of the class struggle together with, and at the head of, the masses. They are true knights knowing no fear or doubt. They devoted all their seething energy to the task of preparing the masses for a new revolutionary upsurge. And it is not sur-prising that Mao Tse- tung, Chu Teh, Farg Chi- min and the other most devoted Bolsheviks were the first organizers and banner bearers of the victorious Soviet movement in China. They rallied the broad masses of the toilers for the armed struggle against imperialism and the Chinese counter- revolution. They formed the first units of the workers* and peasants' Red Army. They saw in this army the true and indomitable bulwark of the national revolution and did all they could to multiply its forces and strengthen its contacts with the masses of the people. Under their tried leadership the Chinese Red Army invariably emerged victorious from innumerable battles and covered itself with undying glory. Mao Tse- tung, Chu Teh, Fang Chi- min and the other leaders of the Red Army deservedly became universal1 recognized national heroes whose exploits have been interwoven in popular legend, and which even their bitterest enemies dare not- d. eny. The main core of the Chinese Red Army was the Fourt Army Corps which in 1928, under the command of Mao rung and Chu Teh, operated in the almost inaccessible m tains of Tsinkangshan in the province of Kiangsi and soon e heroic march into West Fukien. In the beginning of e Fourth Army Corps was joined by a regiment com-by Peng Teh- huai, which had rebelled against the Kuo- !& shed himself as one of the most talentedleaders of the Chinese Red Army. The Red Army grew rapidly and became hardened and produced its talented commanders. In 1928 it was 10,000 strong, but in 1929 its numbers had grown to 22,000. I n the beginning of 1930 there were already 19 Soviet dis-tricts each of which covered from one to four counties. In the Soviet districts the slogans of the agrarian revolution were put into pactice and the workers and peasants were given arms. The Soviet movement achieved the greatest success in the South and ceritral provinces of China in which favorable soil had been pre-pared by the revolution of 1925- 27. In May, 1930, the Red Army consisted of 13 army corps of a total strength of 62,000, more than half of which were furnished with rifles. # The Anti- Commtem Line of Li Li- san f the workers' and peasants' movement con- Communist Party of China with very complicated t time the Party had greatly strengthened its ranks contacts with the masses. In January, 1930, it had a ,528. The Party also grew stronger ideologi-tting the putschist tendencies which threatened y's ties with the workers and peasants, the Party waged a determined struggle against pessimistic nks, against its faint- hearted members who the revolution became pessimistic, lost their ctive and slipped into liquidationism. During the C. E. R. conflict the Party conducted a wide campaign in de-fettse of the U. S. S. R. in the course of which it proved its inter-nationalism in deeds and showed that it thoroughly understood ary tasks of the working class. what was in the main a correct line, up to the sum-the Communist Party achieved very important suc-cesses in all spheres of its activity. In the summer of 1930, how- \ 67 ever, when the revolutionary struggle was beginning to flare up again, the policy advocated by Li Li- san, which ran counter to the line of the Communist International, began to predominate in the leadership of the Party. Li Li- sanys policy was based on the assumption that the Chinese and world revolution would soon . ainst Li Li- san's semi- Trotskyist policy was hanghai section of the Party under the leadership This fight for a correct line was quite success-best forces of the Party around himself, Com-yu ( Wang Ming), one of the most prominent mittee, held in January, 193 1, that the political line of the rty leadership was straightened nut. The Fourth Plenum ected a new Party leadership, exposed the anti- Leninist char-ter of Li Li- san's policy and repelled the attempt of the ght opportunists to impose a defeatist program of retreat upon e Party. In doing this the Fourth Plenum played an extremely portant part in the further Bolshevization of the Party. The Growth of the Red Army e effect of the strengthening of the Communist Party was in the enormous new successes achieved by the Soviet move-t. The Red Army defeated the first campaign of the Kuo-ntang generals waged against the Soviet districts. This campaign s started in December, 1930. A Kuomintang army numbering 00 was hurled against the Soviet districts. But already in ry, 1931, the Red Army, after defeating more than five ing divisions, compelled the Kuomintang forces to retreat anic from the Soviet districts. The same fate awaited the d campaign against the Soviet districts which was started in , 193 1. Thanks to the heroic support of the working popula-he Red Army defeated the second campaign, notwithstanding numerical and, to a large extent, technical superiority of the conducted its military operations against the The victories of the Red Army led to a considerable e pansion of the territory of the Soviet government. The Army itself grew into a mighty force. In 1931 the regular of the Red Army already numbered 100,000. The streng the Red Guard was about the same. Several hundred thousand young workers and peasants belonged to the semi- military you organization known as the Young Guard. Such was the situation in China when the Japanese imperia ists invaded Manchuria and thus opened a new page in the histo of the colonial enslavement and partition of China. Japanese Occupation of Manchuria On September 18, 193 1, the Japanese imperialists started thei piratical war against China. In the course of several days their troops occupied all the most important centers of Manchuria. As a result of these operations Japanese imperialism usurped territo two and a half times the area of Japan itself. It reduced t 30,000,000 Chinese toilers inhabiting Manchuria to the position of colonial slaves. It was not difficult for the Japanese imperialists ~ o find a pretext for their invasion. They provoked anti- Chinese riots in Korea and Korean- Chinese conflicts in Manchuria. Then they seized upon the alleged murder on the frontiers of Mon-golia of a Japanese general staff officer named Nakamura. Finally, they seized upon the alleged destruction of the permanent way of the Japanese- owned South Manchurian Railway by Chinese sol-diers as the immediate pretext for starting their predatory war. Posing as the champions of justice and order the Japanese im-perialists poured into Manchuria. The real purpose of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria is to out the broad and far- reaching imperialist plans of the ese capitalists and landlords. By seizing Manchuria the apanese imperialists hope to entrench themselves on the Asiatic ainland, to use Manchuria as a place d'armes for a further attack rest of China, and to strengthen the position of imperialist in the Pacific and in the whole world. ot meeting with any serious resistance on the part of the ese generals, the Japanese imperialists occupied the three rovinces of Manchuria without any particular difficulty or ex-the Japanese militarists were not content with this. to lay their hands on the northern part of China and hanghai district. On January 21, 1932, the Japanese pre-ultimatum to the Chinese government demanding the of anti- Japanese organizations and the cessation of oycott of Japanese goods. On January 28 the Japanese riali? ts started military operations against the Chinese section usurpatory actions of the Japanese militarists gave a 1 impetus to the anti- imperialist struggle. The general Mukden and Anshan, the strike in all the Japanese hanghai, as well as a number of strikes and anti- Japanese and students' demonstrations in a rumber of other towns to the determination of the Chinese proletariat and of whole of the Chinese people to fight for the integrity and ndence of their country. broad partisan movement began to spread over Manchuria. guerilla warfare, which assumed a more and more per-ent and mass character, created increasing difficulty for the invaders. The heroic struggle which the workers, and soldiers of the 19th Army waged for two months ed the Japanese troops from capturing the Shanghai dis-was the treachery of the Nanking Kuomintang militarists led the Japanese to achieve their aims. Nevertheless, in he measures taken by the Nanking government to sup-anti- Japanese movement, the latter continued to grow. n petty bourgeoisie was once again drawn into the anti-struggle. The students of Peking, Shanghai, Nan-an fu and other cities organized huge anti- Ja of government buildings and the editorial intang newspaper. . situation the successes Revolution in Russia, the First Congress of Chinese Soviets opened in Juikin, in the province of Kiangsi. Prior to that t Red Army had defeated the third Kuomintang campaign again the Soviet districts. This campaign was started by Chiang Kai- sh on July 2, 1931. He marched against the Chinese Soviets at t head of an army of 300,000. At general headquarters as we as at divisional headquarters he had German military advisers. Nevertheless, on this occasion also the Red Army was vict The Nanking forces were utterly defeated. The Red routed 17 Kuomintang divisions and captured 25,000 rifles. this time the Red Army had grown to 150,000. At the time of the First Congress of Soviets the Soviet move-ment had spread to 300 counties having a population of several tens of millions. Six hundred and ten delegates attended the Congress, representing all the Soviet districts. The Congress, at which great enthusiasm prevailed, passed a number of laws whi indicated the main trend of policy of the Chinese Soviets, such a draft of the Constitution, a land law, a labor law, a law economic policy, resolutions on the Red Army, on the Sov state, on the national question, etc. A provisional central Soviet government was elected with Comrade Mao Tse- tung as presi-dent and Comrades Hsiang Yin and Chang Kuo- tao as vice-he draft Constitution that was adopted defined the aims inese Soviet Republic guarantees the which it passed officially formulated the policy of the ese Soviets in the various spheres of their activity. Of special mportance is the land law which was passed. How does t evolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat santry in China achieve the revolutionary solution of arian problem? In the Soviet districts the land of the land1 d other big private landowners was confiscated without com-ensation. The confiscated land was divided among the easants. All verbal as well as written feudal and extortionate greements were annulled. All the debts of peasants and poor city dwellers to usurers were wiped off. Attempts to revive en-lavement for debt, or any other of the old relations between surer and debtor, are punished with all the severity of revolu-onary law. Freedom of action is granted to the revolutionary gricultural laborers' unions and groups of poor peasants which serve as the bulwark of the Soviets in the rural districts in bring-bout the revolutionary agrarian changes. The former numer-nd burdensome taxes have been superseded by a single gradu-tax, the whole burden of which falls upon the wealthy and J exploiting classes. At the same time the Soviets are taking measures to improve he technique of agriculture, to extend the area of cultivation, o improve the cultivation of the soil, and to increase the yield f crops. Soviet bodies are collecting selected seed and are supply-them to the peasant farms. They are increasing the output of e and other fertilizers for the peasant fields. They organize e repair and manufacture of agricultural imple and build new irrigation systems, and mobi for the purpose of carrying out the sowing a gns. As a result of all these measures the con of the peasantry in the Soviet districts t is true that before the First Congress of Soviets kes had been committed in a number of districts in c he agrarian policy. For example, in some pi ded on various pretexts in retaining possession o In other places agricultural laborers were not give " not to destroy the proletarian base in the rural dist were cases where local authorities would not grant land to Red Army men on the ground that " if they receive land they will no longer want to fight". In some districts the local authorities insisted upon dividing the land equally among all peasants with-out taking into consideration the desires and temper of the masses of the peasants. In other districts attempts were made to form collective farms and state farms before the conditions were ripe for this, etc. After the First ' Congress of Soviets mistakes and distortions of Soviet policy of this kind became more and more rare. The Labor Law and Cultural Work The workers in the Soviet districts also obtained considerable improvements. The eight- hour day has been introduced in all districts. For agricultural laborers the working day is fixed by agreement. The working day for young people is shorter than for adults. The principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women is applied. Conditions of labor have improved a great deal compared with what they were in the past, and this applies also to the behavior of employers toward their employees. The workers have secured considerable increases in wages. The overwhelming majority of the workers in the Soviet districts are organized in trade unions. The practical measures carried out by the Soviets in the interests of the workers and peasants help to awaken the broad masses of the toilers to active political life and stimulate the growth of their organization and political consciousness. All sorts of public organizations seethe with activity. The revolutionary initia-tive of the common people is developing. This is facilitated by the emancipation of women and the complete equality of the toilers f the various nationalities. A very important part in the life of the viet districts is played by the trade unions, at the head of which the member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, omrade Liu Shao- chi. he workers and peasants are displaying a strong desire for n. A wide network of educational institutions has been ed. For example, in the county of Ningtu, where formerly ere were only a few schools, there are now 350 elementary Is, 580 evening schools, 13 clubs and numerous circles for dation of illiteracy. successes of the Soviet movement and the historic vic-the Red Army have placed China in the front rank of nal revolutionary movement in the colonial world. The Second Congress of Soviets All these gains of the Chinese workers and peasants were olidated at the Second Congress of Soviets where, also, easures for the further improvement of the conditions of the ilers were put forward. The Second Congress of Soviets was opened on January 22, 934, in the town of Juikin. There were present 821 delegates and about 1,5 00 visitors. The social composition of the delegates eresting. According to the report of the Credentials Com-e, among the delegates there were eight industrial workers, artisans, 5 3 coolies, two shop assistants, 122 agricultural borers, 303 poor peasants, 25 middle peasants and 64 small shop-s, students, professional people and others. the period between the First and Second Congresses of the the Chinese Red Army defeated the fourth and fifth ns of the Kuomintang generals against the Soviet dis- I t is well known that instead of fighting the Japanese ialists the Nanking Kuomintang concentrated all its forces suppression of the Soviet movement. In February, 1932, uomintang started its fourth campaign and in the summer 3 it organized its fiftn" campaign against the Soviet districts. h it was defeated, and the strength and prestige of the nese Red Army and of the Chinese Soviets were greatly The most outstanding item on the agenda of the Second ress of Soviets was the report of the President of the Soviet nment, Comrade Mao Tse- tung. In the course of his report ao Tse- tung strikingly summed up the results of the past rs of struggle and indicated definite measures for mobilizing masses to repel the sixth Kuomintang campaign which was icipated. He quoted interesting facts indicating the gains which e workers had achieved in the Soviet districts. Conditions of labor had improved and wages had risen. As a result of the agrarian reforms the conditions of the masses of the peasantry had markedly improved. In the course of one year, the yield of the peasant fields had increased 20 per cent. " Compared with the Kuomintang period the lives of the peasants had to eat the bark of trees, grass, etc. At the present time, not only has year to year. I Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mif, P. (Pavel) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived New York : Workers Library Publishers Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource digitized 6/7/2007 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0007 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1937 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/05b39803bdde82ce36d2382f80929ff8.pdf 1a7cdf54160316d5ee07e6b3d7f5c1cc https://ideasproject.org/files/original/e145e0846febd4462f002fc2e6b44fa8.pdf 1a7cdf54160316d5ee07e6b3d7f5c1cc Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Document A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 40 p. ; 19 cm. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Militarist wars and revolution in China : a Marxian analysis of the new reactionary civil war and prospects of the revolution in China Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Chinese Communist Party; CCP Description An account of the resource The major part of this pamphlet was first published in a series of eight articles in the Daily Worker (Nov. 25 to Dec. 2, 1929) Transcript of pamphlet text: By EARL BROWDER A valuable document of the Chinese Revolution. An excellent description of events forming the historical background to the discussions in this new pamphlet. SALE AT REDU For all who have an interest in th hak-ing China directly involving one- fourth of the entire human race, this booklet is an indispensible source of information and understanding. The Chinese Revolution, which shook the entire world of imperialism in 1925- 27, is gathering its forces for a new upward swing which will have deeper and more lasting effects both upon the life of the Chinese masses and upon the rest of the world. In this booklet will be found the key to an understanding of the current' events, and the forces behind them, in China, which are a prelude to a new period of revolutionary development. Those who have followed the development of the Kuomintang, from its period of revolutionary anti- imperialist struggle when it was allied with the Chinese Communist Party and received the fraternal support of the Soviet Union ( 1924- 1927), to its breakdown in July 1927 and its surrender to the imperialists, and on to the present day when this Kuomintang has become nothing but a tool in the hands of various foreign imperialist powers, will find in the following pages the key to the understanding of the forces which made inevitable this evolution of the Kuomintang. The events of 1927, the ft Revolution, was described in a booklet (" Civil War in Nationalist China." pub-lished in 1927), in the form of the notes of an American participant in some of the events of that time. As the author of that descriptive pamphlet, which dealt with the treacherous events at the time they were happening, I wish to recommend the present booklet as the best analysis of these events and their consequences which has yet appeared in the English language. I t is a permanent contribution to the political literature on the Chinese Revolution. As such it is a con-, tribution to the world struggle to overthrow the rule of imperialism. November 21, 1929. EARL BROWDER. CONTENTS 1. Introduction.- No Stability and Peacef elopment for China under a Semi- feudal Bourgeois Regime. 2. Economic Basis of the Militaris Regime and Civil Wars in China - False Bourgeois Interpretations. 3. The Social and Political Content and Present Alignment of Reactionary Forces and the New Civil War in China. A. The Chiang Clique and the Nanking Regime. The Shanghai National Bourgeoisie and the Chiang Kai- shek Clique. Chiang Kai- shek and American Imperialism. The Nanking Regime. B. The Anti- Nanking Bloc. The Metamorphosis of the Kuomintang " Left" Wingers The " Third Party" Group. Chang Hsueh- liang and the Kwangsi Militarists. Feng Yu- Hsiang, the " Christian General." Yen Msi- shan, the " Model" Governor of Shansi. 4. Conclusion.- The Outcome of the Civil War and Prospects of the Revolution in China. The New Government Following the Present Civil War. Present Conditions in the Labor and Peasant Movements in China. The Rising Revolutionary Wave in China and the Oppor-tunist Right Wingers. The Nature and Tasks of the Revolution in China. The Chinese Communist Party and the Revolution in China. The Chinese Revolution, the American Working Class, and the Chinese Workers in America. Author's Note. 1. INTRODUCTION- D PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT FOR CHINA UNDER A SEMI-FEUDAL BOURGEOIS REGIME. Less than two years since the so- called " unification" of China by the Kuomintang, a second civil war of reaction is raging in China. The roaring guns of the rival militarist groups are again reminding the world of the existence of grave contradictions in China, un-solved and insoluble by the semi- feudal and bourgeois regime. Any-body with a true Marxist understanding of the Chinese situation knew even at the height of the short period of peace which Chiang Kai- shek's regime enjoyed that it could never last long. I t was not surprising that soon after the fall of Peking which Chiang Kai- shek declared as the beginning of the reconstruction period, the Nanking- Kwangsi war broke out. This war, which was a clear expression of Anglo- Japanese and American antagonisms in the Far East and an inevitable result of the conflicting and irreconciliable interest of the different ruling groups of the bourgeoisie and semi- feudal landlords, ended in temporary victory for Chiang Kai- shek. In this fight, Chiang Kai- shek, although doubtless acting as agent of American Imperialism, was not a pure representative of the Chinese bourgeoisie. he ~ hineseb ourgeoisie, not being an independent force, has no pure champion in China. Chiang Kai- shek's Nanking regime thus repre-sented only a temporary combination of the bourgeoisie, particularly the Shanghai bourgeoisie, and a section of the feudal landlords of South China. Thus it was foolish to consider the victory of Chiang Kai- shek in the Nanking- Kwangsi war as the victory of the Chinese bourgeoisie which, as many asserted, would have opened up a vista of peaceful capitalist development for China with the help of Ameri-can finance capital. It is equally foolish to assume that the defeat of the Kwangsi clique meant the defeat of British imperialism and hence its retreat from China. The short period of peace that followed the conflict was pregnant with troubles. British imperialism was busily looking for another tool or strengthening the old one, and the rival militarists, reflecting the conflict between the different 6 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA strata and groupings of the ruling classes, were hastily preparing for a new trial of strength. The ~ isbandment Conference which made such a loud noise and caused many easily deluded people to believe in its effectiveness, represented merely a process of bargaining between the different militarists, a step in the preparation for a new war. But as soon as the conference ended, rumors pointing to a new conflict sifted through the most closely censored press. War clouds gathered fast. Politicians were still talking about the possibilities of a peaceful development, but even the most credulous began to doubt. Soon the truth unfolded itself. War was declared on Chiang Kai- shek by Chang Fa Kwai on September 26 and with the combined advance of the Kwangsi clique and Chang Fa Kwai's forces from the South and Feng Yu Hsiang's Kuon~ inchiun from the North against Chiang Kai- shek, the second civil war of reaction in two years has actually begun. Thus history has again confirmed the infallible truth of the Marxist dictum that the Chinese bourgeois feudal regime can never solve the contradictions and unify China. Only a Soviet govern-ment o~ f the workers and peasants of China can basically solve the Chinese question, unify the country and put it on the road of peace-ful and upward development ! 2. ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE MILITARIST REGIME AND C I V I L WARS I N CHINA. The root of the trouble in China has to be sought for in its econ-omic conditions. It is not an accident that China is not a really in-dependent and unified country but is composed of autonomous states practically governed by independent semi- feudal militarist groups, the leaders of semi- feudal landlords and native bourgeoisie, which are backed by different imperialist powers. I t is not merely because of the wickedness of individual militarists that the militarist groups fre-quently indulge in figthing against each other for the extension of their respective territories and the control of the central government. A close examination of the social forces at work in China will show that these conditions are primarily the expression of the semi- feudal character and colonial status of Chinese economy. Comrade Chiu Wito, a leading theoretician in the Chinese Comn~ unist Party, wrote a remarkable paragraph on this point in an unpublished manuscript in MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 7 which he gave a brief but clear analysis of the economic background in China in the following words: " Under the hegemony of imperialism, China is cut up into differ-ent spheres of influence- the imperialists; especially Great Britain and Japan, each occupy a certain area in China- each of the different areas in China has its own semi- independent local market, com-mercial capital of a local character, financial apparatus, and military force. The imperialists brought the economic centers of these areas into their own ( imperialist) economic organism. This is a very good basis for the ' militarists' regime' and ' the division of the country by militarists.' At the same time, each iniperialist power fights for the control of the nominal central government- the existence of such a central government provides an apparatus for ' legalizing' the ' in-fluence' or ' interests' which the imperialist powers acquired in China. Under the circumstances, the remnants of feudalism and backward agrarian relations remain completely preserved and provide a basis for the militarist regime in China." ( Translated from the Chinese version of an unpublished manuscript entitled, " Observa-tions on the Peasant Problem in China." Permission for quoting from this manuscript was obtained from the author.) In other words, there are two elements in Chinese economy which bring about the present situation. The first element is the semi-feudal pro- capitalist economy of the country whose sectionalist character provides a basis for a decentralized political system with civil strife as the necessary outcome. However, the economic con-dition of a country is not and can never be static. Had China been " left alone" and gone through a " free" and normal capitalist de-velopment, it would have been possible for China to develop into an industrial nation with the necessary political superstructure of a centralized modern state and unified native bourgeois regime. ( Of course, for the sake of clarity in discussion we assume that there is no socialist revolution which would certainly put the country on an entirely different path.) But such is not the fate of China. Just about the time when China was about to enter such a stage of de-velpoment wo'rld capitalism had already ushered in its last stage, imperialism, which in its mad grasp for colonies, speedily harnessed China to the chariot of colonial servitude. " The fundamental ten-dency of colonial exploitation acts in the direction of hindering the development of productive forces in the colonies, of despoiling them 8 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA of their natural riches and, above all, of exhausting the reserves of human productive forces in the colonial countries . . . This is the essence of its function of colonial enslavement: " the colonial country is compelled to sacrifice the interests of its inde-pendent development and to play the part of an economic ( agrarian-raw material) appendage to foreign capitalism . . . " ( Colonial Thesis of Sixth World Congress of the Cornintern. Inprecorr, Eng-lish Edition, Vol. 8, No. 88, Page 1663.) Yes, an economic appendage to foreign capitalism- this is what I meant by colonial status, the second element of Chinese economy. It is precisely this status that oppresses the Chinese workers and peasants by extorting surplus value from their labors, that drain the country of its riches, and hinders the development of productive forces in China. I t is precisely this status that preserves the remnants of feudalism and backward agrarian relation's which firovide a firm basis for the hated militarist regime! The presence of imperialist influences in China, which maintains the colonial status, carries with it all the inherent contradictions of imperialism. The situation is made worse and more precarious be-, cause of the fact that there is not only one imperialist power in China, like the British in India, but several imperialist powers whose con-flicting interests always collide with each other. The rival imperialist powers, by bringing each economic center of the various local areas ( spheres of influence) into their ( imperialists') respective economic organisms, inject fresh contradictions into the semi- feudal economy of China already full of sharp contradictions of its own and thus intensify the conflict between the local groups. Hence we see that the militarist regime and civil wars in China are the inevitable result of econ80mic conditions in the country, a condition that can only be changed by a workers' and peasants' revoluton! FALSE BOURGEOIS INTERPRETATIONS. Bourgeois writers naturally close their eyes to these facts and re-fuse to see the truth of such an explanation. Many have offered in-genious explanations that serve either to expose the ignorance and dishonesty of the writer or to illustrate the ridiculous stupidity of all such apologies for bourgeois policy. Some said that the corruption of Chinese officials is the cause of the troubles in China. Some even went so far as to assign official corruption as an inherent characteristic MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 9 of the Chinese race! Others try to explain the troubles in China by assigning as main causes such factors as Chinese philosophy, ancestor worship, the family system, etc., which are merely the superstructure of the semi- feudal economy that imperialism is doing its best to pre-serve and perpetuate in China. Dr. F. J. Goodnow, former president of John Hopkins University and a well known expert on Chinese affairs in the camp of American imperialism, offered a geographical explanation. He writes in the National Geographic Magazine of June, 1927, the following: " There is probably no section of the world where geographical conditions have had a more potent influence over its history and over the character of the people than! the part of Asia which we speak of as China . . . The geographical and topographical situation of China has had two important results; first, a country which is probably more suited than any other part of the world for the production of purely agricultural products; and second, a frequent political division into a north and a south China." Even if it is true that before China's contact with capitalism and western industrial development, geographical peculiarities, which excluded China from extensive commercial relations with the outside world and thus deprived her of the stimulus of a wide oversea market, might have been partly responsible for China's stagnation in her economic life, still once this isolation was broken down, and once the technology of the Industrial Revolution was introduced into China, the geographical impediments which retarded China's earlier development lost their significance. Indeed, the geographical in-heritance of China, with its rich resources, fertile soil, a n d teeming population ( if we consider population a geographic factor) should be considered as very favorable for industrial development. Dr. Good-now was probably letting his wishes run away with him when he asserted that China is " a country probably more suited than any other part of the world for the production of purely agricultural products." ( How about America and Russia?- R. D.) No doubt it has been and it still is the policy of imperia- lism to keep China an agricultural appendage of the metropolis and Dr. Goodnow's theory is nothing more than an apology and a justification of this policy. A glance at the railroad map of China is sufficient to show that the railroads of China which were mostly planned and built by the im-perialists were not laid out with the purpose of connecting up the 10 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA whole country as a unit and creating a national market but were built regionally, each imperialist power working for its own end and creating its own economic center. This is merely one concrete expression of the colonial policy of the imperialists that plunges China into economic disruption and political chaos and keeps her from entering upon the road of " freey' and " normal" industrial de-velopment! I t is imperialism and the semi- feudal economy which imperialism seeks to perpetuate in China that are responsible for the " frequent political division into a north and a south China" and not " the geographical and topographical situation" which Dr. Goodnow unsuccessfully tried to make the scapegoat. Thus the high priests of bourgeois society vainly seek an explana-tion that would exonerate the capitalist system ( imperialism) from the crime of maintaining a regime of chaos and murder, the militarist regime, in China; an explanation which would delude the masses into believing that it is the " corrupt officials," " Chinese philosophy," or " geographical peculiarities" and not imperialism that is responsible for their misery. I t is the duty of every class conscious worker and revolutionist to expose the falsehood and counter- revolutionary role of these theories and explain to the masses the real cause of the troubles in China. 3. THE SOCIAL AND POL N T AND PRESENT ALIGNMENT OF FORCES AND THE NEW CIVIL WAR IN CHINA.. Early in July this year, Comrade Chiu Wito gave us a very clear picture of the contradictions in China that were bound to bring about a civil war in the near future. He said: " The background of the militarist wars in China can be described as the following: ( 1) the struggle between British, Japanese and American imperialists for spheres of influence in China and the right to control the central government; ( 2) the struggle between the various militarist groups for territories, representing the combined interests of commercial capitalists in the local markets and the gentry and landlords; ( 3) the struggle of the Shanghai national bourgeoisie ( including banking capitalists and compradores, the capitalists of the big industrial and commercial banks) for the control of all the markets of the nation, demanding the local markets ( such as Han- MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 11 kow, Canton, Tsingtao, Tientsin, and Dairen, etc.) to abolish their semi- independent character and obey Shanghai, and thus to bring about the unification of the national market; hence the conflict with the local militarists. These three causes of civil wars in China are closely related to each other." ( Taken and translated from a Chinese pamphlet entitled " International Struggle Against Opportunism.") Two months after the above words of Comrade Chiu were writ-ten, the opening battles of the present civil war of reaction were fought. Nobody who was familiar with the situation in China was surprised; everybody who has an interest in Chinese politics was pa-tiently waiting for the curtain to rise. The general aggravation of international and internal contradictions in China made the war inevitable in the nearest future and the war came at this particular time because of the more or less simultaneous occurrence of the fol-lowing events which precipitated the inevitable clash. The urgent de-mand of the northern commercial bourgeoisie to move the capital back from Nanking to Peking, hoping thus to afford a relief to the acute economic depression in the North which was greatly aggravated by the removal of the capital to Nanking, temporarily reconciled the contradictions among the Northern militarists and hastened their suothwaid drive. The worsening of famine conditions in the north-western provinces, the territory under Feng Yu- Hsiang's control, with little or no prospect of relief, presented a grave food problem for Feng Yu Hsiang's army and thus gave the " Christian General" a strong impetus to descend southward at the earliest possible mo-ment. The prolonging of the " Sino- Soviet Crisis" weakened Nan-king's position and thus strengthened the positio'n of Feng Yu- Hsiang, and, at the same time, alienated Chang Hsueh- liang's ( the Manchu-rian war lord) support of Nanking. The Disbandment Conference last April which was nothing more than a preparation for the new civil war was used by both sides as a weapon of manouvre and pr~~ paganda. Soon after the closing of the conference Chiang Kai- shek accused Feng Yu Hsiang and his allies of defying the attempts of the " Central" Government ( Nanking) to carry out the decisions of the Disbandment Confer-ence while the insurgents declared that Chiang Kai- shek only at-tempted to disband the other's troops while re- enforcing his own. Of course it is true that, as far as the interests of the Chinese na-tional bourgeoisie are concerned, they are in favor of the disband- 12 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA ment of the Chinese troops, which are no good for modern warfare and constitute a heavy burden and nuisance to Chinese businessmen. This explains why the strongest advocate of disbandment, which meant to reduce the standing army to a minimum, was T. V. Soong, the chief spokesman of the national ( Shanghai) bourgeoisie. But the Nanking Government, as later explanations will show, is not a purely bouregois government. Chiang Kai- shek, while partly cham-pioning the cause of the national bourgeoisie, is a local militarist him-self, and also relies on the support of other local militarists. There-fore to Chiang Kai- shek, the Disbandment Conference was both a maneuver and a propaganda campaign. It was a maneuver to disarm his rivals peacefully, if he could, but if he could not, to use it as an excuse, as he did, to launch a military expedition against the rival militarists. It was, at the same time a propaganda campaign for deceiving the masses. But Chiang Kai- shek's rivals refused to be out- maneuvered. They said yes to all the empty resolutions at the Conference, but left the Conference in haste as soon as its sessions were closed, and hurried back to their respective semi- fudal " capitols" to prepare for the coming civil war. The Kwangsi militarists struck the first blow, with Feng Yu Hsiang and others hesitating and looking for a chance to get some advantage out of the Nanking- Kwangsi war. The Kwangsi militarists col-lapsed after a short struggle, and Chiang Kai- shek emerged vic-torious and proceeded to brandish his " disbandment" clubs over Feng Yu I- Isiang's head. Chang Fa Kwei, who had connections with the " Reorganizationists" and showed signs of disobeying Chiang Kai- shek was also to have his troops disbanded. Chang Fa- Kuai soon revolted, and his war cry against Chiang Kai- shek was echoed and re- echoed on all sides, by various militarist groups, each having its own particular grievances against the dictator but all working for his downfall. The reports about the war are so confusing that it is not possible to examine in detail with a fair degree of accuracy the military pro-gress of the warfare. Fortunately, such an examination is not neces-sary here. The important things to know are the political and social content of the groups involved and their part in the march of events toward the Chinese revolution. MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 13 A. THE CHIANG CLIQUE AND THE NANKING The present civil a combined attack the " Central" Government the Chiang clique. Therefore, we will begin our analysis with a brief survey of the Nanking group and its regime. THE SHANGHAI NATIONAL BOURGEO THE CHIANG KAI- SHEK CLIQUE. I t is true that Nanking serves as the agent of Am ial-ism and at the same time represents the interests of Shanghai bour-geoisie. It is also true that Nanking's tottering existence signifies, as Comrade Chiu said, " the struggle of the Shanghai national bour-geoisie for the control of all the markets of the nation, demanding the local markets ( such as Hankow, Canton, Tsingtao, Tientsin, and Darien, etc.), to abolish their semi- independentcharacter and obey Shanghai, and thus bring about the unification of the national market." But here it should be made clear that Nanking is not a real national government. I t is practically built upon the support of only a few provinces in the lower Yangtze valley. While bearing the name and having the legal status of a national government, Nan-king, ever since its beginning, has always the character of a local government. " Although Chiang Kai- shek represents the Shanghai bourgeoisie, the Shanghai bourgeoisie is grown up together and mixed with certain landlords and compradores. The fact that Chiang Kai- shek must depend upon the support of Chu Pei- Te ( of Kiangsi), Ho Ying Chin ( of Hupeh), Chen Tio- yuan ( of Anbui) and even Ho Chien ( of Huan) is an evidence of this situation!" ( from Chiu Wito's pamphlet "~ nternational Struggle Against Opportunism," pub-lished in Chinese.) In the present conflict the alliance of Chiang Kai- shek with Chen Ming- shu of Kwangtung is a very clear illus-tration of this point.) Chen Ming- shu, with the slogan " Kwang-tung for the ~& angtun~ neseis" almost a pure type of a militarist, representing the semi- feudalists and commercial capitalists of that region. Indeed, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, which is more or less concentrated at Shanghai, is not yet an independent force sufficiently strong enough to dominate the whole country! Since the 14 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA Nanking Government is not a real national bourgoeis government and must rest upon the support of local forces, it cannot proceed along the line of pure bourgeois development. Hence, the civil war in China can never be a progressive war, not even from the point of view of Nanking. The Chiang clique is not a compact body repre-senting the independent bourgeoisie of China ; like the anti- Nanking bloc, it is also a bloc, an allied group, composed of Chiang Kai- shek himself, representing the Shanghai bourgeoisie controlling Kiangsu and Chekiang, and the provincial militarists of Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Fukian, and part of Honan. Such civil wars of reaction, even if Nanking comes out again victorious, can never bring about the real unity of China! The Tenth Plenum of the Communist International has diagnosed the Chinese situation quite correctly in the sentence which says that " the interests of the ruling clique in China are diametrically opposed to the interests of the na-tional unification of China.'' ( Inprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 46, p. 957.) CHIANG KAI- SHEK AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. The dual character of the National Government at Nanking to a large extent also serves to explain the sometimes wavering foreign policy of Nanking. Although Chiang Kai- shek chiefly leans upon American imperialism, the fact that the Yangtse valley is primarily a British sphere of influence together with other circumstances oblige him to flirt not infrequently with his British and Japanese masters, and sometimes he doesn't even hesitate to " pass a night" with either one of the two. The capitulation in the Tsinan case, the recognition of the infamous Nishihara loan, and the Sino- British naval agree-ment are some of the well known products of such " overnight unions." But, by and large, Chiang Kai- shek is primarily pro- American. Of course, Chiang Kai- shek's occasional overtures to Great Britain and Japan weakens America's confidence in him. However, no wise master expects complete fidelity from his servant. So long as he does not resent the master's approaches and carries out his wishes, some kind of support from the master can be assured. Thus we see, despite Chiang Kai- shek's infidelities, America still gives him help in his recent trouble. The American bourgeoisie realizes that it cannot win the Chinese market from England or Japan without a war, and she does not hesitate to start the struggle, on a smaller scale, by MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 15 helping out her agent in Chin he lifting of the arms embargo which makes it legal for forei ers to sell arms to China, but only through the central gov naturally greatly strengthens Chiang Kai- shek. The recent order from Nanking for the largest consignment of army aeroplanes that China has ever made before in any foreign country is of great significance since, owing to the poor arms of the opposing forces, this may be of decisive importance to the outcome of the war. It may be mentioned here that almost the whole air force of China, under Chiang Kai- shek's direction, organized with American capital ( the Curtis interests) and und the command of the famous American adventurer, Albert Ha masquerading as " General Chang" in China. The New York Time of November 1, carries the news that " the Nanking government i now negotiating with the American Oil Company, raise $ 10,000,000 Mexican ($ 5,000,000 gold) advance by giving a 20 per cent rebate." We do not know yet of the negotiations, but the very fact that negotiations certainly proves that American imperialists have not yet of betting on Chiang Kai- shek. The editorials of two capitalist papers in America also betray this attitude the imperialists. The New York Times ( Oct. 16, 1929) said: " whether or not the National Government be- as its supporters assert- the only hope of China, it has succeeded, longer than any of its predecessors, in maintaining a semblance of order in China." The New York Herald- Tribune, ( Oct. 13, 1929) is even more outspoken. It wries: " Chiang thus far has seemed to symbolize civil peace and national unity; that is why the successive revolts against his govern-ment have collapsed." Of course, this over- confidence of American imperialism in Chiang Kai- shek does not mean that if Chiang Kai-shek goes to the dogs, American influence in China will go with him. Imperialists can always find new agents when the old one has served its turn. But in the meantime, I think, the evidence at hand war-rants the conclusion that American imperialism has not yet aban-doned hope in Chiang Kai- shek and is still supporting him. THE NANKING REGIME. The Nanking government was born out of the womb of counter-revolution, when the Chinese bourgeoisie, under the leadership of Chiang Kai- shek, betrayed the Revolution in April, 1927 and organ- 16 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA ized a government at Nanking as a rallying center for all counter-revolutionary forces in South China. Later, as the result of the temporary defeat of the workers and peasants by the combined forces of reaction with the support of imperialism, Nanking became the " central government" of China. Every leaf of the short history of the Nanking regime is stained with the blood of the workers and peasants. It is a record of the most ruthless suppression of mass movements and mass revolts. It is, at the same time, a chronology of corruption, deceit, and failure in internal politics and the most shameful capitulation to foreign powers. Indeed, the two dominant features of the Nanking regime, white terrorist policy toward mass movements and open capitulation to reaction and imgerialism, complement each other. I t was only by the use of unprecedented terrorist methods that Nanking was able to temporarily suppress the revolution and drive the revolutionary move-ment underground, thus making it temporarily safe for the imperial-ists and native bourgeoisie and feudal elements to carry on their grim business of exploitation. Sirce the Nanking government came into power, all the privileges which the workers had gained through bloody struggle during the revolution were abolished and all the lands which the peasants took over during the revolution were taken away and given back to the landlords. All militant trade unions and peas-ant leagues were closed and in their place governmental unions were set up. The workers and peasants were deprived entirely of the freedom of speech, right of organization, and assembly, and strike. The punishment for being a member of the Communist Party or a revolutionary trade union is death. According to conservative esti-mates made in this spring, from the summer of 1927 up to the spring of 1929, within a period of one year and a half, more than half a million Chinese workers and peasants, including women and children, were executed by the Nanking regime. Just take the month of November, 1928, a normal month without mass disturbances in China; the newspapers report 2,169 arrested, 3,236 executed and 53 sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. ( The Chinese Red Flag, Dec. 18, 1928.) The reason why the number of executions exceeds the number of arrests is because many executions took place on the streets without going through the formality of trial. By the fact that many arrests and executions are done in secret and news-papers report only about 20 or 30 per cent of the actual number MILITAR 1ST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 17 of them, the extent and mass character of the white terror can be well imagined. However, while doing its utmost terrorist measures, the Nanking gcve all the contradictions in China, is unwittingly preparing the ground for a new revolution. The unprecedented crisis in agriculture which plays a dominating role in Chinese economy is very severely affecting the whole economic life of China. In July of this year, the Chinese ambassador in the United States stated officially in the press that 37 million people in China were starving. The newspapers in China, foreign or Chinese, are full of tales of horror about the famine. But the g- o vernment has not taken any fundamental measure to meet the crisis. Even in relief work, beyond appropriating the pitiful sum of a half million Mexican dollars, the government is absolutely helpless. Of course Chiang Kai- shek takes $ 1,000,000 from the public treasury for himself each month, but that does not help the situation since he is not yet a famine sufferer! The crisis is cutting; its deep wounds into the economic life of China. One of its results is bound to be the increasing pauperization of the peasantry and further concentra-tion of land into the hands of big landlords, thus strengthening the system of semi- feudalistic method of exploitation and deepening the contradictions in the villages. Nanking recognized the grave situation of class antagonisms in the villages, not only in the famine districts but throughout China, and attempts were made to minimize the con-tradictions by reformist measures. 25 per cent reduction of rents was once put through in Chekian ut the reduction was abolished as soon as the landlords felt a li fer. A commission was set up to work out measures for agrari orm, but no concrete measures could be agreed upon and so far the commission has not offered any definite proposal. The June session of the Kuomintang Executive formally announced its failure to work out measures for agrarian re-form by deciding to postpone all such measures for four & ars. sideby side with the rapid deterioration of agriculture, industry as a whole also remains depressed, especially the heavy industries. The severely oppressed condition of the Tientsin flour mill industry, the reduced production of Chinese Cigarette factories, the stagnation in the leather industry, and the crisis in the silk industry all contribute to present a gloomy picture. ( See M. Volin, China in 1928, published by the Chinese Labor University in Moscow, and also see the Commu- 18 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA nist International, Vol. 6, No. 23.). In addition to the agricultural crisis and industrial depression, Nanking is also faced with financial bankruptcy. The repeated attempts o, f T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's minister of finance and a real spokesman of the Shanghai na-tional bourgeoisie, to put the finances of the country in order met with failure at every turn. Early in August this year, Mr. Soong, in desperation, made a declaration which contains the following words : " During the last year the finances of the whole country have fallen into a most hopeless state. The people are groaning under the im-mense burden. Every one had hoped that, following the unification of the country, the military expenditure would have been reduced and brought into the regular budget. If no guarantee can be given, if even after the Disbandment Conference, the military expenditure still remains unlimited, and the estimates withold exact definition- in such a case our government's ability to obtain financial credits must be reduced to zero, and the financial burdens resting on our people will increase without limit. Life, already extremely difficult, will become impossible." ( Yeh Shih Pao, Peking. August 8, 1929). What a picture of financial bankruptcy! No government can last long under such circumstances. Thus, instead of ushering in a period of prosperity and economic development, as many well- wishers of Nanking expected, Nanking not only remains utterly helpless in the face of an agriculture crisis, industrial depression, and financial bank-ruptcy, but makes the situation worse by corruption, intensified oppression and exploitation of the masses and complete capitulation to the increasingly aggressive encroachments of the imperialist powers. The crucial problem in China's relations with the imperialist powers is the tariff question. In estimating the result of Nanking's foreign policy we must see what alterations Nanking has brought about in connectio* n with this question. Comrade Volin put the question very correctly. He said, " The future position of China in the system of international imperialism and the corresponding form and direction of China's development all depends upon how the tariff problem is solved." ( See M. Volin, China in 1928). What has Nanking done about the tariff problem? Despite the publicity wit) which Nanking tried to emphasize the importance of the empty promise of the powers to grant China tariff autonomy, the history of the tariff negotiations which Nanking conducted last year with the MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 19 powers tells a story of complete defeat. The new tariff rates for-mally promulgated by the Nanking government on December 5, 1928 and put into operation on February 1 of this year, are almost com-pletely the rates proposed by the Japanese, British and American dele-gations at the 1925- 26 Tariff Conference. According to the new rates the import duty on merchandise ranges from 27.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent. Such important commodities as cotton cloth, cotton yarn, cement, coal, porcelain, matches, and paper still maintain the old rate of 7.5 per cent. A glance at the above items is sufficient to show the absolute ineffectiveness of the new tariff agreemnt as a protction to Chinese industry. The new tariff agreement has not even answered the minimum requirement of the most important native industries for protection. Thus, the question of tariff autono-my turned into a question of a slight increase of tariff rates for reve-nue purposes in the hands of Nanking. The control by imperialism of Chinese industry was not even slightly altered by the new tariff agreement! And furthermore, the control of the tariff administra-tion still remains in the hands of foreigners. It is true that the powers made a little concession by allowing Nanking a higher rate than the old agreement. According to the Chinese Tariff Superin-tendent Chang Fa- Yuan's report, the new agreement will yield about 30,000,000 Haikuan Taels additional income for the government. For this meager sum, consider what China lost by the greement! Thirty million taels- what a price! The next important item in Nanking's program on foreign affairs is the abolition of unequal treaties which was later " prudently" changed into a question of mere revision. A careful study of all the " new" treaties concluded by Nanking with imperialist powers re-veals the fact that in those treaties, all the main special privileges enjoyed by foreigners and foreign capital in China are still carefully preserved and guarded. In essence, the so- called " revisions" are no revisions at all! Aside from thes " rvisions," the other dealings which Nanking made with various imperialist powers, such as the recognition of the notorious Nishihara loan, and the new Manchurian railroad agreement with Japan, the Radio and Aviation agreements with American capitalists and the naval agreement with Great Britain, and the invitation of the Kemmerer Commission to China each forms an important chapter in the history of Nanking's complete capitulation to the imperialist powers. 20 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA Thus, Nanking " sold the country," to use a Chinese expression, and intended to keep most of the " proceeds" herself. The strong resentment and dissatisfaction of the other militarist cliques and the particular interest they represent all of whom desire the right to " sell the countryv which means the control of the " central" government, are to be expected. Fanned by the ambitious imperialist powers, especially England and Japan, who desire to change the status quo of the existing division of the spheres of influence and enjoy the benefit of the change, the flame of revolt against Nanking flared up. Rally-ing all the disc0~ 11tented elements against Nanking, the extensive Anti- Nanking bloc was formed. Chang Fa- Kwei made the , rst move in Ichang, and, with a hedious howl, all jumped on Chiang Kai- shek and his clique! B. THE C. The anti- Nanking bloc is a very extensive but most heterogenous combination. It embraces the so- called " left" wingers, or the " re-organizationists," the extreme right wingers, or the Kwangsi militar-ists, Feng Yu- hsiang and his clique, and such " inactive" and seini-open adherents as Yen Hsi- shan of Shansi and Chang Hsueh- liang of Manchuria. Enemies and friends all thrown together, the only basis for a temporary united front is their common hatred for Chiang Kai- shek and his domination of the central government. This bloc has no single leader recognized by all. There is neither a common program nor a unified organization. In the following analysis I will attempt to bring out the social and political content of each group and their respective roles in the present fiasco. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE KUOMINTANG ' LEFT" WINGERS. Although Feng Yu- hsiang's name figures large in the press as the most outstanding military leader of the revolt against Nanking, the ideological leader of the anti- Nanking movement taken as a whole is the so- called " Left Wing" or the (' Re~ r~ anizationisgtr oup" of the Kuomintang, headed by the renegades of the last revolution, Wang Chin- wei and Chen Kui~ g- PO. I t is the most revealing thing to examine the metamorphosis of these petty- bourgeois politicians since MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION those exciting days in May, 1925, which marked the beginning of the last revolutionary wave in China. I think it is one of the most interesting and instructive objective lessons in history. During the first stage of the revolution immediately after May, 1925, when the workers a. nd peasants were just beginning to wake up and the movement was not yet strong enough to be a menace to the Chinese bourgeoisie and landlords, petty- bourgeois phillistines like Wang Chin- wei and Chen Kung- po shouted at the top of their lungs for the interests of the oppressed and advocated a workers' and peasants' revolution. They played the hero of the masses when the masses were not yet a real danger to the class which they represented. But later, in the Wuhan days, in the summer of 1927, when they saw that the influence of the labor movement was growing to tremendous proportions and when the agrarian revolution had actually started with landlords being chased away and peasants taking land over for themselves, Wang Chin- wei and Chen Kung- po and Co. took fright. They bitterly criticised the labor unions and peasants' leagues for having gone " too far" and hurriedly brought out the slogans " slow down the labor and peasant movement," " protect the land and prop-erty of the revolutionary (?) soldiers' families,'' and " protect the interests of merchants and industrialists!" Thus, they unmasked themselves and openly came out as the representatives o'f the interests of the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the small landlords and, at the same time, they joined hands with the semi- feudal land-lords and militarists. Finally, as soon as it became obvious that the workers' and peasants' movement could not be checked in a peace-ful way, that the oppressed classes, once aroused from their slumbers and having tastd power, were determined to have power and fight to the finish for their emancipation, Wang Chin- wei, Chen Kung- po and Co. became desperate and immediately betrayed the revolution in the most shameful fashion. The betrayal was complete. From that time on they sank deeper and deeper into the mud of reaction. I t is a matter of common knowledge that the Canton Uprising of December, 1927, was bathed in blood under the swords of the com-bined forces of Chang Fa- kwai ( Wang Chi- wei's military ally) and Li Fu- ling and by the order of the famous Wang Chi- wei himself! The traitors of Wuhan thus came out as the executioners of Canton! Is it conceivable then that such a group can still play any role in the revolution in the future other than that of its executioner? 22 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA After having taken an active part in crushing the " rear guard fight" of the revolution, Wang Chin- wei and his associates returned ti the task of typical reactionary petty- bourgeois politicians, playing the '( opposition" to Chiang Kai- shek, begging at the doors of various militarists for a chance " to serve," while at the same time publishing magazines and papers again trying to fool the masses and bidding for their support by talking about the interests of the " people." But this time they weremore cautious. Instead of talking of the interests of the peasants and workers alone, they now added the urban petty-bourgeoisie. As for the land question, they merely reiterated the vague slogan of Sun Yat- sen of " equalizing the rights in land" with-out proposing concrete measures for its realization. They openly rejected the revolutionary methods of direct action and mass uprisings and advocated change by peaceful reform. Their hostile attitude toward the Communists and the Soviet Union was becoming increas-ingly vicious ever since the Wuhan days. But their deed were even worse than their words. They worked in the labor unions with the purpose of betraying them and sidetracking the workers. They accepted bribes from various militarists, engineered civil wars, thus trying to get back into the poliical arena for a share of the spoils. Ever since the Nanking- Kwangsi war, Wang Chin- wei, Chen Kung- po and Co. intensified their activities and succeeded in cap-turing a large number of the local branches of the Kuomintang. With these organizations as their stock in trade they bargained with various militarist groups, and took a leading part in engineering the organization of- the Anti- Nanking bloc. The compositi& of this bloc which is now playing the " rebel" against Chiang- Kai- shek is most amazing. I t ranges from the extreme right wing, the Kwangsi militarists, to the so- called " left," " iron- side" general, Chang Fa-kwei. The manifesto, bearing the names of Wang Chin- wei, Chen Kung- po and ten other members of the Central Executive Com-mittee of the Kuomintang, which declared war against Chiang Kai-shek, is a most revealing document- revealing in the sense that it reveals more of Wang Chin- wei than of Chiang Kai- shek. It con-tains ten points, five of which accuse Chiang Kai- shek of corrup-tion, employing only his relatives and friends, embezzlement and mis- appropriation of public funds; two of which expose Chiang's weak foreign policies ; another two of which protest against Chiang's despotism and packing the Third Kuomintang Congress with his MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 23 own men; and one of which objects to Chiang's " illegal murders and ruthless property confiscations against opponents!" ( Emphasis by R. D.) Of course, all these accusations against Chiang Kai- shek are true, but not a word about the rights and interests of the workers and peasants which Chiang & i- shek's regime trampled to the ground! Not a word against the white terror which took the lives of more than half a million workers and peasants but merely an objection to " illegal murders and ruthless property confiscation!"- a mere protest of the rival militarist generals and officials whose property Chiang Kai- shek confiscated! No wonder the correspondent of the London Observer speaks of the manifesto as " not an uncommon manifesto in Chinese politics." It is a typical document of a Chinese militarist, worthy of a Wu- Pei- fu or a Chang Tso- ling. It marks the final step in the complete metamorphosis of Wang- Chin- wei, Chen Kung- po and Co. from petty- bourgeois philistines into stark reac-tionary politicians, open and shameless tools o'f the semi- feudal militarists and imperialists. I dwell so much on Wang owing to the fact that they succ and enjoyed so much popularity among the workers and peasants prior to the Wuhan days, it is probably that some may still enter-tain illusions about them. Such illusions are not difficult to dispel once the facts are known. As for Chang Fa- kwei, the so- called general of " Ironsides," he is nothing more than a military chief of the Wang Chin- wei clique. No further analysis of him is necessary except to point out that his army is no more the old " Ironsides" but merely a collection of mercenaries, entirely devoid of the discipline and revolutionary zeal of the old " Ironsides" of the first Northern Expedition days which were put under his command. Almost all of the old " Ironsides" either died in the first Northern Expedition or were later massacred by reactionary generals including Chang Fa- kwei himself. The few survivors that are left are now fighting under the banner of the Chinese Red Army. THE " THIRD PARTY" GROUP. Another little group of petty- bourgeois phillistines which claims to be even more " left" than Wang Chin- wei, is still busying itself with organizing a petty- bourgeois party with a pretentious friendli- 24 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA ness for the workers. I refer to the pitiful efforts of the " third party" group which is led by Madame Sun Yat- sen, the former General Dun Yen- da, Eugene Chen, the famous foreign minister of the Wuhan government, and Tan Ping- shan, the Con~ munist rene-gade, the classical representative of opportunism. These four horse-men of Chinese social reformism are thinking of naming their party " The Chinese Revolutionary Party" whose program will be somewhat of the same nature as the platform of the Russian " Social Revolu-tionists" ( better known as the SRs). They are " opposed" to both Chiang Kai- shek and the Reorganizationists. They proclaim them-selves to be true disciples of Sun Yat- sen and profess to remain faith-ful to his principles. But there are sharp differences among them-selves as to what they think as the correct interpretation of Sun Yat- senism. However, even if they may reach some agreement in the future, Sun Yat- senism as a whole has already become a reac-tionary ideology. While it played a very useful role in the first stage of the Chinese Revolution, as a consequence of the further process of class- differentiation that has taken place in the country and of the further progress of the revolution, Sun Yat- senism has now changed from being the ideological expression of the develop-ment of that revolution into fetters of its further development, and plays the role of the ideology of counter- revolution. Even the name of Sun Yat- sen lost its magic power as soon as it was converted into a symbol of counter- revolution by the Kuomintang. It has rather become a danger signal which warns the workers and peasants away from it. With Sun Yat- sen as its prophet and the SR as it model, the pitful baby party certainly has a bad start! So far it is still in the stage of formation; it has not yet any mass following but only a small number of petty- bourgeois intellectuals and disheartened revolutionists in its ranks. I think it will never yet a mass following and has very little chance of growing into a fully developed part< The role of the national reformists in China is already filled by the Reorganizationists; there is very little chance for a new party to occupy the same position except as a possible successor. The fact that it has not yet found a militarist to serve and to attach itself to. shows that its special brand of reformism is not yet in demand, which means that it has very little chance of making its debut, at least not in the near future. MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 25 CHANG HSUEH- LIANG AND THE KWANGSI MILITARISTS. Before discussing the two militarists Hsiang, and Yen Hsi- Sha distant " brothers," Cha North East and the Kw West. About these t color is so clear and detailed analysis woul into the shoes of his leadership of the Ma churia is so openly and Hsueh- Liang is so pronouncedly a tool of Japanese imperialism that to say that Japan is behind almost every important move of Chang Hseuh- Liang is not an exaggeration. His recent statement that he found " reasonable points in the manifesto" against Chiang Kai- shek and that " the central government does not mean the government of one man," ( New York Times, Oct. 16) clearly indicates on which side of the fence he stands. His geographical position makes it in-convenient for him to take an active part in a war against Nanking. However, it would be very bad for the anti- Nanking bloc if he actively supported Chiang Kai- sl y merely remaining neutral and thus depriving Chiang ICai- s a powerful ally in the rear of the enemy, Chang Hsueh- Lia dering a great service to his " allies." Ever since their defe Nanking- Kwangsi war this spring, the Kwangsi militarists to their " home" province Kwangsi, and have been intensively preparing for revenge, and a " come back." The Kwangsi clique most outspokenly championed the cause of the semi- feudal gentry and the old trade compradore bour-geoisie connected with British capital, and constituted the extreme right wing of the Kuomintang. Whether the Kwangsi clique will emerge from the struggle weaker or stronger, the semi- feudal gentry and the old trade compradore bourgeoisie will remain a potent force in Chinese politics as long as semi- feudal economy and imperialism hold sway in the country. FENG YU- HSIANG, THE " CHRISTIAN GENERAL" Now we come to Feng Yu- Hsiang, the so- called " Christian Gen-eral," who is a Christian not by birth, but by choice. I want to 26 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA emphasize the word choice because, like everything else that Feng Yu- Hsiang advocated and believed in, he became a Christian to serve his own purpose. I t is not necessary to mention the advantage of having a close connection with the Christian church and the well organized Y. M. C. A. in China. Even the Christian title, which he earned by allowing a priest to sprinkle a few drops of water on him, no doubt serves him as a good letter of introduction to his imperialist masters and, I may add, it also happily possesses the great quality of saving his masters the trouble of memorizing his name. But he is not merely a tool of the imperialists. Every Chinese militarist plays a double role, first as an agent of a certain brand of foreign imperialism, and second as the leader of the native semi- feudal landlords and bourgeoisie of the particular region over which the militarist has control. I t is true that Feng Yu- Hsiang put through some petty " reformist" measures in Shensi, Honan and Kansu, such as the prohibition of luxurious habits, the decree forcing all men living in his territory to shave their heads, the closing of houses of prostitution, the building of workers' baths in one or two cities and official labor unions ( these only in a few localities in Honan). But these measures are either of a distinctly backward character ( prohibition of luxurious habits such as wearing good clothing and giving entertainments and feasts) or reformist demonstrations ( exhibitions) with the specific purpose of fooling the masses and bidding for their support. The fact that he builds a few bath houses for workers while they are starving indicates clearly the purpose of these establishments. Comrade Dun Tsun- Shia of the Profintern correctly calls this a " policy of charity." I disagree with some Comrades who consider Feng Yu- Hsiang as representing the petty bourgeoisie. Considering the economic structure of the provinces he controls, where the system of small landholdings dom-mates, with little or no modern industry, it is very likely that Feng Yu- Hsiang represents the interests of the dominant social strata, the landowners ( whose holding are usually smaller than those of southern landowners) and local commercial capitalists. Most of the officers in his army come from landowning families. His ruthless suppres-sion of the Mohammedan peasant revolt in Kansu and the latter's bitter hatred for him is another indication of the direction of Feng Yu- Hsiang's political orientation. Backed by the landowning class and commercial capitalist ( who MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 27 are closely related to each other), of the Northwestern provinces, and under the direction of his Japanese advisers whom he engaged since his betrayal of the revolution in 1927, Feng Yu- Hsiang is now pushing southward to wrest the hegemony of the national govern-ment from the hands of Chiang Kai- shek, who is the agent of Ameri-can in~ perialism, and also the representative of the Shanghai bour-geoisie and landlords and local commercial capitalists of the South-eastern provinces. In Feng's demand for the removal of the capital back toPeking, which hemade public through an interview with the Associated Press ( New York Times, Nov. 5), we see clearly the working of the hand of the commercial capitalists in the north. If we recall the grave economic crisis which Peking and almost the whole of North China ( except Manchuria) suffered ever since last year, owing to the removal of the capital to Nanking, we will under-stand the full significance of this demand. YEN HSI- SHAN, THE " MODE OVERNOR OF Nort e removal of the capital to ~ e k i nh~ e , sp eaks for all the Northern Chinese land-lords and capitalists, his main support comes from the Northwest. Another war lord of North China is the so- called " model governor" of Shansi- Yen Hsi- Shan. The son of a native banker and pawn broker, he ruled Shansi with semi- feudal methods, more or less suc-cessfully for eighteen years. The secret of his success, to a great extent, lies in his " village policy," by which he consolidated village organizations by conferring governmental appointments upon village elders, thus increasing their power and responsibility and bringing them closer to the higher authorities. This amounts to a conversion of the old self- governing autonomous village system into an almost military organization, which naturally greatly increased the efficiency of the governmental machinery. Here we must point out that since the so- called " villnqe eldersJ' come almost exclusively from the land-lord commercial capitalist class, the tightening up of the village organizatiorn and the increasing of the efficiency of the village gov-ernment means the ti. qlztenirig ufi of the control of the exploiting class over the exploited. Herein lies the secret of the comparatively " peace-ful and orderly" condition of Shansi. This situation cannot last 28 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA long, because, no matter how tightly and efficiently exploitation is organized, the exploited cannot always be kept down. A better means of robbery may prolong a little the grim business, but it can never be a guarantee for the perpetuation of the system of robbery. And further, partly on account of the protection afforded him by the favorable geographical position of the province, Yen Shi- Shan for many years successfully manouvered to remain outside of the various civil war combinations in the country and thus postponed his down-fall. At the brink of every civil war he walked on a precipice and every time, somehow or other, he balanced himself successfully and was saved. But the situation is becoming more critical; every addi-tional civil war deepens the contradictions in China and it is becom-ng increasingly more difficult for the " Model Governor" to hold his balance. Since 1926 he has already lost his balance twice. For-tunately for him, each time he fell in a pool of water and was saved. But there cannot be a pool of water waiting for him all the time! Those who believe that Yen Hsi- Shan is immune to the fate of all militarists in China are undoubtedly betting on a losing horse. However, this time Yen Hsi- Shan may be saved again. Although he is as conscious of the interests of the Northern landowners and bourgeoisie as his temporary ally, Feng Yu- Hsiang, and though he himself controls both Shansi and Chihili, which includes the im-portant cities of Peking and Tientsin, Yen Hsi- Shan is not unaware of the favorable position which he now occupies. He takes full advantage of the situation and is letting Feng Yu- Hsiang fight the battle for him, while he is saving his military strength for later use. Th- - e- fact that Yen Hsi- Shan did not come out openly against Chiang Kai- shek earlier does not mean that he was wavering. The hatred of the Northern landlords and comn~ ercial capitalists toward Chiang Kai- shek, their resentment of the domination of the Central Govern-ment by the Shanghai bourgeoisie, and their determination to remove the capital from Nanking back to Peking, is strong enough, I think, to bring about a temporary united front of the two leaders of the Northern ruling classes, Feng Yu- Hsiang and Yen Hsi- Shan. Recent reports that Yen Hsi- Shan, speaking as a mediator, considers Chiang Kai shek's resignation necessary as a condition for peace, and that he has refused to receive Nanking's delegates, certainly confirms this i e w . However, he is not likely to relinquish the favorable position of a " neutral" unless it becomes absolutely necessary for him to do MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 29 so. He is taking part in the struggle as an arbiter , and after the conclusion of the war, will place himself in a con~ fortables eat in the new government. 4. CONCLUSION- THE OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL WAR AND PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION I N CHINA. THE NEW GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE PRES-ENT CIVIL WAR. What will be the outcome of the war? The milita the question does not concern us much; we are not speculating about the possible victory of either side. If, however, it is a question of the nature of the new government that is likely to be organized after the war, it is not amiss to say a few words here. It is obvious that if Chiang Kai- shek comes out of the war victori-ous, he shall have to distribute the spoils not according to the shares which the various groups in the present government hold, but according to their services in this war and the respective military strength which each group or general is able to keep at the end of the war. Such a government, though necessarily different from the present government in composition, will undoubtedly follow the old political ( line of counter- revolution. If the Anti- NanHng bloc comes out victorious in the war, or if a compromise brings about a temporary peace without victory to either side, the new government will certainly continue the reactionary policy of the present Nan-king government, with possible alterations as to the regional distri-bution of power and the relative positions that various imperialist powers will hold in the new division. But the present civil war, while itself is an expression of contradictions in China, will further intensify and deepen those contradictions, and a government founded upon such a shaky basis will inevitably be less stable than its pre-decessor. A glance at the names composing the Anti- Nanking bloc is enough to convince the most optimistic observer of the storms and stress that lie ahead of its voyage. Its wrekage can fairly accurately be predicted. If it is not wrecked because of its own contradictions soon enough, the storm of the revolution will certainly blow it to pieces, and in its place a strong and sturdy ship of Soviet State will surely be established ! 30 MILITARIST WARS AN DREVOLUTION IN CHINA PRESENT CONDITIONS IN THE LABOR AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN CHINA. But there is another aspect of the question of the outcome of the civil war which is of the utmost importance. I mean the effect of the war upon the revolution. However, before entering into a dis-cussion of this question, it is necessary to examine the conditions and the tendency of development of the mass movement at the outbreak of the war. The depression in the labor movement which immediately fol-lowed the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 has long since passed away. The mass movement of protest against the Japanese massacre at Tsinan in May, 1928 ushered in a period of recovery, and the workers have shown a growing spirit of militancy ever since the Postal Strike in October, 1928. Comrade Dun Chin- shia, repre-sentative of the All- China Labor Federation in the R. I. L. U., and the best authority on the Chinese Trade Union movement, has com-piled a statistical table of the number of workers taking part in economic strikes at Shanghai, which shows that in 1928, the year following the defeat of the revolution, there were 239,000 strikers as compared with 202,000 strikers in 1926 and 230,000 in 1927. ( See the Pan- Pacific Worker, April, 1929.) This means that the number of workers taking part in economic strikes at Shanghai has actually increased instead of decreased since the last revolution. Shanghai being the industrial center of China, the facts brought out by the statistics are quite significant. In 1929 the strikes grew in extent both as to area and trades involved. In the various industrial centers such as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hongkong, workers of such varied trades as dock workers, seamen, railway men, tramway work-ers, electricians, miners, textile workers, store employees, etc., were among the strikers. In Shanghai alone, the number of strikers has varied between 10,000 and 60,000 each month. As for their de-mands, there is a growing tendency of turning more and more from economic to political demands. Strikes for purely political demands are becoming more frequent. The political clashes between the workers and the reactionary government are developing into street demonstrations. On the 30th of May this year, the fourth anniver-sar oyf the Shanghai incident, 30,000 came out on demonstration, despite police orders to the contrary, and smashed the editorial offices MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 31 of two Kuomintang papers, held up the traffic in several streets, and even made organized efforts to build barricades. In July and on the International Red Day, there were demonstrations at Shanghai, Canton, Wuchang, Tientsin, and Peking. Space does not permit me to cite more facts, but those cited above are sufficient to sh'ow the upward surge of the Chinese labor movement which has distinctly entered upon a stage of revival. Coupled with the rapid advan the workers' movement, the peasant movement is also march rward, and sometimes, with bursts of sudden fury, resembles a volcano in the initial stages of its developn~ ent. The Mohammedan Peaant uprisings in Kansu are attaining tremendous proportions, although the isolated position of the province prevents us from getting detailed information on the subject. The semi- mystical organizations of the Chinese villages, such as the " Red Spears," " Big Swords," etc., which, although of a backward character, represent genuine peasant organizations fost-ering revolt, are reviving. Guerilla warfare between various peasant detachments and government troops is increasing. The famous de-tachments under the leadership of Comrade Chu T e and Mao Tzu-tung, numbering several thousand men, are broadening and deepen-ing the agrarian revolution wherever they go. An uprising of 70,000 peasants occurred in Nimpo, the home county of Chiang Kai- shek in Chekiang province, this March. In April, Soviets were established in six villages in Finchung in Kwangtung province as the result of a peasant uprising. Yes, the slogan of the Soviet has actually pene-trated into the farthest corners of the villages, especially in South China. The strength of the slogan is already felt. In the coming revolutionary wave, this slogan is bound to play a leading role in concretizing and consolidating the victories of the workers and peasants into a Soviet state! THE RISING RE THE OP A detailed survey of the mass movements in China would require a much larger space than I have devoted to it in the above para-graphs. But what I have said is sufficient to bring out the fact that, at the outbreak of the present civil war, both the labor and peasant movements had already entered upon a very active stage and that offensive fights on the part of the masses took place in many places 32 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA and were developing both in magnitude and intensity. No matter whether Chiang Kai- shek or his reactionary rivals win the war, the greatest and most significant outcome of the war will be its effect on the developing mass movement in the country. It will undoubted-ly further deepen the economic crisis in the country and bring about a more intensified exploitation of the masses, which will, in turn, stir the masses to greater activity and a more determined struggle. I t will completely destroy the illusion of the masses in regard to the Kuomintang and the Chinese Bourgeoisie's ability to unify and stabi-lize China, and thus it will bring about a more resolute fight on the part of the masses against the Kuomintang and the ~ hinese bour-geosie. In a word, the present civil war will certainly deepen the class contradictions in China and hasten the coming of the next revolutionary wave! This, I think, will be the most important effect of the war on the Chinese revolution. This will be the most significant and far- reaching outcome of the war. Together with reports of the reactionary civil war in China, news about mass riots and the growing influence of the Comn~ unist Party also appear in the press. On October 22, the Associated Press re-ported a serious mass riot of rickshaw men which " took place through-out the city" of Peking and lasted more than three hours. On October 29th, the New York Times correspondent in Shanghai reported that " a body of 5,000 communists descended from the moun-tains" and captured the city of Bingyuan in Kwangtung. A special Inprecorr telegram to the Daily Worker reported that about 20,000 communists, under the leadership of Chu T e and Mao Tsu- tung, have recently reoccupied Hailufeng in Kwangtung. If we recall that Hailufeng is the place where the peasant movement is more devel-oped than in any other part of China and that, for more than a year, i t was the seat of a soviet government which ruled a large section of rural Kwangtung, the full significance of this development will be clear. These facts all prove that the effect of the war on the revo-lution is already felt throughout the country. The opportunists will undoubtedly underestimate the importance of these facts. They will underestimate the importance of the facts that indicate the rising of a new revolutionary wave just as they overestimated the possibility of the American imperialists and the Chinese bourgeoisie's ability to bring about unity and stabilty in China. Right after the fall of Peking and when Chiang Kai- shek at the height of his power, the opportunists maintained that era of peaceful capitalist development was dawning in China advocated opportunist tactics of retreat and moderation in the nese Communist Party. ( Pepper, et als). When the Nanking-angsi war broke out, the opportunists advanced a theory which signed to Chiang Kai- shek the role o, f a pure bourgeois, fighting progressive war against feudal reaction in China, which entirely epresented the nature and significance of the war. They would likely try to apply again this counter- revolutionary and utterly theory to the explanation of the present war. But facts un-tedly speak more eloquently and convincingly than the false eories of the opportunists, and I am confident that enough has appened since the fall of Peking to convince the class- conscious revolutionist of the true state of affairs which I try to analyze here. opportunists are deceivinw themselves by their short- sightedness. he Tenth Plenum of the Comintern, in July, Comrade Molotov correctly that " although it is too early to speak of a new revo-ry wave in China, it would be nothing short of contemptible short- sightedness to deny the growth of class contradictions in China and the fact that premises are being created for another evolutionary wave." ( Inprecori- Vol. 9, No. 49, p. 1047). Much appened since last July and subsequent facts have definitely ed the truth of Comrade Molotov's remarks. Born in con-ions, nurtured by the continuous growth of these co~ ztradic-nd spurred on ' by the roaring tide of revolution in India, the tremendous success of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and the upsurge of the international revolutionary labor movement, the new revolutionary wave in China is rising- rising much more rapidly than the opportunists are willing to believe. THE NATURE AND TASKS OF THE REVOILJTION IN CHINA. 34 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA the development of productive forces and the socialization of labor stands at a comparatively low level. This circumstance, together with the fact of foreign domination and also the presence of powerful relics of feudalism and pre- capitalist relations, determines the charac-ter of the immediate stage of the revolution in these countries. In the revolutionary movement of these countries we have to deal with the bourgeois democratic revolution, i. e., of the stage signifying the preparation of the prerequisites for proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution. Corresponding to this, the following kinds of tasks can be pointed out, which may be considered as general basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the colonies nad semi-colonies : "( a) A shifting in the relationship of forces in favor of the pro-letariat : emancipation of the country from the yoke of imperialism ( nationalization of foreign concessions, railways, banks, etc.) and the establishment of the national unity of the country where this has not yet been attained : overthrow of the power of the exploiting classes at the back of which imperialism stands; organization of Soviets of workers and peasants and organization of the Red Army; establish-ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; consolida-tion of the hegemony of the proletariat. ' ( b) The carrying through of the agrarian revolution; emanci-pation of the peasants from all pre- capitalist and colonial conditions of exploitation and bondage ; nationalization of the land ; radical measures for alleviating the position of the peasantry with the object of establishing the closest possible economic and political union be-tween the town and village. "( c) In correspondence with the further development of in-dustry, transport, etc., and with the accompanying growth of the proletariat, the widespread development of trade union organizations of the working class, strengthening of the Communist Party and its conquest of a firm leading position among the toiling masses; the achievement of the 8- hour working day. "( d) Establishment of equal rights for nationalities and of sex equality ( equal rights for women) ; separation of the church from the state and the abolition of caste distincions; political education and raising of the general cultural level of the masses in town and counry, etc. " How far the bourgeois- democratic revolution will be able in prac- MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 35 to realize all its basic tasks, and how far it will be the case that of these tasks will be carried into effect only by the socialist volution, will depend on the course of the revolutionary movement the workers and peasants and its successes or defeats in the strug-ainst the imperialists, feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. In par-the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is ted by the development of the socialist revoltuion in the capi-orld and can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of e proletariat in the leading capitalist countries." ( Inprecorr, Vol. , No. 88, p. 1665.) THE CHINE HE REVOLUTIO Vho will be the leader in stion can be answered c ice. The vanguard of the 1st Party, is the only hinese masses and will be the only leader in the coming: revolution. e Kuomintang has long since trrned counter- revokitionary. The ctionary role of the " left" Kuomintang group or Reorganization-and the " Third Party" group both of which plpiy the part of ional reformist wing of the Kuomintang, is becoming more and e clear to the masses. The possibility of a peasant party leading e revolution is out of the question because, even if we assume that h a party can be successfully organized in China, it will neces-step into the camp of reaction when the revolution develops ill never be able to lead the revolution. The lesson in the the Russian Social Revolutionaries should be sufficient to warn inese masses against entertaining any illusions regarding a y peasant party. The Chinese peasants can only win their om and liberation under the leadership of the proletariat. Only nese Communist Party, the Chinese Section of the Communist tional, the only truly revolutionary party in China, is lead- Chinese masses in their daily struggles now and is vigorously zng for the rising revolutionary wave, and only under the hip of the Chinese Communist Party can the Chinese workers peasants win the fight in the revolution! ^ à ˆ 36 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, THE AMERICAN WORK-ING CLASS, AND THE CHINESE WORKERS IN AMERICA. War is a continuation of politics. But the civil war in China is not merely a continuation of civil or internal politics. Since the Chinese civil war represents preliminary skirmishes between the im-perialist powers in the Pacific, it is also a continuation of international politics and an expression of international antagonisms. The Chinese civil war marks a step forward in the onward march of world capi-talism to its grave. It is one of the many signs which announce the accentuation of the general crisis of world capitalism, and the ap-proach of a world war. The working class of the world, especially the American working class, should not lose sight of this fact. They must not think that the Chinese civil war signifies only a maturing crisis of world capitalism in China. The same cause that brought about the present economic crisis in America, that is responsible for the revolutionary struggles in India, and in Palestine, etc., is also the cause of the civil war in China. The American working class should learn to look at the problems of the world situation as a whole. They should strongly combat the " theory" of exceptionalism which artificially builds a Chinese wall around the " good old U. S. A." The world edifice of capitalism is crashing and we should consider every crack in its process of coming down as heralding the approach-ing end of the whole edifice, rather than merely a sign of the break-ing down of an " isolated" part of the building. The connection between the Chinese revolution and the welfare of the working class of western industrial countries has been dealt with in many publications, and I will not repeat in detail what should be common knowledge to every class conscious worker. Suffice it to point out that, by holding China down to a colonial status and by thus seeking to perpetuate semi- feudal conditions in China, the ruling class of the imperialist powers is trying to keep the standard of living of the Chinese workers down to the starvation point, which will inevitably pull down the standard of living of the working class MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 3' 7 rialist countries as well. Herein lies the basis of the f interest between the workers in the colonial countries in imperialist lands. The only complete guarantee of ard of living for the workers in imperialist countries lies 1 revolution in the colonies and semi- colonies just as the guarantee for the emancipation of the colonies from imperialist yoke is the victory of the proletariat in the leading italist countries. Only through the concerted action of all can workers of both colonial and imperialist countries win a com-te victory in their fight for emancipation. are playing in the world revolution and the Chinese revolution? immediate task of the Chinese workers in America, of course, fight for every day demands. Their immediate enemy is, na-ly, their bosses, the majority of whom are Chinese capitalists. is generally believed that the Chinese in America are mostly re-ed to each other and that family ties are stronger than class divi-s so that it is very difficult to agitate among the Chinese in Amer-le not underestimating family ties and all other feudal rela-ideologies as obstacles in the way of the class struggle, it pointed out here that class consciousness among the Chinese ot as difficult to arouse as it is generally supposed. rteen or sixteen hour day and unusually low wages are strong h to break any family ties and arouse class consciousness among orkers. Contrary to the general belief that they are immune struggle, the Chinese workers in America can be proud ikes since the world war. Ten years ago there was a restaurant workers' strike. Five years ago, the Chinese tisans' League in San Francisco conducted a strike. two big strikes, Chinese workers in Los Angeles, and Philadelphia all have strikes to their credit. Recently, se laundry workers went on strike in San Francisco and won a partial victory. Increasing numbers of workers have joined American Revolutionary Unions the leadership of the T. U. U. L. There are also tions of Chinese workers in America such as the hinese Workers' Alliance which have been in existence for 38 MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA . nearly two years. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of America, the T. U. U. L. and fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Negro and white workers, the Chinese workers in America are doing their part in the militant fight against the capitalist class. The political fight of the Chinese workers in America also has a glorious past to its credit. When Chiang Kai- shek betrayed the Chinese revolution in April, 1927, the Chinese workers here led the fight against Chiang in the Kuomintang in America and con-solidated the left wing movement in this country. After the betrayal of the revolution by Wang Chin- wei and Co., the Chinese workers in America openly denounced the renegades, and, realizing that the Kuomintang banner had turned into an emblem of counter- revolu-tion, they dissolved the Kuomintang organizations under their con-trol in many cities and led the petty bourgeois elements who were still sympahizing with the revolution into an independent united front organization called " The Alliance for the Support of the Work-ers' and Peasants' Revolution in China," which is not a party but a mass organization similar to the Anti- Imperialist League. During all these fights, militant Chinese workers in America were struggling under the guidance of their only party organization, the Communist Party of America. Side by side with their Negro and white com-rades, militant Chinese workers in America have already taken up the fight for the common cause and against the common enemy, the world capitalism in general and American imperialism in particular. American imperialists have their agents in China, in the persons of the Chinese militarists, to fight for their interests, and their right to exploit and enslave the Chinese masses. But the Chinese workers and peasants also have their brothers in America, in the persons of Negro, white and yellow workers, to fight for their emancipation and independence. The fight is international and is going on in all parts of the world! The outcome is certain- the victory even-tually belongs to the working class! MILITARIST WARS AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA 39 eries of t articles in the Dail orker ( Nov. 25 to De Chapter 2 also ap d in the November iss ts Monthly. Some additions and minor revisions are made he present edition. uch water has pas hlet was en a little over a month ago, but what happened in China dur-his short interval proves t othing more than a logical ent of the shifting re1 p of social forces in China his pamphlet attempts to analyse. I think this pamphlet can e as an introduction to an understanding of the present hap-ite the complaint of some ending enough money to n imperialists have not he help of American m n " advisers," Chiang Ka hen, according to Chiang's own admission, the fate of Nan- ' hanging on a hair." Now Chiang Kai- shek is again play-ro who has '( unified" China and is making a fresh gesture about administrative " reforms" and " reconstructing" . Here it is important to point out that it is not an at the news of the '( victory" of Chiang Kai- shek and the the report of the Kemmerer Commission in China came at time. American imperialism's strong support of Chiang to the Improvement and Sustainance Fund of " THE CHINES- E VANGUARD Organ of the All- American Alliance for the Support of Chinese Worker- peasant Revolution and the ONLY Chinese weekly that fighte against a dozen of reac-tionary Chinese dailies in this Continent and mobilizes Chinese workers in America for the support of the Chinese and World revolutionary movement. 1. Send subscriptions to your Chinese friends as New Year gifts. 2. Rush money to: " THE CHINESE VANGUARD" 26- 28 Union Square New York City 1 year ............... $ 2.00 Subscription Rates: 6 months ......... 1.25 3 months Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Doonping, Richard Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived New York : Chinese Vanguard Publ. Co. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/7/2007 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0005 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 1930 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/e17d7a2a0f7d2d88cc76613c23eb4914.pdf 770c74406f1ba1e26312cfbb06757ee3 https://ideasproject.org/files/original/84cd9a4a827fb1542bbd2a39cf148cfc.pdf 770c74406f1ba1e26312cfbb06757ee3 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hugh Dean East Asian Pamphlet Collection Description An account of the resource The Hugh Dean Collection consists of East Asian pamphlets, most relating to China during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Each pamphlet is downloadable as a PDF file, and full text searchable. The collection also includes a series of postcard views of historic sites in Japan. Still Image A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials. Physical Dimensions The actual physical size of the original image 79 p. ; 19 cm Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Red Hands on China Subject The topic of the resource Politics and Government - Military; Communist Party; Soviet Union Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource anonymous Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived London and Derby: Benrose and Sons Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007-14-07 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Lewis and Clark College Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This image is available for educational and research purposes, provided due recognition is given to the author. Transmission or reproduction of protected items beyond fair use requires the permission of Lewis & Clark College. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource eng Type The nature or genre of the resource pamphlet Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context lc0004 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant China China - Republic of China 1911 - 1949 [1927]?